# NC – Combo

#### To act ethically, humans must unify their reasons with their values to properly orient themselves towards the good—educational institutions have an obligation to take explicit stances against unjust sentiments.

Lewis 43 The Abolition of Man 1943 <https://archive.org/stream/TheAbolitionOfMan_229/C.s.Lewis-TheAbolitionOfMan_djvu.txt> NP

But I doubt whether Gaius and Titius have really planned, under cover of teaching English, to propagate their philosophy. I think they have slipped into it for the following reasons. In the first place, literary criticism is difficult, and what they actually do is very much easier. To explain why a bad treatment of some basic human emotion is bad literature is, if we exclude all question-begging attacks on the emotion itself, a very hard thing to do. Even Dr Richards, who first seriously tackled the problem of badness in literature, failed, I think, to do it. To 'debunk' the emotion, on the basis of a commonplace rationalism, is within almost anyone's capacity. In the second place, I think Gaius and Titius may have honestly misunderstood the pressing educational need of the moment. They see the world around them swayed by emotional propaganda—they have learned from tradition that youth is sentimental—and they conclude that the best thing they can do is to fortify the minds of young people against emotion. My own experience as a teacher tells an opposite tale. For every one pupil who needs to be guarded from a weak excess of sensibility there are three who need to be awakened from the slumber of cold vulgarity. The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defence against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. For famished nature will be avenged and a hard heart is no infallible protection against a soft head. But there is a third, and a profounder, reason for the procedure which Gaius and Titius adopt. They may be perfectly ready to admit that a good education should build some sentiments while destroying others. They may endeavour to do so. But it is impossible that they should succeed. Do what they will, it is the 'debunking' side of their work, and this side alone, which will really tell. In order to grasp this necessity clearly I must digress for a moment to show that what may be called the educational predicament of Gaius and Titius is different from that of all their predecessors. Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt. The reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more 'just' or 'ordinate' or 'appropriate' to it than others. And he believed (correctly) that the tourists thought the same. The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions. But for this claim there would be nothing to agree or disagree about. To disagree with This is pretty if those words simply described the lady's feelings, would be absurd: if she had said I feel sick Coleridge would hardly have replied No; I feel quite well. When Shelley, having compared the human sensibility to an Aeolian lyre, goes on to add that it differs from a lyre in having a power of 'internal adjustment' whereby it can 'accommodate its chords to the motions of that which strikes them',9 he is assuming the same belief. 'Can you be righteous', asks Traherne, 'unless you be just in rendering to things their due esteem? All things were made to be yours and you were made to prize them according to their value.'10St Augustine defines virtue as ordo amoris, the ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it.11 Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.12 When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in 'ordinate affections' or 'just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in Ethics; but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science.13 Plato before him had said the same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful.14 In the Republic, the well-nurtured youth is one 'who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in ill-made works of man or ill- grown works of nature, and with a just distaste would blame and hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man of gentle heart. All this before [s]he is of an age to reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, [s]he will hold out his hands in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her.'15 In early Hinduism that conduct in men which can be called good consists in conformity to, or almost participation in, the Rta—that great ritual or pattern of nature and supernature which is revealed alike in the cosmic order, the moral virtues, and the ceremonial of the temple. Righteousness, correctness, order, the Rta, is constantly identified with satya or truth, correspondence to reality. As Plato said that the Good was 'beyond existence' and Wordsworth that through virtue the stars were strong, so the Indian masters say that the gods themselves are born of the Rta and obey it.16 The Chinese also speak of a great thing (the greatest thing) called the Tao. It is the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar.'^ 'In ritual', say the Analects, 'it is harmony with Nature that is prized.'"^ The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being 'true'.'' This conception in all its forms, Platonic, AristoteUan, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as 'the Tao'. Some of the accounts of it which I have quoted will seem, perhaps, to many of you merely quaint or even magical. But what is common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, the behef that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or fihal emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. I myself do not enjoy the society of small children: because I speak from within the Tao I recognize this as a defect in myself — just as a man may have to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind. And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it. Over against this stands the world of The Green Book. In it the very possibility of a sentiment being reasonable — or even unreasonable — has been excluded from the outset. It can be reasonable or unreasonable only if it conforms or fails to conform to something else. To say that the cataract is sublime means saying that our emotion of humility is appropriate or ordinate to the reality, and thus to speak of something else besides the emotion; just as to say that a shoe fits is to speak not only of shoes but of feet. But this reference to something beyond the emotion is what Gaius and Titius exclude from every sentence containing a predicate of value. Such statements, for them, refer solely to the emotion. Now the emotion, thus considered by itself, cannot be either in agreement or disagreement with Reason. It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational: it does not rise even to the dignity of error. On this view, the world of facts, without one trace of value, and the world of feeUngs, without one trace of truth or falsehood, justice or injustice, confront one another, and no rapprochement is possible. Hence the educational problem is wholly different according as you stand within or without the Tao. For those within, the task is to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not, and in making which the very nature of man consists. Those without, if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all sentiments, as far as possible, from the pupil's mind; or else to encourage some sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic 'justness' or 'ordinacy'. The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating in others by 'suggestion' or incantation a mirage which their own reason has successfully dissipated. Perhaps this will become clearer if we take a concrete instance. When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion which he himself shared and which he beUeved to be in accord with the value which his judgement discerned in noble death. He was giving the boy the best he had, giving of his spirit to humanize him as he had given of his body to beget him. But Gaius and Titius cannot believe that in calling such a death sweet and seemly they would be saying 'something important about something'. Their own method of debunking would cry out against them if they attempted to do so. For death is not something to eat and therefore cannot be duke in the literal sense, and it is unlikely that the real sensations preceding it will be dulce even by analogy. And as for decorum — that is only a word describing how some other people will feel about your death when they happen to think of it, which won't be often, and will certainly do you no good. There are only two courses open to Gaius and Titius. Either they must go the whole way and debunk this sentiment like any other, or must set themselves to work to produce, from outside, a sentiment which they believe to be of no value to the pupil and which may cost him his life, because it is useful to us (the survivors) that our young men should feel it. If they embark on this course the difference between the old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions'. The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds — making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation — men transmitting manhood to men; the new is merely propaganda. It is to their credit that Gaius and Titius embrace the first alternative. Propaganda is their abomination: not because their own philosophy gives a ground for condemning it (or anything else) but because they are better than their principles. They probably have some vague notion (I will examine it in my next lecture) that valour and good faith and justice could be sufficiently commended to the pupil on what they would call 'rational' or 'biological' or 'modern' grounds, if it should ever become necessary. In the meantime, they leave the matter alone and get on with the business of debunking. But this course, though less inhuman, is not less disastrous than the opposite alternative of cynical propaganda. Let us suppose for a moment that the harder virtues could really be theoretically justified with no appeal to objective value. It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a [person] man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe that 'a gentleman does not cheat', than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as Gaius and Titius would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'. ^o The head rules the belly through the chest — the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity,^! of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment — these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. It is an outrage that they should be commonly spoken of as Intellectuals. This gives them the chance to say that he who attacks them attacks Intelligence. It is not so. They are not distinguished from other men by any unusual skill in finding truth nor any virginal ardour to pursue her. Indeed it would be strange if they were: a persevering devotion to truth, a nice sense of intellectual honour, cannot be long maintained without the aid of a sentiment which Gaius and Titius could debunk as easily as any other. It is not excess of thought but defect of fertile and generous emotion that marks them out. Their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so. And all the time — such is the tragi-comedy of our situation — we continue to clamour for those very qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more 'drive', or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or 'creativity'. In a sort of ghastly simpUcity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful. The practical result of education in the spirit of The Green Book must be the destruction of the society which accepts it. But this is not necessarily a refutation of subjectivism about values as a theory. The true doctrine might be a doctrine which if we accept we die. No one who speaks from within the Tao could reject it on that account: 'εν δε φαει και 'δλεσσου. But it has not yet come to that. There are theoretical difficulties in the philosophy of Gaius and Titius However subjective they may be about some traditional values, Gaius and Titius have shown by the very act of writing The Green Book that there must be some other values about which they are not subjective at all. They write in order to produce certain states of mind in the rising generation, if not because they think those states of mind intrinsically just or good, yet certainly because they think them to be the means to some state of society which they regard as desirable. It would not be difficult to collect from various passages in The Green Book what their ideal is. But we need not. The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical in intention) is written to no purpose. And **this end must have real value** in their eyes. To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake. And this time they could not maintain that 'good' simply described their own emotion about it. For the whole purpose of their book is so to condition theyoung reader that he will share their approval, and this would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they held that their approval was in some way valid or correct. In actual fact Gaius and Titius will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whole system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars.1 Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process. They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited taboos, in order that 'real' or 'basic' values may emerge. I will now try to find out what happens if this is seriously attempted. Let us continue to use the previous example—that of death for a good cause—not, of course, because virtue is the only value or martyrdom the only virtue, but because this is the experimentum crucis which shows different systems of thought in the clearest light. Let us suppose that an Innovator in values regards dulce et decorum and greater love hath no man as mere irrational sentiments which are to be stripped off in order that we may get down to the 'realistic' or 'basic' ground of this value. Where will he find such a ground? First of all, he might say that the real value lay in the utility of such sacrifice to the community. 'Good', he might say, 'means what is useful to the community.' But of course the death of the community is not useful to the community—only the death of some of its members. What is really meant is that the death of some men is useful to other men. That is very true. But on what ground are some men being asked to die for the benefit of others? Every appeal to pride, honour, shame, or love is excluded by hypothesis. To use these would be to return to sentiment and the Innovator's task is, having cut all that away, to explain to men, in terms of pure reasoning, why they will be well advised to die that others may live. He may say 'Unless some of us risk death all of us are certain to die.' But that will be true only in a limited number of cases; and even when it is true it provokes the very reasonable counter question 'Why should I be one of those who take the risk?' At this point the Innovator may ask why, after all, selfishness should be more 'rational' or 'intelligent' than altruism. The question is welcome. If by Reason we mean the process actually employed by Gaius and Titius when engaged in debunking (that is, the connecting by inference of propositions, ultimately derived from sense data, with further propositions), then the answer must be that a refusal to sacrifice oneself is no more rational than a consent to do so. And no less rational. Neither choice is rational—or irrational—at all. From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn. This will preserve society cannot lead to do this except by the mediation of society ought to be preserved. This will cost you your life cannot lead directly to do not do this: it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. The Innovator is trying to get a[n] conclusion in the imperative mood out of premisses in the indicative mood: and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succeed, for the thing is impossible. We must therefore either extend the word Reason to include what our ancestors called Practical Reason and confess that judgements such as society ought to be preserved (though they can support themselves by no reason of the sort that Gaius and Titius demand) are not mere sentiments but are rationality itself; or else we must give up at once, and for ever, the attempt to find a core of 'rational' value behind all the sentiments we have debunked. The Innovator will not take the first alternative, for practical principles known to all men by Reason are simply the Tao which he has set out to supersede. He is more likely to give up the quest for a 'rational' core and to hunt for some other ground even more 'basic' and 'realistic'. This he will probably feel that he has found in Instinct. The preservation of society, and of the species itself, are ends that do not hang on the precarious thread of Reason: they are [Is] given by Instinct. That is why there is no need to argue against the man who does not acknowledge them. We have an instinctive urge to preserve our own species. That is why men ought to work for posterity. We have no instinctive urge to keep promises or to respect individual life: that is why scruples of justice and humanity—in fact the Tao—can be properly swept away when they conflict with our real end, the preservation of the species. That, again, is why the modern situation permits and demands a new sexual morality: the old taboos served some real purpose in helping to preserve the species, but contraceptives have modified this and we can now abandon many of the taboos. For of course sexual desire, being instinctive, is to be gratified whenever it does not conflict with the preservation of the species. It looks, in fact, as if an ethics based on instinct will give the Innovator all he wants and nothing that he does not want. In reality we have not advanced one step. I will not insist on the point that Instinct is a name for we know not what (to say that migratory birds find their way by instinct is only to say that we do not know how migratory birds find their way), for I think it is here being used in a fairly definite sense, to mean an unreflective or spontaneous impulse widely felt by the members of a given species. In what way does Instinct, thus conceived, help us to find 'real' values? Is it maintained that we must obey Instinct, that we cannot do otherwise? But if so, why are Green Books and the like written? Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going? Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable? Or is it maintained that if we do obey Instinct we shall be happy and satisfied? But the very question we are considering was that of facing death which (so far as the Innovator knows) cuts off every possible satisfaction: and if we have an instinctive desire for the good of posterity then this desire, by the very nature of the case, can never be satisfied, since its aim is achieved, if at all, when we are dead. It looks very much as if the Innovator would have to say not that we must obey Instinct, nor that it will satisfy us to do so, but that we ought to obey it.2 But why ought we to obey Instinct? Is there another instinct of a higher order directing us to do so, and a third of a still higher order directing us to obey it?—an infinite regress of instincts? This is presumably impossible, but nothing else will serve. From the statement about psychological fact 'I have an impulse to do so and so' we cannot by any ingenuity derive the practical principle 'I ought to obey this impulse'. Even if it were true that men had a spontaneous, unreflective impulse to sacrifice their own lives for the preservation of their fellows, it remains a quite separate question whether this is an impulse they should control or one they should indulge. For even the Innovator admits that many impulses (those which conflict with the preservation of the species) have to be controlled. And this admission surely introduces us to a yet more fundamental difficulty. Telling us to obey Instinct is like telling us to obey 'people'. People say different things: so do instincts. Our instincts are at war. If it is held that the instinct for preserving the species should always be obeyed at the expense of other instincts, whence do we derive this rule of precedence? To listen to that instinct speaking in its own cause and deciding it in its own favour would be rather simple-minded. Each instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of all the rest. By the very act of listening to one rather than to others we have already prejudged the case. If we did not bring to the examination of our instincts a knowledge of their comparative dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged; or, if he is, the decision is worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-preservation or sexual appetite. The idea that, without appealing to any court higher than the instincts themselves, we can yet find grounds for preferring one instinct above its fellows dies very hard. We grasp at useless words: we call it the 'basic', or 'fundamental', or 'primal', or 'deepest' instinct. It is of no avail. Either these words conceal a value judgement passed upon the instinct and therefore not derivable from it, or else they merely record its felt intensity, the frequency of its operation and its wide distribution. If the former, the whole attempt to base value upon instinct has been abandoned: if the latter, these observations about the quantitative aspects of a psychological event lead to no practical conclusion. It is the old dilemma. Either the premisses already concealed an imperative or the conclusion remains merely in the indicative.3 Finally, it is worth inquiry whether there is any instinct to care for posterity or preserve the species. I do not discover it in myself: and yet I am a man rather prone to think of remote futurity—a man who can read Mr Olaf Stapledon with delight. Much less do I find it easy to believe that the majority of people who have sat opposite me in buses or stood with me in queues feel an unreflective impulse to do anything at all about the species, or posterity. Only people educated in a particular way have ever had the idea 'posterity' before their minds at all. It is difficult to assign to instinct our attitude towards an object which exists only for reflective men. What we have by nature is an impulse to preserve our own children and grandchildren; an impulse which grows progressively feebler as the imagination looks forward and finally dies out in the 'deserts of vast futurity'. No parents who were guided by this instinct would dream for a moment of setting up the claims of their hypothetical descendants against those of the baby actually crowing and kicking in the room. Those of us who accept the Tao may, perhaps, say that they ought to do so: but that is not open to those who treat instinct as the source of value. As we pass from mother love to rational planning for the future we are passing away from the realm of instinct into that of choice and reflection: and if instinct is the source of value, planning for the future ought to be less respectable and less obligatory than the baby language and cuddling of the fondest mother or the most fatuous nursery anecdotes of a doting father. If we are to base ourselves upon instinct, these things are the substance, and care for posterity the shadow—the huge, flickering shadow of the nursery happiness cast upon the screen of the unknown future. I do not say this projection is a bad thing: but then I do not believe that instinct is the ground of value judgements. What is absurd is to claim that your care for posterity finds its justification in instinct and then flout at every turn the only instinct on which it could be supposed to rest, tearing the child almost from the breast to creche and kindergarten in the interests of progress and the coming race. The truth finally becomes apparent that neither in any operation with factual propositions nor in any appeal to instinct can the Innovator find the basis for a system of values. None of the principles he requires are to be found there: but they are all to be found somewhere else. 'All within the four seas are his brothers' (xii. 5) says Confucius of the Chün-tzu, the cuor gentil or gentleman. Humani nihil a me alienum puto says the Stoic. 'Do as you would be done by,' says Jesus. 'Humanity is to be preserved,' says Locke.4 All the practical principles behind the Innovator's case for posterity, or society, or the species, are there from time immemorial in the Tao. But they are nowhere else. Unless you accept these without question as being to the world of action what axioms are to the world of theory, you can have no practical principles whatever. You cannot reach them as conclusions: they are premisses. You may, since they can give no 'reason' for themselves of a kind to silence Gaius and Titius, regard them as sentiments: but then you must give up contrasting 'real' or 'rational' value with sentimental value. All value will be sentimental; and you must confess (on pain of abandoning every value) that all sentiment is not 'merely' subjective. You may, on the other hand, regard them as rational—nay as rationality itself—as things so obviously reasonable that they neither demand nor admit proof. But then you must allow that Reason can be practical, that an ought must not be dismissed because it cannot produce some is as its credential. If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved. Similarly if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all. To some it will appear that I have merely restored under another name what they always meant by basic or fundamental instinct. But much more than a choice of words is involved. The Innovator attacks traditional values (the Tao) in defence of what he at first supposes to be (in some special sense) 'rational' or 'biological' values. But as we have seen, all the values which he uses in attacking the Tao, and even claims to be substituting for it, are themselves derived from the Tao. If he had really started from scratch, from right outside the human tradition of value, no jugglery could have advanced him an inch towards the conception that a man should die for the community or work for posterity. If the Tao falls, all his own conceptions of value fall with it. Not one of them can claim any authority other than that of the Tao. Only by such shreds of the Tao as he has inherited is he enabled even to attack it. The question therefore arises what title he has to select bits of it for acceptance and to reject others. For if the bits he rejects have no authority, neither have those he retains: if what he retains is valid, what he rejects is equally valid too. The Innovator, for example, rates high the claims of posterity. He cannot get any valid claim for posterity out of instinct or (in the modern sense) reason. He is really deriving our duty to posterity from the Tao; our duty to do good to all men is an axiom of Practical Reason, and our duty to do good to our descendants is a clear deduction from it. But then, in every form of the Tao which has come down to us, side by side with the duty to children and descendants lies the duty to parents and ancestors. By what right do we reject one and accept the other? Again, the Innovator may place economic value first. To get people fed and clothed is the great end, and in pursuit of its scruples about justice and good faith may be set aside. The Tao of course agrees with him about the importance of getting the people fed and clothed. Unless the Innovator were himself using the Tao he could never have learned of such a duty. But side by side with it in the Tao lie those duties of justice and good faith which he is ready to debunk. What is his warrant? He may be a Jingoist, a Racialist, an extreme nationalist, who maintains that the advancement of his own people is the object to which all else ought to yield. But no kind of factual observation and no appeal to instinct will give him a ground for this option. Once more, he is in fact deriving it from the Tao: a duty to our own kin, because they are our own kin, is a part of traditional morality. But side by side with it in the Tao, and limiting it, lie the inflexible demands of justice, and the rule that, in the long run, all men are our brothers. Whence comes the Innovator's authority to pick and choose? Since I can see no answer to these questions, I draw the following conclusions. This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) 'ideologies', all consist of fragments from the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. If my duty to my parents is a superstition, then so is my duty to posterity. If justice is a superstition, then so is my duty to my country or my race. If the pursuit of scientific knowledge is a real value, then so is conjugal fidelity. The rebellion of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if the[y] rebels could succeed they would find that they had destroyed themselves. The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in. Does this mean, then, that no progress in our perceptions of value can ever take place? That we are bound down for ever to an unchanging code given once for all? And is it, in any event, possible to talk of obeying what I call the Tao? If we lump together, as I have done, the traditional moralities of East and West, the Christian, the Pagan, and the Jew, shall we not find many contradictions and some absurdities? I admit all this. Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development, is required. But there are two very different kinds of criticism. A theorist about language may approach his native tongue, as it were from outside, regarding its genius as a thing that has no claim on him and advocating wholesale alterations of its idiom and spelling in the interests of commercial convenience or scientific accuracy. That is one thing. A great poet, who has 'loved, and been well nurtured in, his mother tongue', may also make great alterations in it, but his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the language itself: he works from within. The language which suffers, has also inspired the changes. That is a different thing—as different as the works of Shakespeare are from Basic English. It is the difference between alteration from within and alteration from without: between the organic and the surgical. In the same way, the Tao admits development from within. There is a difference between a real moral advance and a mere innovation. From the Confucian 'Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you' to the Christian 'Do as you would be done by' is a real advance. The morality of Nietzsche is a mere innovation. The first is an advance because no one who did not admit the validity of the old maxim could see reason for accepting the new one, and anyone who accepted the old would at once recognize the new as an extension of the same principle. If he rejected it, he would have to reject it as a superfluity, something that went too far, not as something simply heterogeneous from his own ideas of value. But the Nietzschean ethic can be accepted only if we are ready to scrap traditional morals as a mere error and then to put ourselves in a position where we can find no ground for any value judgements at all. It is the difference between a man who says to us: 'You like your vegetables moderately fresh; why not grow your own and have them perfectly fresh?' and a man who says, 'Throw away that loaf and try eating bricks and centipedes instead.' Those who understand the spirit of the Tao and who have been led by that spirit can modify it in directions which that spirit itself demands. Only they can know what those directions are. The outsider knows nothing about the matter. His attempts at alteration, as we have seen, contradict themselves. So far from being able to harmonize discrepancies in its letter by penetration to its spirit, he merely snatches at some one precept, on which the accidents of time and place happen to have riveted his attention, and then rides it to death—for no reason that he can give. From within the Tao itself comes the only authority to modify the Tao. This is what Confucius meant when he said 'With those who follow a different Way it is useless to take counsel'.5 This is why Aristotle said that only those who have been well brought up can usefully study ethics: to the corrupted man, the man who stands outside the Tao, the very starting point of this science is invisible.6 He may be hostile, but he cannot be critical: he does not know what is being discussed. This is why it was also said 'This people that knoweth not the Law is accursed'7 and 'He that believeth not shall be damned'.8 An open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful. But an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or of Practical Reason is [stupid] idiocy. If a man's mind is open on these things, let his mouth at least be shut. He can say nothing to the purpose. Outside the Tao there is no ground for criticizing either the Tao or anything else. In particular instances it may, no doubt, be a matter of some delicacy to decide where the legitimate internal criticism ends and the fatal external kind begins. But wherever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we have taken the wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavours to show that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really embody the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal attack 'Why?'—'What good does it do?'—'Who said so?' is never permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values at all can justify themselves on that level. If you persist in that kind of trial you will destroy all values, and so destroy the bases of your own criticism as well as the thing criticized. You must not hold a pistol to the head of the Tao. Nor must we postpone obedience to a precept until its credentials have been examined. Only those who are practising the Tao will understand it. It is the well-nurtured man, the cuor gentil, and he alone, who can recognize Reason when it comes.9 It is Paul, the Pharisee, the man 'perfect as touching the Law' who learns where and how that Law was deficient.10 In order to avoid misunderstanding, I may add that though I myself am a Theist, and indeed a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism. I am simply arguing that if we are to have values at all we must accept the ultimate platitudes of Practical Reason as having absolute validity: that any attempt, having become sceptical about these, to reintroduce value lower down on some supposedly more 'realistic' basis, is doomed. Whether this position implies a supernatural origin for the Tao is a question I am not here concerned with.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the Ordo Amoris, defined as correctly orienting our love and appreciation.

Impact calc: A) Finding the correct orientation of love is hierarchical, not aggregative – if its wrong to betray three friends for money, it is equally wrong to betray a single friend for that price, B) Understanding the good is like understanding beauty. You can appreciate beauty without clearly definining it in the abstract – lack of abstract categorization does not undermine its existence.

#### My thesis is that educational institution ought not value untrammeled freedom of expression – rather, they should become environments that evoke a deeper notion of freedom that allow individuals to best know the good.

#### The good proper to university education is different from those goods proper to the public square. University is fundamentally concerned with the development of expertize and the goods of discipline, not discipleship.

#### **Post**, Robert. “Academic Freedom and the Constitution.” in Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan R. Cole (Eds.), *Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?* (New York: Columbia University Press)

“**The** U.S. **Supreme Court has** since and frequently **proclaimed** that “**it** is **the purpose of the First Amendment** **to** **preserve a**n uninhibited **marketplace of ideas** in which truth will ultimately prevail**.**” There is a general belief in constitutional circles that the point of the First Amendment doctrine is to “advance knowledge and the search for truth by fostering a free marketplace of ideas and an ‘uninhibited, robust, wide-open debate on public issues.” Indeed, ‘the most influential argument supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.” The premise of the marketplace of ideas is that truth will emerge from the clash of conflicting opinions. The theory of the marketplace of ideas therefore deploys First Amendment doctrine to prevent the state from interfering in the free flow of public discussion. **It permits** the **regulation** of speech **only when the state** can **meet** a strict “requirement of **viewpoint neutrality.**” Courts pursuing the ideal of the marketplace of ideas apply “the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its context.” A doctrinal structure of **this** nature **is in fundamental tension with** the forms of **disciplinary knowledge** that underlie academic freedom of research and publication**.** The point of the professional ideal of academic freedom is to ensure that **universities are organized to** advance their mission of **produc**ing **expert, disciplinary knowledge.** **But** **if**, as the theory of **the marketplace of ideas** holds, “the First Amendment **recognizes no** such thing as a ‘**false’ idea**," **then it cannot** **sustain,** or even tolerate, the disciplinary practices necessary to sustain the truth claims to which the ideal of **expert knowledge** aspires**.** Not only is the theory of the marketplace of ideas incompatible with ordinary judgments that universities must continuously make to identity and promote “competence,” **it is also incompatible with the** forms of social **order our society** ordinarily **uses to produce professional knowledge.** Expert knowledge is produced by disciplines, and as the Oxford English Dictionary reminds us, disciplinary refers to “the training of scholars or subordinates to proper and orderly action by instructing and exercising them.” **Disciplines are not organized according to market** or even democratic **principles.** For example, disciplines commonly use professional journals to serve as gatekeepers for the recognition and distribution of knowledge. Journals could not perform this function if they were required to operate according to the theory of the marketplace of ideas. If disciplinary journals were forced by constitutional doctrine to accept all manuscripts on a first-come, first-served basis, or if they were constitutionally prohibited from engaging in the content discrimination required to distinguish good from poor submissions, they could no longer serve as disciplinary gatekeepers for the recognition and distribution of knowledge. If a marketplace of ideas model were to be imposed upon Nature or the American Economic Review or The Lancet, such publications would very rapidly lose their capacity to authoritatively register what we do and do not know about the world. I do not mean to deny that scholars in the arts, humanities, and sciences sometimes possess powerful personal charisma. My point is rather that the creation of disciplinary knowledge—**the kind of knowledge that justifies modern universities** and therefore also the professional ideal of academic freedom—**requires the maintenance of disciplinary authority.** Disciplinary authority rests on forms of discrimination incompatible with the marketplace of ideas. It is simply a confusion to believe the marketplace of ideas can generate doctrine remotely compatible with modern university practices. If the constitutional concept of academic freedom is to be justified, therefore, it cannot be by the theory of the marketplace of ideas. Instead we need a constitutional rationale that can validate simultaneous commitments to critical freedom and to rigorous disciplinary standards of judgment.55 **Universities cannot fulfill their social function unless they are authorized to evaluate** scholarly **speech based upon its content** and professional quality**.** No doubt if the New York Times were to editorialize that the moon is made of green cheese, the First Amendment, deploying the concept of the marketplace of ideas, would prohibit government from imposing any sanction. Yet no astronomy department could survive if it were constitutionally prohibited from denying tenure to young scholars who were similarly convinced. It is no wonder that the constitutional doctrine of academic freedom lies in shambles: it is justified by a theory that is incompatible with the mission of the modern university.

#### Valuing and creating space for expertise is critical to the FW. Truth is a primary good, and expertize is thus nothing more nor less than to be fully and rightly oriented towards the good. Also outweighs on inherency. Universities are the unique space in public systems for the inculcation of respect for expertise.

#### And the implication is that requiring free-speech on colleges is wrong, instead we should defer to professional standards set by the university as the expert institution.

**Simpson**, Robert **and** **Srinivasan Forthcoming**, Amia. *Academic Freedom* (ed. J. Lackey, In Oxford University Press). <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_&_Writing_files/No%20Platforming_FINAL.pdf>

In addition, **the communicative norms** and practices **of universities** also **give recognized** disciplinary **experts –** that is, academic faculty – various kinds of **control over** the **speech** of others,as is necessarytocreate anduphold the intellectual rigors of, and thus promote the epistemic aims of, their disciplines. **In the public square we can tolerate the speech of** flat-earth cranks, **shills paid to undermine climate science,** and revisionist historians who espouse conspiratorial misreadings of the evidence. As long as they don’t harass anyone we let them say their piece. 22 **But such** people **are not** owed the opportunity **to** teach History 101 or **publish in scientific journals**, any more than they are owed a platform to address parliament or a corporate board meeting**.** More specifically, **it is permissible for** disciplinary **gatekeepers** **to exclude** cranks and shills fromvaluablecommunicative platforms **in academic contexts, because** good **teaching** and research **requires** thatcommunicative **privileges be given** to some and not others, **based on** people’sdisciplinary **competence.** In short, academic disciplines amplify the speech of experts and routinely silence or marginalize the speech of others. Faculty set the curriculum, and students work within it. The professoriate – not students or the general public – decides which researchers have earned doctoral credentials. Editors of academic journals and presses exercise discretionary judgment to decide whose work will be published. As Post says, **academic expertise is supported by** such practices, which are not just about the freedom to inquire, but also about “affirmative **disciplinary virtues** of methodological care**”, t**he maintenance of **which “**quite **contradicts the** egalitarian tolerance that defines the **marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment”** (2013: vii)**.** And thus, whereas in free speech “there is an equality of status in the field of ideas”, the pursuit of knowledge in academia demands an inequality of status in ideas; it requires “practices that seek to separate true ideas from false ones” (Ibid: 9-10). The university would largely be a waste of time for teachers and students, and its subsidization a waste of resourcesfor the rest of society, were things to be otherwise. In short,communicative practices inuniversities are not governed by the general liberal precepts that regulate communication in the public square, and when universities do restrict speakers and viewpoints this should not be, and indeed is not, based solely (or even primarily) on purely procedural standards aimed at harm-prevention. Given that no platforming is a practice that takes place in universities, our question should be whether it is compatible with norms of academic freedom in particular, where these norms are understood as distinct from general liberal principles of free speech. Granted, some of the speaking engagements that no platformers target – like commencement addresses, or talks at student societies – are not immediately linked to the teaching and research activities that principles of academic freedom are there to safeguard. But principles of academic freedom are an appropriate reference point all the same, because such speaking events are an important part of the cultural and institutional backdrop against which teaching and research activities are conducted. The norms governing these communicative events – as well as attempts to interfere with them – should therefore be guided by consideration of how they affect the university’s core academic activities. What principles of academic freedom are primarily there to uphold, on the understanding we have sketched above, is a certain kind of independence: independence in the exercise of technical expertise in teaching and research from the control of outside actors, like governments, businesses,and administrators, who might try to force individuals or departments into “promulgating particular views” instead of “sustaining the ongoing scholarly discipline by which knowledge is identified and expanded” (Ibid: 89). The aim of these principles is to ensure, for instance, that donors cannot get professors fired for criticising foreign governments, that corporations cannot buy influence to quash research that threatens their commercial interests, that governments cannot gag scientists whose research reveals dangers created by government policies, and that administrative staff cannot force teachers to modify their syllabi based on the management’s ideas about what should be taught. In securing all these protections, though, to reiterate, principles of academic freedom do not guarantee teachers or students (or anyone else) participation in a wide-open discussion of ideas. On the contrary, **the standards of expertise** that govern teaching and research **are compatible with** all sorts of **content-based restrictions** on communication**.** What principles of academic freedom are meant to ensure is that such constraints are imposed by credentialed disciplinary experts, not outsiders, and that such constraints serve the promotion of disciplinary knowledge, not some ulterior agenda (Ibid: 85-93). Why should we regard the above as a liberal conception of academic freedom? Post’s answer is roughly as follows. Free people cannot justifiably be subject to the brute authority of elites. Government must involve the people governing themselves in order to be legitimate. For Post, this follows from a broader theory of free speech grounded in the idea of open democratic participation as an essential requirement of democratic legitimacy (Post 1990, 2011). The realization of self-government is not just a matter of a society having formally democratic electoral and parliamentary institutions. This ideal also requires (i) that everyone should be at liberty to par- ticipate in the public discourse that underpins democratic decisions, and (ii) that everyone should have access to the knowledge and information necessary for well-informed judgements about how we ought to be governed. 23 Principles of free speech, which safeguard disliked views against viewpoint-based restriction in the public square, serve the first requirement of open access and participation. Principles of academic freedom, by contrast, serve the second requirement. In order that everyone should have access to the information necessary for informed judgements about issues of public concern, societies need specialized institutions – including an independent university sector – devoted to the creation and dissemination of expert knowledge. 24 Post’s account of academic freedom is not the only one available. There are deflationary account like the one suggested by Stanley Fish (2014), which say that academic freedom is little more than a demand by academics that they be allowed to do their job however they like. Principles of academic freedom, thus understood, have little normative purchase on anyone besides the academics whose interests they serve. There are also accounts that characterize academic freedom as a specific institutional expression of a more general political principle of freedom of thought, instead of something grounded in – and thus potentially limited by – claims about the authoritative privileges of experts in academic disciplines (e.g. Bromwich 2015). It is also worth noting that principles of academic freedom come in different forms, and with different historical underpinnings, in different jurisdictions (see Barendt 2010). Post’s account of academic freedom is linked to broader principles of American constitutional law, and its conception of liberal democracy might be seen as idiosyncratic by liberals in other cultural contexts. In any case, our argument isn’t that Post’s account of academic freedom is clearly superior to all other rival accounts that might be offered. Our point is that Post presents a credible account of academic freedom, located squarely within a liberal politics, and one which opens up a way to see no platforming as in principle consonant with a liberal understanding of the university’s mission and nature. It is no intrinsic affront to the intellectual culture of the university, on this view, that a person should be deprived of a platform to express her views because of a negative appraisal of her credibility or the content of her views. Principles of academic freedom of the kind that Post defends can permit such exclusion, provided that it respects and supports the independent exercise of disciplinary expertise in teaching and research. Of course this does not yet entail that all or even most instances of no platforming will receive the liberal’s approval. What it shows is how such approval can be merited. In at least some cases, there is reason to think that the no platforming of a particular speaker would positively contribute to an institutional culture that protects the exercise of disciplinary expertise against ulterior influences and external agendas, or at the very least, would do nothing to threaten that aspect of the institutional culture. The way to make a liberal argument for no platforming, then – in the Greer case, the Namazie case, or any other – is to see whether that kind of judgement can be sustained in relation to the relevant instance of no platforming. This is the topic of the next section. We also discuss a more radical way of using Post’s account of academic freedom to defend no platforming, one that involves viewing students, and not just teaching and research faculty, as having a legitimate role to play in the formation of disciplinary standards. 5. Easier cases and harder cases First, **consider the no platforming of an anti-Semitic historical revisionist** who denies the Holocaust, or an oil company lobbyistwho peddles misinformation casting doubt on the reality of anthropogenic climate change. **The** Holocaust **denier** flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern historical inquiry. The oil company shill flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern inquiry in climate science and related disciplines. Speakers like these **make a joke of the intellectual standards** to which teaching and research in these disciplines aspire**.** Denying either one of them an opportunity to address a student club, or deliver a commencement address, is at least prima facie compatible with respecting the independence of disciplinary expertise, since no experts within the university would be restricted in their teaching or research practice because of the exclusion. 25 The no platforming of such speakers would thus seem prima face permissible under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom, especially if the aim was to uphold disciplinary standards, but possibly even if the aim was orthogonal to this (e.g. if a Holocaust denier was no platformed for moral rather than intellectual reasons). But we can go further. Beyond mere permissibility, **we may have positive reasons to withhold university speaking opportunities** from Holocaust deniers and climate change shills under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom. **No single**, isolated **instance** **of Holocaust** or climate change **denial is sufficient to undermine** the **disciplinary integrity** of the history or climate science departments**.** **Nevertheless, the intellectual and disciplinary culture of a university is shaped by** all of the **public speaking** activities **that happen within the institution. The university that wants to respect** and support the independence of its **disciplinary experts** – in short, the university **that takes its core epistemic purposes seriously** – **needs to** try to **cultivate an intellectual culture that** properly **recognises and esteems the authority of its disciplinary experts.** And this plausibly generates a reason for the university to not extend any symbolic esteem or approval to speakers that fall far short of the intellectual standards that define its academic disciplines. 26 By a symmetrical line of reasoning, when academic departments invite speakers who they recognise as credible practitioners in the relevant field, the no platforming of those speakers would be a clear infringement of academic freedom under Post’s account. Consider again the example of an economist who opposes progressive welfare. Assume that this speaker is a proficient practitioner of her discipline; while many economists reject her views, nearly all of them accept that she is methodologically competent and that her views should be taken seriously. The no platforming of this speaker – by a leftwing student group, say – would undermine the independent disciplinary expertise of the university’s economists, which includes deciding who to invite to speak at research seminars, and would thus infringe their academic freedom. It would also undermine the integrity of teaching and research in the discipline, by treating as ‘beyond the pale’ a view that, according to the discipline’s own standard-bearers, remains viable.

#### They Continue

Critics of no platforming argue that the practice is at odds with a liberal commitment to free speech. Defenders of the practice typically respond by invoking **the harm principle**, which is, on a standard liberal view, the most natural way to defend limits on free speech. But thisline of defence is premised on a suite of controversial theoretical and empirical claims. Moreover, it simply **accepts the** liberal critic’s **presupposition that the academy is an extension of the public sphere,** and thus **governed by** general **free speech principles.** What we’ve offered here is an alternative way of reconciling at least some instances of no platforming with liberal principles. **Our proposal builds on Post’s account** **of academic freedom as something entirely different from a** mere **extrapolation of free speech principles** **into** **the** realm of the **university.** **Principles** **of academic freedom,** unlike principles of free speech, **positively support the exclusion of speakers and viewpoints for content-based** – rather than merely procedural – **reasons.** **These exclusions are** justified, indeed, they’re **necessary**, in order **for researchers and teachers to uphold disciplinary standards and exercise** their disciplinary **expertise free from undue external interference.** The exclusion of speakers because of their views is thus not in principle antithetical to the aims and nature of the university, as some liberal commentators say**.** At least in some cases, no platforming can be compatible with, and even support, these aims.

# NC – Axiarchism

#### Until we recognize the underived and primary authority of the good no explanation can proceed -- only the Good can explain why there is something rather than nothing. Your attempt to identify the motivation to be ethical ignores the fact that the ethical is authoritative whether you recognize it or not.

**Roberts**, John [Philosophy professor at FSU, specializes in Modern philosophy and the work of Cudworth, also a professor of Marshall Thompson, which is pretty cool]. “Axiarchism and Selectors” Faith and Philosophy 31 (4):412-421 (2014)

And therein lies the heart of the Axiarchist explanatory strategy. The reason **Plato**, Plotinus and so many others **looked to the ethical to explain why the world exists** is **because there is an intrinsic connection between goodness and being.** Maximality, simplicity, elegance, etc., might qualify as special in some sense of 'special' but the good is special in the *relevant* way. Unlikethe other selectors, the ethically good has a built-in claim on being. That's because **when something is ethically good there is** both **an intrinsic *need*** for it to exist **and a** corresponding ***demand* that it exist.** The intrinsic nature of the best of all possible worlds, its goodness, marks it out for being. The extraordinary part of Axiarchism, the part addressed to our extraordinary question, is the claim that this ethical demand is creatively efficacious. But however extraordinary that claim is, the key point is that it is based upon a real, intrinsic connection between Axiarchism's choice of a Selector, and a *necessity* for something *to be*. That in mind, contrast Axiarchism answer with, for instance, Maximality's Selector and its filling in of (3). (M1) Of the countless cosmic possibilities one is as full as possible. Immediately we want to know, what is it about the nature of this Selector feature that marks it out for existence? What is it about having the most compossible beings that could serve as a source of the *making* of this possibility the actual? When we ask that question there might be a temptation to read Maximality's fundamental principle, (MF) Being possible and part of the fullest way that reality could be, is sufficient for being actual, as, (MF\*) The world must be as full as possible. But, of course, these are not equivalent because (MF\*) is just a disguised version of the Axiarchist answer. It simply uses 'must' for 'ought' and offers an implausible account of what constitutes the ethically best. What makes it tempting to read (MF) as (MF\*) is that regardless of its plausibility, at least it offers an answer to the question, what *makes* the world exist? Whatever one thinks of Axiarchism plausibility it, at least, has the twin virtues of recognizing that we need an answer to that question and that the kind of making called for must be some kind of *necessity* *for being*. But what is maximality's connection with necessity for being? The Axiarchist looks to the ethical realm to answer this question, not merely because ethical truths are necessary truths, but because ethical needs and their corresponding demands claim that it is *necessary that some state of affairs* *exist*. **No**ne of the **other** Selector **hypotheses**, Maximality, Simplicity, Mathematical Elegance, etc., **have these vital characteristics.** Consequently, if we abstract out Axiarchism's Selector, goodness, the Selector strategy loses whatever explanatory power it had. So much then for my first objection. Axiarchism is the only Selector hypothesis with any promise. Axiarchism and Ultimacy My second objection grows out of the first in the sense that I suspect that mislocating the source of Axiarchism's explanatory power is what leads Parfit to mistake the nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism's claim to being an ultimate explanation.  **Consider** one of Parfit's **other Selectors.** Again, **let's use Maximality. If that** explanatory possibility **obtains then this world is the fullest** and it was selected for this feature. But **we can then ask, why does this** explanatory possibility **obtain rather than some other, say, Simplicity?** Of course, it might just be a brute fact that it obtains. But, Parfit argues, it need not be. It could be that this explanatory possibility obtains because it has some feature which explains why it obtains.In other words, it may itself have been selected by some higher-order selector possibility**.** **Perhaps Maximality was selected because it produces** the greatest **variety** of beings**.** In that case, **Variety is the higher** Selector **principle. We** now **face** the possibility of **a regress** of explanatory **principles.** Parfit's view is that this doesn't mean that we haven't made some progress. After all, if we knew Maximality to be true then we would have some explanation of why the world exists, but the regress of explanatory possibilities means that we don't have an *ultimate* explanation. In response, Parfit suggests, an Axiarchist might claim that their view is immune to this concern. The Axiarchist tells us that the reason the world exists is because so is best. But when we ask why this is the explanatory possibility that obtains they might answer, *because that is best*. And when we ask in turn why this explanatory hypothesis obtains we get the answer, because that is best, and so on. In this way, we might regard the Axiarchic principle as "self validating," as Nicholas Rescher puts it. But this strategy, Parfit argues, won't work. What we have now is a series of explanatory truths, and so now we need an explanation of why this series obtains rather than another series or no series at all. The root of the problem, as Parfit sees it, is the following. What could select between these possibilities? Might goodness be the highest Selector because that is best, or non-arbitrariness be the Selector because that is the least arbitrary possibility? Neither suggestion, I believe, makes sense. Just as God could not make himself exist, no Selector could make itself the one that, at the highest level, rules. No Selector could settle *whether* it rules, since it cannot settle anything unless it does rule. There are a number of important things going on in this passage that need to be addressed, but the first thing to say is that I agree that **appealing to a series** of Selector principles (Axiarchic or otherwise) **will not solve the problem.** To explain more clearly why, but also why I don't think this point effects Axiarchism's claim to being an ultimate explanation, I believe it will be helpful to note that Parfit's point here bears an ironic resemblance to a point made by the 17th century Axiarchist, Ralph Cudworth. In his *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Cudworth is concerned to refute ethical voluntarism, or as he describes it, the view that "all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary and factitious things, that are created wholly by will." In the course of making his case, he argues that even when it comes to positive laws it is not the will of a ruler that obliges one to obey. Because, …laws and commands do not run thus to will that this or that thing shall become just or unjust, obligatory or unlawful, or that men shall be obliged or obey; but only to require that something be done or not done. …For it was never heard of that any one founded all his authority of commanding others, and others' obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him. [Because] if it should be imagined that anyone should make a positive law to require that others should be obliged or bound to obey him, everyone would think such a law ridiculous and absurd. For if they were obliged before, then this law would be in vain and to no purpose. And if they were not before obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they were not previously bound to obey such a person's commands. First the resemblance, then the irony. The resemblance between Cudworth's point and Parfit's is that in both cases the complaint is that **we have a boot-strapping problem.** In Cudworth's case, **the** would-be **ruler can't solve his authority problem by issuing a second-order demand that his** first order **demand ought to be obeyed** because then we'll just want to know why we are obliged to obey this second-order demand. **The only way such a demand would be obligating is if we were already obliged to obey his demand.** In which case, the second-order demand would be superfluous. It wouldn't serve to validate the first-order demand. And, obviously, the problem is not removed by issuing a series of higher upon higher-order demands. A person cannot make his claim to authority self-validating; even **an infinite series of demands** to rule **won't make one ruler.** In Parfit's case the complaint is that the situation is much the same when it comes to Selector principles. No principle, not even the Axiarchic principle, can be validated by appealing to the same principle only at higher-level. But the situation, I believe, is even worse than Parfit suggests. If the first-order principle needed validation then it still needs it even with a second-order principle in place. The second-order principle is entirely impotent. Just as in the case of the would-be ruler's second-order demand, introducing a second-order principle doesn't even manage to push our problem back a step. So much for the resemblance. Now the irony. The irony lies in the fact that the point of Cudworth's argument is not that this is an unsolvable problem, but that **this is a problem for the** Axiarchist's arch enemy, the ***ethical* *voluntarist*.** There can be binding positive laws because there can be genuine ruling authorities. We have such when "natural justice or equity…gives to one the right or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation to obedience." Justice itself enjoys underived authority**.** If one's rule is founded upon justice, Cudworth is claiming, then his commands are genuinely authoritative and one is obliged by them. **That's the magic of the ethical.** It's not that ethical requirements merely *demand* something in the waythat I might demand that you bring me my coffee. **They demand with *authority*. And that authority is underived.** No further backing for their right to rule is called for. The Axiarchist principle is not "self-validating." However, we might, if we like, say that the question, 'Why does the Axiarchic principle rule?' is self-answering. We can say **it is self-answering in the same way** we can say that **the question, 'Why be moral?' is self-answering.** To say that question is self-answering is not to appeal to a further justifying principle. For instance, it is an ethical requirement that you must not cause unnecessary suffering. Of course, it is true that if one were to ask, 'Why should I do what this ethical requirement demands?' we might respond, 'Because it would be wrong not to!' But it would be delivered with a difficult to hide tone of exasperation**.** The exasperation is warranted because you are not answering this illegitimate request for justification by offering a second-order principle that gives the ethical requirement the power to oblige. You're answering that illegitimate question by trying to get your interlocutor to recognize that it is illegitimate by, however ineffectually, getting them to recognize their natural obligation not to cause unnecessary suffering. To adapt Bishop Butler's famous description of conscience, **the ethical is "in kind and in nature, supreme" and "bears its own authority** of being so**.**" The key point here is that **the reason** that **generation after generation of philosophers have looked to the ethical** realm **for** an*ultimate* **explanation of existence is** not merely because ethical truths are necessary truths but **because of the peculiar, non-logical** kind of **necessity they enjoy. When it comes to ethical requirements, *their necessity is a function of their natural authority*. The** Axiarchist's **idea is to ground the** principle of the **world's existence** as the ruling principle upon the kind of necessity provided **by the natural authority of the ethical.** One does not come to recognize the necessity of something like 'It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering,' by coming to recognize that its negation implies a contradiction. You come to recognize value's necessity when you recognize its authority. And what it takes to recognize its authority is to recognize that you *are* obliged by it. You must recognize its inherent right to rule. Value's peculiar form of necessity is grounded in its natural Sovereignty. Contra Parfit, since their power to oblige is derived from their authority and their authority is grounded in their own nature, i.e., in themselves, we may say, if we please, that in there is a sense in which the Axiarchic principle has the power to make itself the ruling principle. But it accomplishes this without appeal to a never-ending series of Axiarchic principles and thus without appeal to any illegitimate boot-strapping. When it comes to Axiarchism and Axiarchism alone there is no call for higher-order Selector principles. Therein lies the force of Axiarchism claim that it alone is fit to serve as an *ultimate* explanation. That Value Cannot Fail and the State of the Debate. Finally, the preceding, I believe, can be used to defend John Leslie's claim that **not only does value rule reality, it could not fail to rule.** Against this Parfit objects that that's hard to believe because "while it is inconceivable that undeserved suffering could not have failed to be in itself bad, it is clearly conceivable that value might have failed to rule, if only because it seems so clear that value does not *rule*." This, I think, gets the dialectic wrong. Again, according to the Axiarchist, **value's** peculiar form of **necessity is grounded in its natural Sovereignty. You recognize** the necessity of **the ethical by recognizing** its authority and that means recognizing that **you are obliged** by it**.** You accept its Sovereignty. So, since Parfit accepts both that undeserved suffering could not fail to be bad and that Selector hypotheses are genuinely explanatory, and since the Axiarchist's Selector is the only viable Selector, the question that seemingly unnecessary suffering raises is *how could it be possible for value to fail to rule?* Parfit will owe the Axiarchist an answer to that question. In turn, the Axiarchist will owe Parfit an answer to the problem of evil. These seem to me to be comparably difficult tasks.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the Ordo Amoris, defined as correctly orienting our love and appreciation.

Impact calc: A) Finding the correct orientation of love is hierarchical, not aggregative – if its wrong to betray three friends for money, it is equally wrong to betray a single friend for that price, B) Understanding the good is like understanding beauty. You can appreciate beauty without clearly definining it in the abstract – lack of abstract categorization does not undermine its existence.

#### The good proper to university education is different from those goods proper to the public square. University is fundamentally concerned with the development of expertize and the goods of discipline, not discipleship.

#### **Post**, Robert. “Academic Freedom and the Constitution.” in Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan R. Cole (Eds.), *Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?* (New York: Columbia University Press)

“**The** U.S. **Supreme Court has** since and frequently **proclaimed** that “**it** is **the purpose of the First Amendment** **to** **preserve a**n uninhibited **marketplace of ideas** in which truth will ultimately prevail**.**” There is a general belief in constitutional circles that the point of the First Amendment doctrine is to “advance knowledge and the search for truth by fostering a free marketplace of ideas and an ‘uninhibited, robust, wide-open debate on public issues.” Indeed, ‘the most influential argument supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.” The premise of the marketplace of ideas is that truth will emerge from the clash of conflicting opinions. The theory of the marketplace of ideas therefore deploys First Amendment doctrine to prevent the state from interfering in the free flow of public discussion. **It permits** the **regulation** of speech **only when the state** can **meet** a strict “requirement of **viewpoint neutrality.**” Courts pursuing the ideal of the marketplace of ideas apply “the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its context.” A doctrinal structure of **this** nature **is in fundamental tension with** the forms of **disciplinary knowledge** that underlie academic freedom of research and publication**.** The point of the professional ideal of academic freedom is to ensure that **universities are organized to** advance their mission of **produc**ing **expert, disciplinary knowledge.** **But** **if**, as the theory of **the marketplace of ideas** holds, “the First Amendment **recognizes no** such thing as a ‘**false’ idea**," **then it cannot** **sustain,** or even tolerate, the disciplinary practices necessary to sustain the truth claims to which the ideal of **expert knowledge** aspires**.** Not only is the theory of the marketplace of ideas incompatible with ordinary judgments that universities must continuously make to identity and promote “competence,” **it is also incompatible with the** forms of social **order our society** ordinarily **uses to produce professional knowledge.** Expert knowledge is produced by disciplines, and as the Oxford English Dictionary reminds us, disciplinary refers to “the training of scholars or subordinates to proper and orderly action by instructing and exercising them.” **Disciplines are not organized according to market** or even democratic **principles.** For example, disciplines commonly use professional journals to serve as gatekeepers for the recognition and distribution of knowledge. Journals could not perform this function if they were required to operate according to the theory of the marketplace of ideas. If disciplinary journals were forced by constitutional doctrine to accept all manuscripts on a first-come, first-served basis, or if they were constitutionally prohibited from engaging in the content discrimination required to distinguish good from poor submissions, they could no longer serve as disciplinary gatekeepers for the recognition and distribution of knowledge. If a marketplace of ideas model were to be imposed upon Nature or the American Economic Review or The Lancet, such publications would very rapidly lose their capacity to authoritatively register what we do and do not know about the world. I do not mean to deny that scholars in the arts, humanities, and sciences sometimes possess powerful personal charisma. My point is rather that the creation of disciplinary knowledge—**the kind of knowledge that justifies modern universities** and therefore also the professional ideal of academic freedom—**requires the maintenance of disciplinary authority.** Disciplinary authority rests on forms of discrimination incompatible with the marketplace of ideas. It is simply a confusion to believe the marketplace of ideas can generate doctrine remotely compatible with modern university practices. If the constitutional concept of academic freedom is to be justified, therefore, it cannot be by the theory of the marketplace of ideas. Instead we need a constitutional rationale that can validate simultaneous commitments to critical freedom and to rigorous disciplinary standards of judgment.55 **Universities cannot fulfill their social function unless they are authorized to evaluate** scholarly **speech based upon its content** and professional quality**.** No doubt if the New York Times were to editorialize that the moon is made of green cheese, the First Amendment, deploying the concept of the marketplace of ideas, would prohibit government from imposing any sanction. Yet no astronomy department could survive if it were constitutionally prohibited from denying tenure to young scholars who were similarly convinced. It is no wonder that the constitutional doctrine of academic freedom lies in shambles: it is justified by a theory that is incompatible with the mission of the modern university.

#### Valuing and creating space for expertise is critical to the FW. Truth is a primary good, and expertize is thus nothing more nor less than to be fully and rightly oriented towards the good. Also outweighs on inherency. Universities are the unique space in public systems for the inculcation of respect for expertise.

#### And the implication is that requiring free-speech on colleges is wrong, instead we should defer to professional standards set by the university as the expert institution.

**Simpson**, Robert **and** **Srinivasan Forthcoming**, Amia. *Academic Freedom* (ed. J. Lackey, In Oxford University Press). <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_&_Writing_files/No%20Platforming_FINAL.pdf>

In addition, **the communicative norms** and practices **of universities** also **give recognized** disciplinary **experts –** that is, academic faculty – various kinds of **control over** the **speech** of others,as is necessarytocreate anduphold the intellectual rigors of, and thus promote the epistemic aims of, their disciplines. **In the public square we can tolerate the speech of** flat-earth cranks, **shills paid to undermine climate science,** and revisionist historians who espouse conspiratorial misreadings of the evidence. As long as they don’t harass anyone we let them say their piece. 22 **But such** people **are not** owed the opportunity **to** teach History 101 or **publish in scientific journals**, any more than they are owed a platform to address parliament or a corporate board meeting**.** More specifically, **it is permissible for** disciplinary **gatekeepers** **to exclude** cranks and shills fromvaluablecommunicative platforms **in academic contexts, because** good **teaching** and research **requires** thatcommunicative **privileges be given** to some and not others, **based on** people’sdisciplinary **competence.** In short, academic disciplines amplify the speech of experts and routinely silence or marginalize the speech of others. Faculty set the curriculum, and students work within it. The professoriate – not students or the general public – decides which researchers have earned doctoral credentials. Editors of academic journals and presses exercise discretionary judgment to decide whose work will be published. As Post says, **academic expertise is supported by** such practices, which are not just about the freedom to inquire, but also about “affirmative **disciplinary virtues** of methodological care**”, t**he maintenance of **which “**quite **contradicts the** egalitarian tolerance that defines the **marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment”** (2013: vii)**.** And thus, whereas in free speech “there is an equality of status in the field of ideas”, the pursuit of knowledge in academia demands an inequality of status in ideas; it requires “practices that seek to separate true ideas from false ones” (Ibid: 9-10). The university would largely be a waste of time for teachers and students, and its subsidization a waste of resourcesfor the rest of society, were things to be otherwise. In short,communicative practices inuniversities are not governed by the general liberal precepts that regulate communication in the public square, and when universities do restrict speakers and viewpoints this should not be, and indeed is not, based solely (or even primarily) on purely procedural standards aimed at harm-prevention. Given that no platforming is a practice that takes place in universities, our question should be whether it is compatible with norms of academic freedom in particular, where these norms are understood as distinct from general liberal principles of free speech. Granted, some of the speaking engagements that no platformers target – like commencement addresses, or talks at student societies – are not immediately linked to the teaching and research activities that principles of academic freedom are there to safeguard. But principles of academic freedom are an appropriate reference point all the same, because such speaking events are an important part of the cultural and institutional backdrop against which teaching and research activities are conducted. The norms governing these communicative events – as well as attempts to interfere with them – should therefore be guided by consideration of how they affect the university’s core academic activities. What principles of academic freedom are primarily there to uphold, on the understanding we have sketched above, is a certain kind of independence: independence in the exercise of technical expertise in teaching and research from the control of outside actors, like governments, businesses,and administrators, who might try to force individuals or departments into “promulgating particular views” instead of “sustaining the ongoing scholarly discipline by which knowledge is identified and expanded” (Ibid: 89). The aim of these principles is to ensure, for instance, that donors cannot get professors fired for criticising foreign governments, that corporations cannot buy influence to quash research that threatens their commercial interests, that governments cannot gag scientists whose research reveals dangers created by government policies, and that administrative staff cannot force teachers to modify their syllabi based on the management’s ideas about what should be taught. In securing all these protections, though, to reiterate, principles of academic freedom do not guarantee teachers or students (or anyone else) participation in a wide-open discussion of ideas. On the contrary, **the standards of expertise** that govern teaching and research **are compatible with** all sorts of **content-based restrictions** on communication**.** What principles of academic freedom are meant to ensure is that such constraints are imposed by credentialed disciplinary experts, not outsiders, and that such constraints serve the promotion of disciplinary knowledge, not some ulterior agenda (Ibid: 85-93). Why should we regard the above as a liberal conception of academic freedom? Post’s answer is roughly as follows. Free people cannot justifiably be subject to the brute authority of elites. Government must involve the people governing themselves in order to be legitimate. For Post, this follows from a broader theory of free speech grounded in the idea of open democratic participation as an essential requirement of democratic legitimacy (Post 1990, 2011). The realization of self-government is not just a matter of a society having formally democratic electoral and parliamentary institutions. This ideal also requires (i) that everyone should be at liberty to par- ticipate in the public discourse that underpins democratic decisions, and (ii) that everyone should have access to the knowledge and information necessary for well-informed judgements about how we ought to be governed. 23 Principles of free speech, which safeguard disliked views against viewpoint-based restriction in the public square, serve the first requirement of open access and participation. Principles of academic freedom, by contrast, serve the second requirement. In order that everyone should have access to the information necessary for informed judgements about issues of public concern, societies need specialized institutions – including an independent university sector – devoted to the creation and dissemination of expert knowledge. 24 Post’s account of academic freedom is not the only one available. There are deflationary account like the one suggested by Stanley Fish (2014), which say that academic freedom is little more than a demand by academics that they be allowed to do their job however they like. Principles of academic freedom, thus understood, have little normative purchase on anyone besides the academics whose interests they serve. There are also accounts that characterize academic freedom as a specific institutional expression of a more general political principle of freedom of thought, instead of something grounded in – and thus potentially limited by – claims about the authoritative privileges of experts in academic disciplines (e.g. Bromwich 2015). It is also worth noting that principles of academic freedom come in different forms, and with different historical underpinnings, in different jurisdictions (see Barendt 2010). Post’s account of academic freedom is linked to broader principles of American constitutional law, and its conception of liberal democracy might be seen as idiosyncratic by liberals in other cultural contexts. In any case, our argument isn’t that Post’s account of academic freedom is clearly superior to all other rival accounts that might be offered. Our point is that Post presents a credible account of academic freedom, located squarely within a liberal politics, and one which opens up a way to see no platforming as in principle consonant with a liberal understanding of the university’s mission and nature. It is no intrinsic affront to the intellectual culture of the university, on this view, that a person should be deprived of a platform to express her views because of a negative appraisal of her credibility or the content of her views. Principles of academic freedom of the kind that Post defends can permit such exclusion, provided that it respects and supports the independent exercise of disciplinary expertise in teaching and research. Of course this does not yet entail that all or even most instances of no platforming will receive the liberal’s approval. What it shows is how such approval can be merited. In at least some cases, there is reason to think that the no platforming of a particular speaker would positively contribute to an institutional culture that protects the exercise of disciplinary expertise against ulterior influences and external agendas, or at the very least, would do nothing to threaten that aspect of the institutional culture. The way to make a liberal argument for no platforming, then – in the Greer case, the Namazie case, or any other – is to see whether that kind of judgement can be sustained in relation to the relevant instance of no platforming. This is the topic of the next section. We also discuss a more radical way of using Post’s account of academic freedom to defend no platforming, one that involves viewing students, and not just teaching and research faculty, as having a legitimate role to play in the formation of disciplinary standards. 5. Easier cases and harder cases First, **consider the no platforming of an anti-Semitic historical revisionist** who denies the Holocaust, or an oil company lobbyistwho peddles misinformation casting doubt on the reality of anthropogenic climate change. **The** Holocaust **denier** flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern historical inquiry. The oil company shill flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern inquiry in climate science and related disciplines. Speakers like these **make a joke of the intellectual standards** to which teaching and research in these disciplines aspire**.** Denying either one of them an opportunity to address a student club, or deliver a commencement address, is at least prima facie compatible with respecting the independence of disciplinary expertise, since no experts within the university would be restricted in their teaching or research practice because of the exclusion. 25 The no platforming of such speakers would thus seem prima face permissible under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom, especially if the aim was to uphold disciplinary standards, but possibly even if the aim was orthogonal to this (e.g. if a Holocaust denier was no platformed for moral rather than intellectual reasons). But we can go further. Beyond mere permissibility, **we may have positive reasons to withhold university speaking opportunities** from Holocaust deniers and climate change shills under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom. **No single**, isolated **instance** **of Holocaust** or climate change **denial is sufficient to undermine** the **disciplinary integrity** of the history or climate science departments**.** **Nevertheless, the intellectual and disciplinary culture of a university is shaped by** all of the **public speaking** activities **that happen within the institution. The university that wants to respect** and support the independence of its **disciplinary experts** – in short, the university **that takes its core epistemic purposes seriously** – **needs to** try to **cultivate an intellectual culture that** properly **recognises and esteems the authority of its disciplinary experts.** And this plausibly generates a reason for the university to not extend any symbolic esteem or approval to speakers that fall far short of the intellectual standards that define its academic disciplines. 26 By a symmetrical line of reasoning, when academic departments invite speakers who they recognise as credible practitioners in the relevant field, the no platforming of those speakers would be a clear infringement of academic freedom under Post’s account. Consider again the example of an economist who opposes progressive welfare. Assume that this speaker is a proficient practitioner of her discipline; while many economists reject her views, nearly all of them accept that she is methodologically competent and that her views should be taken seriously. The no platforming of this speaker – by a leftwing student group, say – would undermine the independent disciplinary expertise of the university’s economists, which includes deciding who to invite to speak at research seminars, and would thus infringe their academic freedom. It would also undermine the integrity of teaching and research in the discipline, by treating as ‘beyond the pale’ a view that, according to the discipline’s own standard-bearers, remains viable.

#### They Continue

Critics of no platforming argue that the practice is at odds with a liberal commitment to free speech. Defenders of the practice typically respond by invoking **the harm principle**, which is, on a standard liberal view, the most natural way to defend limits on free speech. But thisline of defence is premised on a suite of controversial theoretical and empirical claims. Moreover, it simply **accepts the** liberal critic’s **presupposition that the academy is an extension of the public sphere,** and thus **governed by** general **free speech principles.** What we’ve offered here is an alternative way of reconciling at least some instances of no platforming with liberal principles. **Our proposal builds on Post’s account** **of academic freedom as something entirely different from a** mere **extrapolation of free speech principles** **into** **the** realm of the **university.** **Principles** **of academic freedom,** unlike principles of free speech, **positively support the exclusion of speakers and viewpoints for content-based** – rather than merely procedural – **reasons.** **These exclusions are** justified, indeed, they’re **necessary**, in order **for researchers and teachers to uphold disciplinary standards and exercise** their disciplinary **expertise free from undue external interference.** The exclusion of speakers because of their views is thus not in principle antithetical to the aims and nature of the university, as some liberal commentators say**.** At least in some cases, no platforming can be compatible with, and even support, these aims.

# NC – Freedom Based

#### Freedom of the will is not about the capacity for choice but about having something meaningful to choose – only through understanding and pursuing the Good can our choices become meaningful. This implies that moral development and understanding only occurs through the development and perfection of character.

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Let us now ask quite simply if this is realistic, if this is what, in our experience, moral choice is like. It might seem at first that the existentialists have an advantage in that they do account for a peculiar feature of moral choice, which is the strange emptiness which often occurs at the moment of choosing. Of course choices happen at various levels of consciousness, importance, and difficulty. In a simple easy unimportant choice there is no need to regard ‘what goes on’ as anything beyond the obvious sequence of reason, decision, action, or just reason, action; and such choices may properly be regarded as ‘impersonal’. ‘Shall I go? Oh yes, I promised to.’ I receive my bill and I pay it. But difficult and painful choices often present this experience of void of which so much has been made: this sense of not being determined by the reasons. This sensation is hailed with delight by both wings of existentialism. The Kantian wing claims it as showing that we are free in relation to the reasons and the Sur- realist wing claims it as showing that there are no reasons. Indeed this experience of emptiness seems perfectly to verify the notion that freedom is simply the movement of the lonely will. Choice is outward movement since there is nothing else there for it to be. But is this the case, and ought we really to be so pleased about this experience? A more sombre note concerning it is struck at one point by Sartre, who on this problem veers wildly between Kantianism and Surrealism. Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits. If we are so strangely separate from the world at moments of choice are we really choosing at all, are we right indeed to identify ourselves with this giddy empty will? (Hampshire: ‘I identify myself with my will.’) In a reaction of thought which is never far from the minds of more extreme existentialists (Dostoevsky for instance), one may turn here towards determinism, towards fatalism, towards regarding freedom as a complete illusion. When I deliberate the die is already cast. Forces within me which are dark to me have already made the decision. This view is if anything less attractive and less realistic than the other one. Do we really have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image of total determinism? Can we not give a more balanced and illuminating account of the matter? I suggest we can if we simply introduce into the picture the idea of atten- tion, or looking, of which I was speaking above. I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is. One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a grandi- ose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens in between such choices is indeed what is crucial. I would like on the whole to use the word ‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like ‘looking’ as the neutral word. Of course psychic energy flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic vocabu- lary. (M seeing D as pert-common-juvenile, etc.) Attention is the effort to counteract such states of illusion.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the Ordo Amoris, defined as correctly orienting our love and appreciation.

#### Impact calc: A) Finding the correct orientation of love is hierarchical, not aggregative – if its wrong to betray three friends for money, it is equally wrong to betray a single friend for that price, B) There must be ethical isomorphism –i.e. appropriate love for given objects. For example, one ought not love a child in the way that one loves a spouse.

#### My thesis is that educational institution ought not value untrammeled freedom of expression – rather, they should become environments that evoke a deeper notion of freedom that allow individuals to best know the good.

#### And the implication is that requiring free-speech on colleges is wrong, instead we should defer to professional standards set by the university as the expert institution.

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In addition, **the communicative norms** and practices **of universities** also **give recognized** disciplinary **experts –** that is, academic faculty – various kinds of **control over** the **speech** of others,as is necessarytocreate anduphold the intellectual rigors of, and thus promote the epistemic aims of, their disciplines. **In the public square we can tolerate the speech of** flat-earth cranks, **shills paid to undermine climate science,** and revisionist historians who espouse conspiratorial misreadings of the evidence. 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On the contrary, **the standards of expertise** that govern teaching and research **are compatible with** all sorts of **content-based restrictions** on communication**.** What principles of academic freedom are meant to ensure is that such constraints are imposed by credentialed disciplinary experts, not outsiders, and that such constraints serve the promotion of disciplinary knowledge, not some ulterior agenda (Ibid: 85-93). Why should we regard the above as a liberal conception of academic freedom? Post’s answer is roughly as follows. Free people cannot justifiably be subject to the brute authority of elites. Government must involve the people governing themselves in order to be legitimate. For Post, this follows from a broader theory of free speech grounded in the idea of open democratic participation as an essential requirement of democratic legitimacy (Post 1990, 2011). The realization of self-government is not just a matter of a society having formally democratic electoral and parliamentary institutions. This ideal also requires (i) that everyone should be at liberty to par- ticipate in the public discourse that underpins democratic decisions, and (ii) that everyone should have access to the knowledge and information necessary for well-informed judgements about how we ought to be governed. 23 Principles of free speech, which safeguard disliked views against viewpoint-based restriction in the public square, serve the first requirement of open access and participation. Principles of academic freedom, by contrast, serve the second requirement. In order that everyone should have access to the information necessary for informed judgements about issues of public concern, societies need specialized institutions – including an independent university sector – devoted to the creation and dissemination of expert knowledge. 24 Post’s account of academic freedom is not the only one available. There are deflationary account like the one suggested by Stanley Fish (2014), which say that academic freedom is little more than a demand by academics that they be allowed to do their job however they like. Principles of academic freedom, thus understood, have little normative purchase on anyone besides the academics whose interests they serve. There are also accounts that characterize academic freedom as a specific institutional expression of a more general political principle of freedom of thought, instead of something grounded in – and thus potentially limited by – claims about the authoritative privileges of experts in academic disciplines (e.g. Bromwich 2015). It is also worth noting that principles of academic freedom come in different forms, and with different historical underpinnings, in different jurisdictions (see Barendt 2010). Post’s account of academic freedom is linked to broader principles of American constitutional law, and its conception of liberal democracy might be seen as idiosyncratic by liberals in other cultural contexts. In any case, our argument isn’t that Post’s account of academic freedom is clearly superior to all other rival accounts that might be offered. Our point is that Post presents a credible account of academic freedom, located squarely within a liberal politics, and one which opens up a way to see no platforming as in principle consonant with a liberal understanding of the university’s mission and nature. It is no intrinsic affront to the intellectual culture of the university, on this view, that a person should be deprived of a platform to express her views because of a negative appraisal of her credibility or the content of her views. Principles of academic freedom of the kind that Post defends can permit such exclusion, provided that it respects and supports the independent exercise of disciplinary expertise in teaching and research. Of course this does not yet entail that all or even most instances of no platforming will receive the liberal’s approval. What it shows is how such approval can be merited. In at least some cases, there is reason to think that the no platforming of a particular speaker would positively contribute to an institutional culture that protects the exercise of disciplinary expertise against ulterior influences and external agendas, or at the very least, would do nothing to threaten that aspect of the institutional culture. The way to make a liberal argument for no platforming, then – in the Greer case, the Namazie case, or any other – is to see whether that kind of judgement can be sustained in relation to the relevant instance of no platforming. This is the topic of the next section. We also discuss a more radical way of using Post’s account of academic freedom to defend no platforming, one that involves viewing students, and not just teaching and research faculty, as having a legitimate role to play in the formation of disciplinary standards. 5. Easier cases and harder cases First, **consider the no platforming of an anti-Semitic historical revisionist** who denies the Holocaust, or an oil company lobbyistwho peddles misinformation casting doubt on the reality of anthropogenic climate change. **The** Holocaust **denier** flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern historical inquiry. The oil company shill flouts the methodological and epistemic norms that govern inquiry in climate science and related disciplines. Speakers like these **make a joke of the intellectual standards** to which teaching and research in these disciplines aspire**.** Denying either one of them an opportunity to address a student club, or deliver a commencement address, is at least prima facie compatible with respecting the independence of disciplinary expertise, since no experts within the university would be restricted in their teaching or research practice because of the exclusion. 25 The no platforming of such speakers would thus seem prima face permissible under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom, especially if the aim was to uphold disciplinary standards, but possibly even if the aim was orthogonal to this (e.g. if a Holocaust denier was no platformed for moral rather than intellectual reasons). But we can go further. Beyond mere permissibility, **we may have positive reasons to withhold university speaking opportunities** from Holocaust deniers and climate change shills under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom. **No single**, isolated **instance** **of Holocaust** or climate change **denial is sufficient to undermine** the **disciplinary integrity** of the history or climate science departments**.** **Nevertheless, the intellectual and disciplinary culture of a university is shaped by** all of the **public speaking** activities **that happen within the institution. The university that wants to respect** and support the independence of its **disciplinary experts** – in short, the university **that takes its core epistemic purposes seriously** – **needs to** try to **cultivate an intellectual culture that** properly **recognises and esteems the authority of its disciplinary experts.** And this plausibly generates a reason for the university to not extend any symbolic esteem or approval to speakers that fall far short of the intellectual standards that define its academic disciplines. 26 By a symmetrical line of reasoning, when academic departments invite speakers who they recognise as credible practitioners in the relevant field, the no platforming of those speakers would be a clear infringement of academic freedom under Post’s account. Consider again the example of an economist who opposes progressive welfare. Assume that this speaker is a proficient practitioner of her discipline; while many economists reject her views, nearly all of them accept that she is methodologically competent and that her views should be taken seriously. The no platforming of this speaker – by a leftwing student group, say – would undermine the independent disciplinary expertise of the university’s economists, which includes deciding who to invite to speak at research seminars, and would thus infringe their academic freedom. It would also undermine the integrity of teaching and research in the discipline, by treating as ‘beyond the pale’ a view that, according to the discipline’s own standard-bearers, remains viable.

#### They Continue

Critics of no platforming argue that the practice is at odds with a liberal commitment to free speech. Defenders of the practice typically respond by invoking **the harm principle**, which is, on a standard liberal view, the most natural way to defend limits on free speech. But thisline of defence is premised on a suite of controversial theoretical and empirical claims. Moreover, it simply **accepts the** liberal critic’s **presupposition that the academy is an extension of the public sphere,** and thus **governed by** general **free speech principles.** What we’ve offered here is an alternative way of reconciling at least some instances of no platforming with liberal principles. **Our proposal builds on Post’s account** **of academic freedom as something entirely different from a** mere **extrapolation of free speech principles** **into** **the** realm of the **university.** **Principles** **of academic freedom,** unlike principles of free speech, **positively support the exclusion of speakers and viewpoints for content-based** – rather than merely procedural – **reasons.** **These exclusions are** justified, indeed, they’re **necessary**, in order **for researchers and teachers to uphold disciplinary standards and exercise** their disciplinary **expertise free from undue external interference.** The exclusion of speakers because of their views is thus not in principle antithetical to the aims and nature of the university, as some liberal commentators say**.** At least in some cases, no platforming can be compatible with, and even support, these aims.

# CONTENTION

## A2 Squo = Imperfect

1. Squo being bad does not justify an unethical response to the squo.

2. Universities have the maxim right, at least, they are adopting these to make better learning environments. Even if the aff and neg are both wrong actions at least the neg is right reason.

3. Some schools will have it right in squo, while in aff none will

4. You can differentiate the question if constitutionally protections are bad from if current practices good. Just like proving the aff world is not perfect does not delink offense. I can say corpal punishment is wrong and it is worse to use it, even if my current response to children is not perfect

## Harvard Contention

#### Mental contamination undermines these appropriate orientations – restricting speech is necessary to ensure agents’ wills aligns with their valuational system

Moles 6, Andrés. (Andres Moles read Philosophy at the National University of Mexico (UNAM) finishing in 2001, and received an MA in Philosophy and Social Theory (2003) and a PhD in Politics (2007) both at the University of Warwick.) Autonomy, Free Speech and Automatic Behaviour. Springer 2006. NP [bracketed for gendered language]

Mental contamination is ‘the process whereby a person has an unwanted response because of mental processing that is un- conscious or incontrollableÕ.63 An important feature of this defini- tion of mental contamination is that it is subjectively defined. This means that contamination occurs when an agent responds in a way [s]she would not like to respond.64 This condition belongs conceptually to the same category as the identification condition discussed in the first section. It is obvious that mental contamination as defined is a violation of autonomy. One cannot respond in unwanted ways, while at the same time satisfying the conditions of ‘identificationÕ and ‘rightÕ belief formation (conditions 1 and 2 in the first part). As such, mental contamination is related to external stimuli that impinge on peopleÕs minds usually without their own awareness – and, necessarily, without their own approval. Notice that not every automatic response threatens autonomy. If we did not have automatic responses we would be completely incapable of living a human life.65 In this sense, there is nothing wrong with unconscious processes and automatic responses as such. The problem emerges when we face un- wanted automatic responses. Mental contamination threatens autonomy in different ways. First, it presents an obvious challenge to the condition of identification in so far as agents whose responses are contaminated cannot identify with them. The teacher who wants to be fair but who nevertheless unconsciously gives a higher mark to a student because he likes him, because of the halo effect, cannot identify himself with his automatic response. The very definition of what counts as mental contamination rules out the identification condition. Second, the process by which mental contamination takes place also conflicts with the ‘rightÕ causal history of desires and beliefs. Contaminated responses are not the outcome of reasons but of external influences that have not been considered. We need to look at the mechanisms that cause the unwanted responses and also at the environmental features that trigger those mechanisms. For instance, in the case of the aggressive reactions towards black peo- ple, we must look at the psychological mechanisms that produce the response; and we must also look at the social environment that triggers the response – in this case, a society which has created a ste- reotype according to which black people are aggressive, sexually dan- gerous, prone to criminality, lazy, etc.66 Third, mental contamination poses an important threat to our critical judgement, to the extent that it makes us react in ways we would not want to. When an agent reacts in a contaminated way his response is ‘alienÕ to him, in that he cannot approve the way in which he is acting. His action is not caused by his values and beliefs but by the mental processes [s]he rejects. In order to neutralise mental contamination, four steps are needed. Imagine that someone is marking two studentsÕ essays. One of them is written by a physically attractive student, while the other is written by an unattractive one. The marker gives the first student a 65, while she gives the second student a 63. The teacher believes that the marks are fair and reflect only the quality of the written work, and that they are completely independent from the attractive- ness of the student (let suppose that in an unbiased evaluation both essays get a 64). Recall the ‘halo effectÕ discussed above – objective evaluations such as marking essays are contaminated by subjective evaluations such as liking or disliking people. In order to neutralise the bias, the first step the teacher needs to take is to be aware that the bias is likely to influence her judgement. But this is not enough; as a second step, the person needs also to be motivated to neutralise the bias. The teacher must concede that she is actually susceptible to being biased towards her attractive student and needs to be moti- vated to act in such a way that the bias is eliminated. This step is hard to take because it violates our common sense theory about ourselves. When she reads about the halo effect she would probably say – ‘hold on, I believe that this ‘halo effectÕ might occur to some people, but surely not to me. IÕm being fair!Õ. So, if the person is not motivated to neutralise the bias, contamina- tion will take place. A third element necessary for avoiding con- tamination is awareness of the direction and magnitude of the bias. Imagine that this teacher reckons that she might be influenced by the halo effect, but she does not know how much she is being biased. Surely, she could take 5 points away from the attractive student, or give 5 extra points to the unattractive one. But then her marking will be biased again, this time not because of the halo ef- fect, but because she has overcompensated for the initial bias. So the fourth element needed is the ability to adjust the response in non-contaminated way. People do employ various strategies to avoid contamination, but most of them seem to be unsuccessful, especially because they usually overestimate their own abilities to control their mental processes. Failure to satisfy any one of the conditions above will end up in contamination. The difficulty in controlling bias comes from our very limited introspective capabilities, from the commonly held idea that we are transparent to ourselves and from a tendency to overestimate our capacity to eliminate contamination: people think, ‘maybe others, but not meÕ.Regarding autonomy, it seems that a necessary condition for achieving it is to neutralise as far as possible the unwanted responses that are caused by the environment. It is indeed important to protect autonomy, but we need to be sensitive to the reality of phenomena such as automatic behaviour, and we need to get a better understanding of the threats it faces. Neutralising all sources of mental contamination is very hard. Nonetheless we need to cate- gorise the risks that different forms of contamination pose to autonomy: to have contaminated reactions regarding trivia such as flavours of lollipops is very different from have such reactions about ethnicity. Automatic responses according to racial stereotypes are not a threat to everyone’s autonomy. There are people who might identify themselves with such reactions, people who accept the content of stereotypes and who autonomously choose to perpetuate them. For them, automatic behaviour of this kind is consistent with their autonomy. This does not mean, of course, that explicit racists are not susceptible to other forms of mental contamination. For instance, someone can be a racist, and regret his reactions regard- ing gender stereotypes. However, for many of us, reacting aggres- sively towards black people and implicitly associating them with negative traits is something to regret, and possibly even to abhor. It is because of these phenomena that the protection of autonomy requires to us rethink some of the associations we usually make between autonomy and the protection of free speech. Audience-based autonomy defences of free speech argue that audience interests are better served by protecting freedom of expression.67 These defences claim that free speech serves auton- omy and critical reflection by offering a wide range of viewpoints whose relative merits audiences can assess. Free speech also offers audiences valuable information and evidence that helps them to decide different aspects of their conception of the good. It is also claimed – notably by J.S. Mill – that free speech forces people to criti- cally assess and defend the grounds of their own views when presented with alternatives. However, free speech also has its costs. It is highly contaminating: consider violent pornography and entertainment, the creation, transmission and enforcement of racial and gender stereotypes, and so on.68 Defences of free speech sometimes try to minimise these costs by advocating ‘more, better speechÕ.69 The idea is that through rational debate and discussion, audiences will autonomously come to realise that the content of stereotypes is false and based on prejudice. Free speech, then, would then have two benefits: it would fight racism and foster rational autonomy. This strategy is not without its problems. Many people who believe they are not racists still manifest racist reactions.70 It is dif- ficult to convince them that, regardless of what they think of them- selves, they sometimes react as racists. Moreover, it has been shown that sometimes trying not to respond according to the stereotype has the ‘ironic effect of increas[es]ing the frequency of stereotypical reactions.71 Similarly, it has been argued that we have a tendency to believe propositions we understand, even when we are explicitly told that they are false. Daniel Gilbert argues that due to the way our system of forming beliefs works, we have a tendency automatically to accept propositions we understand. Rejection requires effort. This second step can be inhibited when individualsÕ mental resources are depleted, for instance by devoting attention to other things, or by lack of sleep, or under torture, or time constraints. If the rejection process is interfered with, then individuals may accept propositions which they would otherwise reject.72 More, better speech seems not be able to cope with this prob- lem, mainly because it aims at rational, conscious processes of belief formation, while the challenges I am presenting here occur at automatic, non-conscious levels. Wilson and Brekke suggest that another strategy might be more successful: exposure control. Just as in the case of normal pollution, the best way of protecting oneself is avoiding being exposed to the polluting agent; the most effective strategy to fight mental contamination could be to avoid the sources of bias. This strategy is already used in certain domains. Teachers assess anonymous essays and exams, journals impose blind controls when considering submissions, and so on. Exposure control is not free of problems; first, the main issue about who is to control what people are exposed to remains open. Second, because we cannot neutralise every source of contamination, we need to categorise the weights of different forms of contamination (racial and gender based are particularly important). Regardless of these problems, it seems that controlling exposure to the serious sources of biasing is a necessary condition for autonomy. This in turn requires that social relations are sensitive to contamination and that the exposure to sources of contamina- tion is more or less socially controlled.

#### Language is particularly important to the way we perceive the world—problematic words corrupt our understanding of the good.

Murdoch 71 Iris (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17

Let me suggest in more detail how I think this process actually happens. This will I hope enable me to clarify the status of the view I hold and to relate it to linguistic philosophy in particular. I have spoken of a process of deepening or complicating, a pro- cess of learning, a progress, which may take place in moral concepts in the dimension which they possess in virtue of their relation to an ideal limit. In describing the example of M and her daughter-in-law I drew attention to the important part played by the normative-descriptive words, the specialized or secondary value words. (Such as ‘vulgar’, ‘spontaneous’, etc.) By means of these words there takes place what we might call ‘the siege of the individual by concepts’. Uses of such words are both instruments and symptoms of learning. Learning takes place when such words are used, either aloud or privately, in the context of particular acts of attention. (M attending to D.) This is a point to be emphasized. That words are not timeless, that word- utterances are historical occasions, has been noted by some philosophers for some purposes. (Strawson notes it when attack- ing the Theory of Descriptions.) But the full implications of this fact, with its consequences for the would-be timeless image of reason, have not, in our modern philosophy, been fully drawn. As Plato observes at the end of the Phaedrus, words themselves do not contain wisdom. Words said to particular individuals at par- ticular times may occasion wisdom. Words, moreover, have both spatio-temporal and conceptual contexts. We learn through attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close attention to objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some extent share their contexts. (Often we cannot.) Uses of words by persons grouped round a common object is a central and vital human activity. The art critic can help us if we are in the presence of the same object and if we know something about his scheme of concepts. Both contexts are relevant to our ability to move towards ‘seeing more’, towards ‘seeing what he sees’. Here, as so often, an aesthetic analogy is helpful for morals. M could be helped by someone who both knew D and whose conceptual scheme M could understand or in that context begin to understand. Progress in understanding of a scheme of con- cepts often takes place as we listen to normative-descriptive talk in the presence of a common object. I have been speaking, in relation to our example, of progress or change for the better, but of course such change (and this is more commonly to be observed) may also be for the worse. Everyday conversation is not necessarily a morally neutral activity and certain ways of describing people can be corrupting and wrong. A smart set of concepts may be a most efficient instrument of corruption. It is especially characteristic of normative words, both desirable and undesirable, to belong to sets or patterns without an appreci- ation of which they cannot be understood. If a critic tells us that a picture has ‘functional colour’ or ‘significant form’ we need to know not only the picture but also something about his general theory in order to understand the remark. Similarly, if M says D is ‘common’, although the term does not belong to a technical vocabulary, this use of it can only be fully understood if we know not only D but M.

Outweighs – a. strength of link – the principle of permitting censorship is consistent with notion of orientation, the correct responsible to corruption is avoidance. b. strength of link – only my advocacy avoids initial exposure to corruption.

#### Universities can not properly treat free speech as a primary good – it must be sacrificed to pursue the university’s appropriate objectives

Fish 94, Stanley Eugene. There's No Such Thing As Free Speech : And It's a Good Thing, Too. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed January 16, 2017). NP

Take the case of universities and colleges. Could it be the purpose of such places to encourage free expression? If the answer were "yes," it would be hard to say why there would be any need for classes, or examinations, or departments, or disciplines, or libraries, since freedom of expression requires nothing but a soapbox or an open telephone line. The very fact of the university's machinery—of the events, rituals, and procedures that fill its calendar—argues for some other, more substantive purpose. In relation to that purpose (which will be realized differently in different kinds of institutions), the flourishing of free expression will in almost all circumstances be an obvious good; but in some circumstances, freedom of expression may pose a threat to that purpose, and at that point it may be necessary to discipline or regulate speech, lest, to paraphrase Milton, the institution sacrifice itself to one of its accidental features.

## Respect Contention

#### Self-respect is a necessary component of agency of both oneself and others

Seglow 16, Jonathan. Hate Speech, Dignity and Self-Respect. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2016) 19:1103–1116 DOI 10.1007/s10677-016-9744-3. July 10, 2016. (bracketed for grammar)

John Rawls (1999), Axel Honneth (1995), Robin Dillon (1997) and other writers agree that self-respect has enormous moral importance as a normative lens which structures individuals’ most basic perception of themselves. Moreover, self-respect is not just a constitutive part of a flourishing life, it also seems extrinsically important as [and] a component of values such as personal autonomy, or successful relationships with others. I understand self-respect as a person’s normative evaluation of her personhood, rights, status, character, situation, achievements, and so on. My focus is on the appropriate and universalisable normative consideration involved in recognition respect; not the particular forms of self-appraisal of one’s talents, accomplishments and excellences of appraisal self-respect (cf. Darwall 1977). Unlike self- esteem, where the criteria of evaluative appraisal are open and thus potentially idiosyncratic (a person might esteem his own racism), a common view is that (recognition) self-respect is an inherently moralised notion. Individuals respect themselves on the basis of reasons, and self-respect’s moral nature means that those reasons are ones which third parties can in principle share. Suppose that A, a racist white person, claims to respect his own racism. Other things being equal, reasonable people have no reason to respect A for his racism. Though A might esteem his own racism, he cannot, on this definition, respect himself for it. In general, I suggest, the reasons A does have to respect himself are just those which B can reasonably endorse as a reason to respect him, and vice versa. Self-respect is a complex concept but I want to pick out two basic dimensions of the idea. The first dimension I shall call agency self-respect and the basic thought is that through authoring their lives, individuals come to appreciate the value of their own agency, which they therefore have reason to respect. One aspect of agency self-respect is deliberation on those aims and attachments which a person wishes to pursue. This serves a person’s self-respect because through such deliberation individuals recognises the independency their own person- hood (they are not instruments of others’ wills) and appreciate their liberty to pursue different options in life. The exercise of critical reflection helps individuals pursue aims and attachments which they value and endorse, rather than ones they regard as alien or worthless. As Rawls emphasises, an important aspect of (agency) self-respect is itself the successful pursuit of those aims, projects and attachments that agents endorses (Rawls 1999, pp.386–7). Pursuing one’s aims successfully involves skills such as planning, perseverance, self-reliance, negotiation, and co- ordination as agents overcome the challenges they inevitably face as they seek to realise their intentions in the world. Both these aspects of agency self-respect require others to respect us in various ways. Individuals need the liberty to deliberate in order to secure their own agency, and an array of options to pursue. More than that, we need our agency to be recognised by those with whom we interact in order to respect it ourselves: we need others positively to affirm that we are indeed competent agents, capable of deliberating, pursuing projects and claiming rights (cf. Honneth 1995, pp.107–21). It’s also worth noting that both these aspects of agency self-respect also have a collective dimension. Persons can deliberate together on what aims and ends they should jointly endorse and pursue, in a way that serves the self-respect of each of them; and in addition they can gain self-respect through pursuing aims or contributing to relationships together. Entitlement self-respect is a second dimension of self-respect and it refers to the reasons a person has to respect herself on the basis of the rights, liberties and institutional entitlements that are recognised by those with whom she interacts. The entitlement dimension thus also makes our self-respect vulnerable to the respect of others. A central part of entitlement self- respect is recognition of a person’s human rights. Our self-respect is maintained through others’ recognition of our rights to freedom of movement, freedom of conscience, and right to own property, for example. Beyond human rights, recognition of entitlements we enjoy as members of various institutions (states, firms, universities, clubs and churches for instance), which may be permissible rather than morally required, is also part of entitlement self-respect. Others’ recognition of a person’s institutional rights and entitlements signals that she is a member in good standing of the relevant institution; the expressive message of their being honoured is an important basis of self-respect. So too is the security which comes from the knowledge that one’s institutional rights can be practically relied upon. Our rights and entitlements typically protect our agency from third party interference and are thus (often if not always) necessary for adequate agency self-respect. Entitlement self-respect is also related to agency self-respect in a further way: our rights and entitlements often need to be actively claimed in order to be activated, and such claiming is an exercise of our agency.

#### Hate speech undermines this, two warrants:

#### Hate speech constitutes an inordinate response to other agents by treating minorities as individuals with nothing worthy of saying or listening to

Seglow 16, Jonathan. Hate Speech, Dignity and Self-Respect. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2016) 19:1103–1116 DOI 10.1007/s10677-016-9744-3. July 10, 2016. (bracketed for grammar)

With these points in mind, we can now consider how hate speech undermines self-respect in both its dimensions i.e. harms its victims whatever intrinsic wrong it may also consist in. As I noted, hate speakers rely upon their victims comprehending and considering their hateful views, else their speech would not have its intended effects. At the same time, hate speech denies that its victims have views which merit others’ comprehension and consideration, as an instance of its more general message that those victims are not properly members of the political community. This undermines agency self-respect in three ways. First, it sets back the interest minority citizens have in deliberation on their aims, insofar as having one’s views considered by others is necessary for such deliberation. Since critically reflecting on one’s aims is an exercise of agency, this gives hate speech’s victims less reason to value their agency. Second, by denying that minorities have views that are significant or worth considering, hate speakers also weaken those minorities’ reasons to have confidence in their aims and projects, insofar as the latter reflect their views. This weakens that aspect of agency self-respect which consists in the successful pursuit of aims one endorses, at least if we think that successfully pursuing one’s aims is harder if the views guiding those aims are disparaged by others. Third, hate speech deforms collective deliberation, since hate speakers do not recognise the capacity of minorities to contribute ideas for collective discussion, whether in the formal political domain or in workplaces, associations, universities and so on. The message of hate speech is that its victims have nothing worth saying, nothing worth listening to. Its perpetrators therefore fail to respect that dimension of their victims’ agency which consists in their standing to be co- deliberants in collective discussion, with something to offer that discussion.

#### Hate speech intrinsically aims to subordinate minorities

Altman 93, Andrew. Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination. Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 2 (Jan., 1993), pp. 302-317

Treating persons as moral subordinates means treating them in a way that takes their interests to be intrinsically less important, an their lives inherently less valuable, than the interests and lives of th who belong to some reference group. There are many ways of treating people as moral subordinates that are natural as opposed to convention the status of these acts as acts of subordination depend solely on universal principles of morality and not on the conventions of a given society. Slavery and genocide, for example, treat people as having inferior moral standing simply in virtue of the affront of such practices to universal moral principles. Other ways of treating people as moral subordinates have both natural and conventional elements. The practice of racial segregation is an example. It is subordinating because the conditions imposed on blacks by such treatment violate moral principles but also because the act of separation is a convention fo (supposedly) proper, subordinate place. I believe that the language of racist, sexist, and homophobic slurs and epithets provides wholly conventional ways of treating people moral subordinates. Terms such as 'kike', 'faggot', 'spic', and 'nigger' are verbal instruments of subordination. They are used not only to express hatred or contempt for people but also to "put them in their place," that is, to treat them as having inferior moral standing.

# Framework Frontlines

### A2 Rule Following Paradox

#### The Platonic notion of the good resolves the rule following paradox – contained in every concept is an understanding of its application

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

I think we can understand what Murdoch wants here by noting how much the Platonic theory leaves open. According to this theory, each concept is associated with norms for its proper use. In order to grasp a given concept, one must satisfy these norms, at least to some degree. But there is room for more complete possession of a concept, for one to approach perfection by meeting its norms in full. Nothing in this account rules out the following possibility: that the norms for concept F and concept G are incompatible, that we cannot perfect our grasp of both. Suppose, for instance, that one act falls under F, another under G. Knowledge that an act is F, with full grasp of the concept, entails decisive motivation: the fact that the act is F is a decisive reason to perform it. At the same time, knowledge that an act is G, with full grasp of the concept, entails decisive motivation: the fact that the act is G is a decisive reason to perform it. It follows that one cannot fully grasp both facts, since one cannot meet both norms. The result is a kind of fragmentation in reason. This description may harbour some hidden incoherence, but it does not conflict with the letter of the Platonic theory. All that is implied is that the standard of ideal rationality in the possession of every concept is unattainable. There are tragedies in which we have decisive reason to do incompatible things. Whether this is true or not is, for Murdoch, a real question: “The notion that ‘it all somehow must make sense’, or ‘there is a best decision here’, preserves from despair; the difficulty is how to entertain this consoling notion in a way which is not false” (Murdoch 1970: 55). If the Good exists, the norms involved in our concepts are compatible: there are no tragedies in which, whatever one does, one acts against a decisive reason. There philosophers’ imprint – 16 – is always a right decision, one that satisfies the norms involved in every concept that applies to one’s circumstance. Belief in the Good is expressed in “the idea [...] that the lines really do converge” (Murdoch 1970: 97): the lines traced out by the norms of each concept, which converge in the Good. “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us” (Murdoch 1970: 90). Perfect grasp of every concept may be psychologically out of reach, but it is not impossible.

#### Only my framework can explain how people perfect their understanding of certain concepts through time

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

With the example of M and D, Murdoch shows how our grasp of mental concepts can deepen and grow, how it can transcend what was apparent in their acquisition. She goes on to make a more startling claim, which she repeats more than once, that “the movement of understanding is onward into increasing privacy” (Murdoch 1970: 28). philosophers’ imprint – 18 – Murdoch insists that the language of moral reasons is “unavoidably idiosyncratic and inaccessible” (Murdoch 1970: 33). There is no single end-point to the perfect grasp of mental concepts: there may be several ways to apply a concept, and to respond to its use, that are equally and perfectly ideal. As we evolve in different ways, we may become increasingly unintelligible to one another, without any of us having gone wrong.47 This feature of Murdoch’s view makes her opposition to the genetic theory, with its emphasis on public standards, especially sharp. But it is not essential to it: a Platonist for whom each concept has a single perfect form would still deny the genetic theory and could argue for Moral Internalism in the same way. And it is potentially at odds with Murdoch’s second Platonism, about the unity and reality of the Good, which stresses convergence, not idiosyncrasy. Is there a contradiction here? In my view, there is not: the appearance of conflict is superficial. To believe in the Good is to believe that one can perfect one’s grasp of every concept. It is not to believe that there is just one way of doing so. Belief in the Good is thus consistent with the privacy of perfect understanding. Still, on my reading, the doctrine of privacy can be severed from the rest of Murdoch’s view: it does not follow from her central claims.

#### Contained in our ability to perceive the world is an inherent understanding of the appropriate response – misapplication of rules is impossible since application is contained in true moral vision

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

No doubt these proposals raise questions of their own. Perhaps the result is to make the epistemology of the mental more mysterious than it seemed. We won’t pursue that issue here. Our task is to find in Murdoch a theory of concepts that makes sense of Moral Internalism. She rejects the genetic theory, and her claim is not merely about thick concepts but about the whole range of thoughts with which we articulate our social world. What account does she give? The clue to Murdoch’s picture lies in the invocation of “realism”, which we encountered in section 1. In a Platonic mode, Murdoch connects the realism of virtue with the “appreciation of beauty in art and nature”, which is “a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real” (Murdoch 1970: 63).36 Great art shares in the exactness and objective attention Murdoch associates with morals. The same is true of technai in general: in an intellectual discipline, “I am confronted by an authoritative structure which commands my respect. [...] Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of reality” (Murdoch 1970: 87). And in the most general formulation of all: “The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact” (Murdoch 1970: 64). It is possible to extract from these increasingly abstract claims a Platonic theory of concepts and concept-possession.37 This theory appliestoallconcepts,notjusttothosewhicharemorallyrelevant:“Are there forms of mud, hair and dirt? If there are then nature is redeemed into the area of truthful vision. (My previous argument assumes of course, in Platonic terms, that there are.)” (Murdoch 1970: 86) In outline, the theory is this: each concept is associated with norms for its proper use, both practical and theoretical; these norms describe when the concept should be applied and what follows from its application, both cognitively and in relation to the will; to grasp a given concept is to approximate, in one’s dispositions of thought, a conformity with these norms. **Concept-possession thus comes by** degree and points to a limit we may never reach: **perfect compliance with the norms by which our concepts are defined.**

### A2 Naturalistic Fallacy

#### Goodness is constituted through moral knowledge and appropriate orientation towards the external world – in our comprehension of empirical natural facts grows an appreciation of the responses required by reason

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

On this view we are certainly in a sense less free than we are pictured as being on the other view, in that the latter presents a condition of perfect freedom as being either our unavoidable fate (the Surrealists) or our conceivably attainable goal (the Kan- tians). Freedom for Hampshire is a matter of having crystal-clear intentions. But on the view which I suggest, which connects morality with attention to individuals, human individuals or individual realities of other kinds, the struggle and the progress is something more obscure, more historically conditioned, and usually less clearly conscious. Freedom, itself a moral concept and not just a prerequisite of morality, cannot here be separated from the idea of knowledge. That of which it is knowledge, that ‘reality’ which we are so naturally led to think of as revealed by just ‘attention’, can of course, given the variety of human personality and situation, only be thought of as ‘one’, as a single object for all men, in some very remote and ideal sense. It is a deep paradox of moral philosophy that almost all philosophers have been led in one way or another to picture goodness as knowledge: and yet to show this in any sort of detail, to show ‘reality’ as ‘one’, seems to involve an improper prejudging of some moral issue. An acute consciousness of this latter difficulty has indeed made it seem axiomatic to recent philosophers that ‘naturalism is a fallacy’. But I would suggest that at the level of serious common sense and of an ordinary non-philosophical reflection about the nature of morals it is perfectly obvious that goodness is connected with knowledge: not with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certainly perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline.

### A2 “What is the Good”

#### Claiming that we can not understand or find the good represents a corruption of philosophy

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Good has often been said to be indefinable for reasons con- nected with freedom. Good is an empty space into which human choice may move. I want now to suggest that the inde- finability of the good should be conceived of rather differently. On the kind of view which I have been offering it seems that we do really know a certain amount about Good and about the way in which it is connected with our condition. The ordinary per- son does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that [s]he creates values by his choices. [s]He thinks that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting it wrong. We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which Good lies. Equally we recognize the real existence of evil: cynicism, cruelty, indifference to suffering. However, the concept of Good still remains obscure and mysterious. **We see the world in the light of the Good**, but what is the Good itself? The source of vision is not in the ordinary sense seen. Plato says of it ‘It is that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does all that it does, with some intuition of its nature, and yet also baffled’ (Republic 505). And he also says that Good is the source of knowledge and truth and yet is something which surpasses them in splendour (Republic 508–9).

#### The true ethical theory will be one that recognizes and embraces the inarticulacy of the good

Ebels-Duggan 15. June 24, 2015. More than Words Can Say: On Inarticulacy and Normative Commitment (by Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Philosopher). NP 9/12/16.

Desires aren’t alone here. Think of what it is like to love someone. Love for a person is almost never a state to which one explicitly reasons. That is, one usually does not, and arguably could not, come to love someone merely by considering claims ascribing admirable qualities to him, or thinking through an argument for the conclusion that one has sufficient reason to love him. Rather, one normally comes to love someone through experience of him, experience in which one appreciates directly the value that one’s love affirms. But love for another is not well understood as a brute preference or whim, unintelligible as a headache or an urge to put parsley on the moon. Even so, just as one couldn’t have arrived at love through reasoning, so one can neither bring another to share the commitment through argument, nor even fully express the reasons for one’s love, through mere report. One may have completely sufficient reasons, while yet being unable to say what these reasons are. In fact, having reasons, perfectly adequate reasons that fully justify an attitude, without being able to say what they are appears to me to be very common. It happens with respect to belief, intention, hope, fear, and a host of other attitudes. These states are all reason responsive, or judgments sensitive. But they are often, perhaps almost always, formed without or prior to explicit reasoning, and becoming articulate about the reasons to which they respond can be extremely difficult, and may sometimes be impossible in principle. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it’s no accident that philosophers have widely overlooked the ambiguity in Nagel’s presentation, or the more general phenomena of which it is an instance. Articulacy about our reasons is an ideal that we hold dear, an ideal that informs both our substantive views and the methods by which we purport to arrive at them. Our commitments, we think, should be based on reasons, and—here’s the move—these reasons should be expressible as claims that could figure in a philosophical argument. Our values should thus wait on the arguments supporting them. If you can’t communicate the reasons for your commitments, and aren’t willing to regard them as brute preferences or matters of taste, then you ought to revise, abandon, or at least suspend them. But if having reasons without being able to say what they are is a normal part of the human condition, then this is a mistaken demand for unwarranted skepticism. So, having begun with a narrow observation about an ambiguity in philosophical terminology, I end with a plea for humility and patience with others and with ourselves. It is surprisingly easy to overlook the large class of reasonable commitments for which people are faultlessly unable to articulate their reasons. When we do so we are prone to wield the tools of philosophical argument like a cudgel. We excuse ourselves from charitable engagement with the perspectives of those who lack the relevant training. We drive our students to skeptical stances that most of us don’t ourselves support. We do so while commending a misleading picture of philosophy as unrestrained discussion that leads us to truth through the inexorable force of the stronger argument. We should, rather, expect, acknowledge, and perhaps even encourage inarticulacy. Even supposing that it is salutary to try to arrive at, or at least more nearly approach, articulacy about our reasons, it would be misguided to condition our commitments on the completion of this difficult task, or to encourage others to do so. Our relationships with others ought not be predicated on the premise that they need to support their commitments in argument before those commitments deserve to be taken seriously. For that matter, neither should our relationships with ourselves.

### A2 Love K

#### The importance of moral love does not mean that we should have love for those that harm us – love may push us to dissociate from those people

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Murdoch’s theory of love is initially puzzling. Why should accurate perception of another, even with perfect grasp of the concepts applied, go along with love, not loathing or contempt? Suppose D really were tiresome and juvenile, or, if those are defective concepts, consider the “clear-eyed contemplation of the misery and evil of the world” (Murdoch 1970: 59). Must the agents of evil be objects of love? Murdoch’s thought is that they must. The air of paradox in this claim can be dissolved in part by recalling that the love in question is not selective — it is not fondness or affection or the desire for intimacy — but love as a moral emotion.48 (The example of M and D is misleading in this respect. It is an accident that the object of M’s loving gaze is her daughter-in-law, not a murderer or an acquaintance at work.) The love that interests Murdoch is the love one should have for one’s neighbour — that is, for anyone with whom one interacts.49 If love in this sense is partial, that is only because we are limited. “Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real” (Murdoch 1959: 215). Since everyone is real, we ought to love them all. It does not follow from this that we should feel affection for everyone or that we should pursue their interests. Love involves “true vision” and leads us to act towards others as we are morally required to act. It might be out of love that we prevent them from doing harm, or berate them, or refuse to associate with them.

#### You misunderstand – love is not an inherent good – it can be oriented towards the wrong ends.

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

However I think that Good and Love should not be identified, and not only because human love is usually self-assertive. The concepts, even when the idea of love is purified, still play differ- ent roles. We are dealing here with very difficult metaphors. Good is the magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves. False love moves to false good. False love embraces false death. When true good is loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is automatically refined, and when the soul is turned towards Good the highest part of the soul is enlivened. Love is the tension between the imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived of as lying beyond it. (In the Symposium Plato pictures Love as being poor and needy.) And when we try perfectly to love what is imperfect our love goes to its object via the Good to be thus purified and made unselfish and just. The mother loving the retarded child or loving the tiresome elderly relation. Love is the general name of the quality of attachment and it is capable of infinite degradation and is the source of our greatest errors; but when it is even partially refined it is the energy and passion of the soul in its search for Good, the force that joins us to Good and joins us to the world through Good. Its existence is the unmistakable sign that we are spiritual creatures, attracted by excellence and made for the Good. It is a reflection of the warmth and light of the sun.

# Framework – Reasons to Prefer

### Generic

#### Only the Platonic/Augustinian ethic can account for the disjunction between knowing what is right and choosing to do it – since oppressive attitudes are often ingrained rather than rational, this is a necessary component of any coherent theory.

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Finally, the Platonic theory casts light on Murdoch’s attitude to defective concepts and conceptual change. Suppose that possession of a putative concept involves being disposed to think or react in immoral ways: the concept is one that a virtuous person would not have. Examples might be chastity or self-denial. It is an implication of Murdoch’s view that such putative concepts fail. Since the norms definitive of any concept are norms of reason, genuine concepts cannot be in this way flawed.42 Those who use the relevant words may appear to be thinking, but they are not. It is consistent with this that our present concepts are limited, that there are facets of reason to which they afford no access, and that there is pressure for us to revise and extend our thoughts.

#### The only way to overcome dehumanization and treatment of others as things to be used is through an orientation of love

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

More significantly, Murdoch’s focus is not on the concepts with which we describe our options — just, courageous, cruel — and whose application guides action, but on the concepts with which we describe our circumstance and the people with whom we interact. Think back to M and D. What the mother gains is not a deeper apprehension of her own moral character, or of her behaviour, but of her daughter-in- law and what she is really like. Nor does Murdoch confine herself to concepts that carry a specific valence, positive or negative, like the ones on Williams’ list. As becomes increasingly clear in the second essay of Sovereignty, the knowledge that constitutes virtue is not knowledge of the Good, or even of particular virtues, but of the real existence of other people: “The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” (Murdoch 1970: 64).

### Unity of Identity

#### Only Augustine’s focus on the ordered and hierarchal will can possibly unify the concept of personal identity. Only by a rational reorientation of what we value as the central criteria of the moral self does the concept of the free self-make any sense at all.

Gary **Watson** [big deal philosopher on issues of free will]. “Free Agency” in Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Free Will Second Edition. Originally from Journal of Philosophy1975.

Now it seems to me that—given the view of freedom as the ability to get what one wants—there can be a problem of free action only if the platonic conception of the soul is (roughly) correct. **The doctrine I** shall **defend is platonic** in the sense that **it involves a distinction between valuing and desiring** which depends upon there being in­dependent sources of motivation. No doubt Plato meant con­siderably more than this by his parts-of-the-soul doctrine; but he meant at least this. The platonic conception provides an answer to the question I posed earlier (207): in what sense can what one most wants differ from that which is the object of the strongest desire? The answer is that the phrase ‘what one most wants' may mean either “the object of the strongest desire" or “what one most values” This phrase can be interpreted in terms of strength or in terms of ranking order or preference. **The problem of free action arises because what one desires may not be what one values,** and what one most values may not be what one is finally moved to get.\* I \* \* 4 The tacit identification of desiring or wanting with valuing is so common5 that it is necessary to cite some examples of this distinc­tion in order to illustrate how evaluation and desire may diverge. There seem to be two ways in which, in principle, a discrepancy may arise. First, it is possible that what one desires is not to any degree valued, held to be worth while, or thought good; one assigns no value whatever to the object of one's desire. Second, although one may indeed value what is desired, the strength of one's desire may not properly reflect the degree to which one values its object; that is, although the object of a desire is valuable, it may not be deemed the most valuable in the situation and yet one's desire for it may be stronger than the want for what is most valued. The cases in which one in no way values what one desires are perhaps rare, but surely they exist. **Consider** the case of **a woman who has a sudden urge to drown her bawling child** in the bath; or the case of a squash player who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the face with the racquet. **It is** just **false that the mother values her child’s being drowned** or that the player values the injury and suffering of his opponent. But they desire these thingsnonetheless. They desire them in spite of themselves.It is not that they assign to these actions an initial value which is then outweighed by other considerations. These activities are not even represented by a positive entry, however small, on the initial “desirability matrix." It may seem from these examples that this first and radical sort of divergence between desiring and valuing occurs only in the case of momentary and inexplicable urges or impulses. Yet I see no conclusive reason why a person could not be similarly estranged from a rather persistent and pervasive desire, and one that is ex­plicable enough. Imagine a man who thinks his sexual inclinations are the work of the devil, that the very fact that he has sexual inclinations bespeaks his corrupt nature. This example is to be contrasted with that of the celibate who decides that the most ful­filling life for him will be one of abstinence. In this latter case, one of the things that receive consideration in the process of reaching his all-things-considered judgment is the value of sexual activity. There is something, from his point of view, to be said for sex, but there is more to be said in favor of celibacy. In contrast, **the man** who is **estranged from his sexual inclinations does not acknowledge** even **a prima facie reason for sexual activity**; that he is sexually inclined toward certain activities is not even a consideration. An­other way of illustrating the difference is to say that, for the one man, forgoing sexual relationships constitutes a loss, even if negli­gible compared with the gains of celibacy; whereas from the standpoint of the other person, no loss is sustained at all. Now, it must be admitted, any desire may provide the basis for a reason insofar as nonsatisfaction of the desire causes suffering and hinders the pursuit of ends of the agent. But it is important to notice that the reason generated in this way by a desire is a reason for getting rid of the desire, and one may get rid of a desire either by satisfying it or by eliminating it in some other manner (by tranquilizers, or cold showers). Hence this kind of reason differs importantly from the reasons based upon the evaluation of the activities or states of affairs in question. For, in the former case, attaining the object of desire is simply a means of eliminating discomfort or agitation, whereas in the latter case that attainment is the end itself. Normally, in the pursuit of the objects of our wants we are not attempting chiefly to relieve ourselves. We aim to satisfy, not just eliminate, desire. Nevertheless, aside from transitory impulses, it may be that cases wherein nothing at all can be said in favor of the object of one's desire are rare. For it would seem that even the person who con­ceives his sexual desires to be essentially evil would have to admit that indulgence would be pleasurable, and surely that is some­thing. (Perhaps not even this should be admitted. For indulgence may not yield pleasure at all in a context of anxiety. Furthermore, it is not obvious that pleasure is intrinsically good, independently of the worth of the pleasurable object.) In any case, the second sort of divergence between evaluation and desire remains: **it is possible that**, in a particular context, **what one wants most strongly is not what one most values.** The distinction between valuing and desiring is not, it is crucial to see, a distinction among desires or wants according to their content. That is to say, there is nothing in the specification of the objects of an agent's desires that singles out some wants as based upon that agent’s values. **The distinction** in question **has** rather **to do with** the source of the want or with **its role in the total “system" of the agent's** desires and **ends.** It has to do with why the agent wants what he does. Obviously, to identify a desire or want simply in terms of its content is not to identify its source(s). It does not follow from my wanting to eat that I am hungry. I may want to eat because I want to be well-nourished; or because I am hungry; or because eating is a pleasant activity. This single desire may have three independent sources. (These sources may not be altogether independent. It may be that eating is pleasurable only because I have appetites for food.) Some specifications of wants or desires—for instance, as cravings—pick out (at least roughly) the source of the motivation. It is an essential feature of the appetites and the passions that they engender (or consist in) desires whose existence and persistence are independent of the person’s judgment of the good. The appe­tite of hunger involves a desire to eat which has a source in physical needs and physiological states of the hungry organism. And emo­tions such as anger and fear partly consist in spontaneous inclina­tions to do various things—to attack or to flee the object of one’s emotion, for example. It is intrinsic to the appetites and passions that appetitive and passionate beings can be motivated in spite of themselves. It is **because desires** such as these **arise independently of the person’s** judgment and **values** that the ancients located the emo­tions and passions in the irrational part of the soul; 6 and it is because of this sort of independence that a **conflict between valuing and desiring is possible.**7 These points may suggest an inordinately dualistic view accord­ing to which persons are split into inevitably alien, if not always antagonistic, halves. But this view does not follow from what has been said. As central as it is to human life, it is not often noted that some activities are valued only to the extent that they are objects of the appetites. This means that such activities would never be regarded as valuable constituents of one’s life were it not for one’s susceptibility to “blind” motivation—motivation inde­pendent of one’s values. Sexual activity and eating are again ex­amples. We may value the activity of eating to the degree that it provides nourishment. But we may also value it because it is an enjoyable activity, even though its having this status depends upon our appetites for food, our hunger. In the case of sex, in fact, if we were not erotic creatures, certain activities would not only lose their value to us, they might not even be physiologically possible. These examples indicate, not that there is no distinction between desiring and valuing, but that the value placed upon certain activities depends upon their being the fulfillment of desires that arise and persist independently of what we value. So it is not that, when we value the activity of eating, we think there are reasons to eat no matter what other desires we have; rather, we value eating when food appeals to us; and, likewise, we value sexual relation- ships when we are aroused. Here an essential part of the content of our evaluation is that the activity in question be motivated by cer­tain appetites. These activities may have value for us only insofar as they are appetitively motivated, even though to have these appetites is not ipso facto to value their objects. Part of what it means to value some activities in this way is this: we judge that to cease to have such appetites is to lose something of worth. The judgment here is not merely that, if someone has these appetites, it is worth while (ceteris paribus) for him to in­dulge them. The judgment is rather that it is of value to have and (having them) to indulge these appetites. The former judgment does not account for the eunuch’s loss or sorrow, whereas the latter does. And the latter judgment lies at the bottom of the discomfort one may feel when one envisages a situation in which, say, hunger is consistently eliminated and nourishment provided by insipid capsules. It would be impossible for a non-erotic being or a person who lacked the appetite for food and drink fully to understand the value most of us attach to sex and to dining. Sexual activity must strike the non-erotic being as perfectly grotesque. (Perhaps that is why lust is sometimes said to be disgusting and sinful in the eyes of God.) Or consider an appetite that is in fact “unnatural” (i.e., acquired): the craving for tobacco. To a person who has never known the enticement of Lady Nicotine, what could be more incomprehensible than the filthy practice of consummating a fine meal by drawing into one’s lungs the noxious fumes of a burning weed? Thus, the relationship between evaluation and motivation is in­tricate. With respect to many of our activities, evaluation depends upon the possibility of our being moved to act independently of our judgment. So the distinction I have been pressing—that between desiring and valuing—does not commit one to an inevitable split between Reason and Appetite. Appetitively motivated activities may well constitute for a person the most worth-while aspects of his life.8 But the distinction does commit us to the possibility of such a split. If there are sources of motivation independent of the agent’s values, then it is possible that sometimes he is motivated to do things he does not deem worth doing. This possibility is the basis for the principal problem of free action: a person may be obstructed by his own will. A related possibility that presents considerable problems for the understanding of free agency is this: some desires, when they arise, may “color” or influence what appear to be the agent's evaluations, but only temporarily. That is, when and only when he has the desire, is he inclined to think or say that what is desired or wanted is worth while or good. This possibility is to be distinguished from another, according to which one thinks it worth while to eat when one is hungry or to engage in sexual activity when one is so inclined. For one may think this even on the occasions when the appetites are silent. The possibility I have in mind is rather that what one is disposed to say or judge is temporarily affected by the presence of the desire in such a way that, both before and after the “onslaught” of the desire, one judges that the desire's object is worth pur­suing (in the circumstances) whether or not one has the desire. In this case one is likely, in a cool moment, to think it a matter for regret that one had been so influenced and to think that one should guard against desires that have this property. In other cases it may not be the desire itself that affects one's judgment, but the set of conditions in which those desires arise—e.g., the conditions in­duced by drugs or alcohol. (It is noteworthy that we say: “under the influence of alcohol.'') Perhaps judgments made in such cir­cumstances are often in some sense self-deceptive. In any event, this phenomenon raises problems about the identification of a person's values. Despite our examples, it would be mistaken to conclude that the only desires that exhibit an independence of evaluation are appetitive or passionate desires. **In Freudian terms, one may be as dissociated from the demands of the super-ego as from those of the id.** One may be disinclined to move away from one's family, the thought of doing so being accompanied by compunction; and yet this disinclination may rest solely upon acculturation rather than upon a current judgment of what one is to do, reflecting per­haps an assessment of one's “duties” and interests. Or, taking another example, one may have been habituated to think that divorce is to be avoided in all cases, so that the aversion to divorce persists even though one sees no justification for maintaining one's marriage. In both of these cases, the attitude has its basis solely in acculturation and exists independently of the agent’s judgment. For this reason, acculturated desires are irrational (better: nonrational) in the same sense as appetitive and passionate desires. In fact, despite the inhibitions acquired in the course of a puritan up-bring­ing, a person may deem the pursuit of sexual pleasure to be worth while, his judgment siding with the id rather than the super-ego. Acculturated attitudes may seem more akin to evaluation than to appetite in that they are often expressed in evaluative language (“divorce is wicked”) and result in feelings of guilt when one’s actions are not in conformity with them. But, since conflict is pos­sible here, to want something as a result of acculturation is not thereby to value it, in the sense of ‘to value’ that we want to capture. It is not easy to give a nontrivial account of the sense of ‘to value’ in question. In part, to value something is, in the appropriate circumstances, to want it, and to attribute a want for something to someone is to say that he is disposed to try to get it. So it will not be easy to draw this distinction in behavioral terms. Apparently the difference will have to do with the agent’s attitude toward the various things he is disposed to try to get. We might say that an agent’s values consist in those principles and ends which he—in a cool and non-self-deceptive moment—articulates as definitive of the good, fulfilling, and defensible life. That most people have articulate “conceptions of the good,” coherent life-plans, systems of ends, and so on, is of course something of a fiction. Yet we all have more or less long-term aims and normative principles that we are willing to defend. It is such things as these that are to be identified with our values. The valuational system of an agent is that set of considerations which, when combined with his factual beliefs (and probability estimates), yields judgments of the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, is a. To ascribe free agency to a being presupposes it to be a being that makes judgments of this sort. To be this sort of being, one must assign values to alternative states of affairs, that is, rank them in terms of worth.The motivational system of an agent is that set of considerations which move him to action. We identify his motivational system by identifying what motivates him. **The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that an agent’s valuational system and motivational system may not** completely **coincide.** Those systems harmonize to the extent that what determines the agent’s all-things-considered judgments also determines his actions. Now, to be sure, since to value is also to want, one’s valuational and motivational systems must to a large extent overlap. If, in appropriate circumstances, one were never inclined to action by some alleged evaluation, the claim that that was indeed one’s evaluation would be disconfirmed. Thus one’s valuational system must have some (considerable) grip upon one's motivational system. The problem is that there are motivational factors other than valuational ones. **The free agent has the capacity to translate his [her] values into action**; his actions flow from his evaluational system. **One’s evaluational system may be said to constitute one’s standpoint**, the point of view from which one judges the world. The important feature of one’s evaluational system is that **one cannot coherently dissociate oneself from it in its entirety**. **For to dissociate** oneself **from** the ends and principles that constitute **one’s evaluational system is to disclaim or repudiate them, and any ends and principles so disclaimed** (self-deception aside) **cease to be constitutive of one’s valuational system.** One can dissociate oneself from one set of ends and principles only from the standpoint of another such set that one does not disclaim. In short, **one cannot dissociate oneself from all normative judgments without forfeiting** all standpoints and therewith **one’s identity as an agent.** Of course, it does not follow from the fact that one must assume some standpoint that one must have only one, nor that one’s standpoint is completely determinate. There may be ultimate conflicts, irresolvable tensions, and things about which one simply does not know what to do or say. Some of these possibilities point to problems about the unity of the person. Here the extreme case is pathological. I am inclined to think that when the split is severe enough, to have more than one standpoint is to have none.

**Watson:** Desires must be distinct from our values – people have desires that fail to unify their identity– e.g. when a mom momentarily desires to drown her child - we must separate desires from the person, and only values, not desires, can be unified. Thus, our standing as a person must be defined by our values.

### Action Theory

#### Only the Platonic/Augustinian account of ethics provides a coherent theory of action that explains moral categories like weakness of the will. Anything else lacks unified agency necessary to explain the phenomena of moral reasoning.

Davidson 1. Davidson, Donald. 2001. *How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? Essays on Actions and Events.* NP 7/26/16.

The situation is common; life is crowded with examples: I ought to do it because it will save a life, I ought not because it will be a lie; if I do it, I will break my word to Lavina, if I don't, I will break my word to Lolita; and so on. Anyone may find himself in this fix, whether he be upright or temporizing, weak‐willed or strong. But then unless we take the line that moral principles cannot conflict in application to a case, we must give up the concept of the nature of practical reason we have so far been assuming. For how can premises, all of which are true (or acceptable), entail a contradiction? It is astonishing that in contemporary moral philosophy this problem has received little attention, and no satisfactory treatment. Those who recognize the difficulty seem ready to accept one of two solutions: in effect they allow only a single ultimate moral principle; or they rest happy with the notion of a distinction between the prima facie desirable (good, obligatory, etc.) and the absolutely desirable (good, obligatory, etc).17 I shall not argue the point here, but I do not believe any version of the ‘single principle’ solution, once its implications are understood, can be accepted: principles, or reasons for acting, are irreducibly multiple. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how to take advantage of the purported distinction between prima facie and absolute value. Suppose first that we try to think of (p.35) ‘prima facie’ as an attributive adverb, helping to form such predicates as ‘x is prima facie good, right, obligatory’ or ‘x is better, prima facie, than y’. To avoid our recent trouble, we must suppose that ‘x is better, prima facie, than y’ does not contradict ‘y is better, prima facie, than x’, and that ‘x is prima facie right’ does not contradict ‘x is prima facie wrong’. But then the conclusion we can draw, in every case of conflict (and hence of incontinence) will be ‘x is better, prima facie, than y, and y is better, prima facie, than x’. This comes down, as is clear from the structure practical reasoning would have on this assumption, to saying ‘There is something to be said for, and something to be said against, doing so and so—and also for and against not doing it.’ Probably this can be said about any action whatsoever; in any case it is hard to accept the idea that the sum of our moral wisdom concerning what to do in a given situation has this form. The situation I describe is not altered in any interesting way if ‘prima facie’ or ‘prima facie obligatory’ is treated as a (non‐truth‐functional) sentential operator rather than as a predicate. I shall return shortly to this problem; now let us reconsider incontinence. The image we get of incontinence from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hare is of a battle or struggle between two contestants. Each contestant is armed with his argument or principle. One side may be labelled ‘passion’ and the other ‘reason’; they fight**; one side wins, the wrong side, the side called ‘passion’ (or ‘lust’ or ‘pleasure’). There is, however, a competing image (to be found in Plato, as well as in Butler and many others). It is adumbrated perhaps by Dante (who thinks he is following Aquinas and Aristotle) when he speaks of the incontinent man as one who ‘lets desire pull reason from her throne’ (Inferno, Canto v).** Here there are three actors on the stage: reason, desire, and the one who lets desire get the upper hand. The third actor is perhaps named ‘The Will’ (or ‘Conscience’). It is up to The Will to decide who wins the battle. If The Will is strong, {it} he gives the palm to reason; if {it} he is weak, he {it} may allow pleasure or passion the upper hand. This second image is, I suggest, superior to the first, absurd as we may find both. **On the first story, not only can we not account for incontinence; it is not clear how we can ever blame the agent for what he does: his action merely reflects the outcome of a struggle within him**. What could he do about it? And more important, **the first image does not allow us to make sense of a conflict in one (p.36) person's soul, for it leaves no room for the all‐important process of weighing considerations.**18 In the second image, the agent's representative, The Will, can judge the strength of the arguments on both sides, can execute the decision, and take the rap. The only trouble is that we seem back where we started. For how can The Will judge one course of action better and yet choose the other?

# Framework Interaction

## Different Virtue Theories

### Aristotelian

#### Aristotelian virtue ethics fail – Aristotle’s account of action can not account for incontinent actions and fails to sufficiently abstract from the state of mind of an agent

Davidson 1. Davidson, Donald. 2001. *How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? Essays on Actions and Events.* NP 7/26/16.

In the simplest case, we imagine that the agent has a desire, for example, to know the time. He realizes that by looking at his watch he will satisfy his desire; so he looks at his watch. We can answer the question why he looked at his watch; we know the intention with which he did it. Following Aristotle, the desire may be conceived as a principle of action, and its natural propositional expression would here be something like ‘It would be good for me to know the time’ or, even more stiffly, ‘Any act of mine that results in my knowing the time is desirable.’ Such a principle Aristotle compares to the major premise in a syllogism. The propositional expression of the agent's belief would in this case be, ‘Looking at my watch will result in my knowing the time’: this corresponds to the minor premise. Subsuming (p.32) the case under the rule, the agent performs the desirable action: he looks at his watch. It seems that, given this desire and this belief, the agent is in a position to infer that looking at his watch is desirable, and in fact the making of such an inference is something it would be natural to describe as subsuming the case under the rule. But given the desire and this belief, the conditions are also satisfied that lead to (and hence explain) an intentional action, so Aristotle says that once a person has the desire and believes some action will satisfy it, straightway he acts. Since there is no distinguishing the conditions under which an agent is in a position to infer that an action he is free to perform is desirable from the conditions under which he acts, Aristotle apparently identifies drawing the inference and acting: he says, ‘the conclusion is an action’. But of course this account of intentional action and practical reason contradicts the assumption that there are incontinent actions. As long as we keep the general outline of Aristotle's theory before us, I think we cannot fail to realize that he can offer no satisfactory analysis of incontinent action. No doubt he can explain why, in borderline cases, we are tempted both to say an agent acted intentionally and that he knew better. But if we postulate a strong desire from which he acted, then on the theory, we also attribute to the agent a strong judgement that the action is desirable; and if we emphasize that the agent's ability to reason to the wrongness of his action was weakened or distorted, to that extent we show that he did not fully appreciate that what he was doing was undesirable. It should not be supposed we can escape Aristotle's difficulty simply by giving up the doctrine that having the reasons for action always results in action. We might allow, for example, that a man can have a desire and believe an action will satisfy it, and yet fail to act, and add that it is only if the desire and belief cause him to act that we can speak of an intentional action.15 On such a modified version of Aristotle's theory (if it really is a modification) we would still have to explain why in some cases the desire and belief caused an action, while in other cases they merely led to the judgement that a course of action was desirable. The incontinent man believes it would be better on the whole to do something else, but he has a reason for what he does, for his (p.33) action is intentional. We must therefore be able to abstract from his behaviour and state of mind a piece of practical reasoning the conclusion of which is, or would be if the conclusion were drawn from the premises, that the action actually performed is desirable. Aristotle tends to obscure this point by concentrating on cases where the incontinent man behaves ‘under the influence of rule and an opinion’ (Nic. Eth., 1147b; cf. 1102b).

### Habit Focus

#### Augustine’s conception of identity and virtue accounts for both our capacity to be good and our capacity to be evil – our will is the source of our character

**Kent**. BONNIE KENT. Augustine’s ethics. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Edited by Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann. NP 7/25/16. 210

Where ancient philosophers typically regard habit as the genus of virtue, Augustine tends to regard it as the enemy of virtue.84 Moral character is not the combined product of native aptitude and appropriate habituation, much less an expression of one’s success or failure in attaining wisdom. Nor does moral devel- opment follow the horticultural model, where good “root stock,” appropriate soil and climate, and other fortunate circumstances prove indispensable for the production of an outstanding, flourishing specimen. Character depends on the will, by which one might break the bonds of habit and turn away from one’s own past. Hence the importance of conversion, the “turning around” that marks the decisive moment in a Christian’s life. Although the mature Augustine believed that God alone can turn someone away from her own dismal past and produce the correct orientation, he still saw in human beings a power ever capable of responding to God. We are by our very nature suprising creatures: never completely past hope of salvation, never com- pletely beyond danger of degeneration, never thoroughly predictable to mortal observers. Given the vast human penchant for self-deception, we can never even be sure that we know ourselves, much less feel confident in predicting our own moral futures. Augustine himself sees nothing anxiety-producing in his vision of humanity’s moral condition. Were God committed to judging brute performance, as Pelagians teach, we would surely all be doomed. But because God is loving and gives full credit for progress and having “one’s heart in the right place,” every one of us has reason to try her best and to hope for God’s grace. The strangely dem- ocratic aspect of Augustine’s ethics, often unnoticed, is that neither native intel- ligence, nor wealth, nor sound “parenting,” nor a well-ordered political community, nor any combination of these makes any great difference to whether we shall eventually become virtuous and attain true happiness. Without God’s grace, the most brilliant, aristocratic philosophers and the most illiterate, penu- rious peasants are all in the same boat; and those with God’s grace have no reason to feel proud.

### Stoicism

#### Stoicism fails – it contradicts all we know about human nature

Kent. BONNIE KENT. Augustine’s ethics. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Edited by Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann. NP 7/25/16. 210

Stoicism rates higher in Augustine’s judgment than Epicureanism, for the Stoics taught that happiness comes not from the pleasure of the body but from the virtue of the mind.20 Agreeing that the virtue of the mind is a necessary con- dition for happiness, Augustine concentrates on arguing that it cannot be a suffi- cient condition. One objection, already made by his philosophical predecessors, says that the Stoic view flies in the face of common sense. Anybody who insists that “a man can be happy on the rack” must be so much in the grip of a theory that he can no longer recognize the obvious: that human beings are not merely minds but composites of bodies and minds, so that we cannot be happy when suf- fering intense physical pain, regardless of how virtuous we might be. Augustine adds to this standard objection that Stoics err in the direction of arrogance, just as Epicureans err in the direction of sordidness; as Epicureans overweight pleas- ure, so Stoics overweight glory. In praising virtue as the highest human good, says Augustine, the Stoics try to make other people feel ashamed. They themselves should feel ashamed of whittling down the supreme good to such a point that they can claim to be the sole cause of their own happiness, instead of acknowledging that mere human beings cannot make themselves happy. Even if the Stoics were correct in teaching that a virtuous mind suffices to make a person happy, they would still be mistaken in failing to recognize that the mind’s virtue is itself a gift of God, not a triumph of human achievement.21 Augustine’s mature works initially appear inconsistent regarding our pros- pects for happiness in the present life. Some texts seem to suggest that at least Christians can be happy now, by living in hope of union with God after death; other texts seem to deny that even the greatest degree of hope suffices to make anyone happy in the present. When speaking with precision, Augustine says that nobody can attain happiness in the present life, and yet anyone who accepts the present life with firm hope of the afterlife “may without absurdity be called ‘happy’ even now, though rather by future hope than in present reality.”22 This carefully nuanced position reflects his concern to avoid downgrading the ideal of happiness while still providing some grounds for the use of “happiness” in every- day speech.

#### Analyzing virtue using an all or nothing paradigm is flawed – virtue is instead accumulated through the intent to resist vice

**Kent**. BONNIE KENT. Augustine’s ethics. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Edited by Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann. NP 7/25/16. 210

Quite early in the letter Augustine expresses distaste for the paradoxes that Stoic philosophers derive from their all-or-nothing view of moral character: a person has no wisdom at all until he has perfect wisdom; there are no degrees of virtue and vice; the transition from vice to virtue must accordingly be complete and instantaneous, as when someone drowning suddenly bursts forth into the air; and all faults (or sins: in Latin, peccata) must therefore be equal, for even if one person is only a hand’s breadth beneath the surface while another is fathoms deep, both are equally drowning. Augustine does not make it as clear as he should that reactions against these doctrines were already common in the pre-Christian Roman empire. But at least he moves beyond reciting standard objections to offering criticisms of his own: The saying, “Who has one virtue has them all, who lacks a particular one has none,” is not a divine judgment but only the judgment of human beings – of great cleverness and with time and zeal for learning, to be sure, but still human beings. But I do not know how I can deny that even a woman – to say nothing of a man (vir), from whom the word “virtue” (virtus) is derived – who remains faithful to her husband, if she does this because of God’s commandment and promise and is faithful to him above all, has chastity; nor would I say that chastity is not a virtue or only an insignificant one. And the same is true of a husband who remains faith- ful to his wife. Yet there are many such people, none of whom I would say is without some sin, and certainly that sin, whatever it is, comes from some vice. Hence conjugal chastity in devout men and women is unequestionably a virtue – for it is neither nothing nor is it a vice, and yet it does not have all the virtues with it. For if all the virtues were present, there would be no vice; if no vice, absolutely no sin; but who is without some sin? Who, then, is without some vice . . . ?79 From Augustine’s perspective, ancient philosophers are mistaken in thinking that any human being can be morally flawless. They are equally mistaken in believing knowledge or wisdom the foundation of all moral virtues. Virtues are not unified through wisdom; they are unified through charity. The more charity someone has, the more virtue; the more virtue, the less vice; yet no one can attain complete charity in the present life.80 The passage from James, then, can be explained: it means that all sins are contrary to charity, and because the whole law of God depends on charity, any sin represents a failure to keep the law.81 We cannot be surprised that Augustine should reach such a conclusion, when he had already come to regard St. Paul as less than the flawless moral paragon he originally believed. Consider the implication: if even the saints among us are morally flawed, then we never meet virtues except in the company of vices. Moral progress for every one of us accordingly becomes what R. A. Markus aptly describes as as “a lifelong process of convalescence,” never entirely com- plete in our mortal lives.82 This may help to shed light on Augustine’s description of the virtue of temperance in De civitate Dei: **. . . What is the activity of virtue in this life but a perpetual battle with vices**, and those not external vices but internal, not vices alien to us but quite clearly our own, our very own? This is the particular struggle of that virtue called so ̄phrosyne ̄ in Greek and “temperance” in Latin, which bridles the lusts of the flesh to prevent their gaining the consent of the mind and dragging it into every kind of dis- grace . . . What do we want to achieve when we will to be made perfect in the supreme good, other than an end to conflict, so that the desires of the flesh do not oppose the spirit, and there is no vice in us for the spirit to oppose? But will as we may, we lack the strength to achieve this in our present life . . .83

## Existentialism

#### The existential view is empty and can not account for the moral importance of the good

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Since the existentialist-behaviourist view wished to conceive of will as pure movement separated from reason and to deprive reason of the use of normative words (since it was to be ‘object- ive’), the moral agent so envisaged could get along, was indeed almost forced to get along, with only the most empty and gen- eral moral terms such as ‘good’ and ‘right’. The empty moral words correspond here to the emptiness of the will. If the will is to be totally free the world it moves in must be devoid of norma- tive characteristics, so that morality can reside entirely in the pointer of pure choice. On my view it might be said that, per contra, the primary general words could be dispensed with entirely and all moral work could be done by the secondary specialized words. If we picture the agent as compelled by obedience to the reality he can see, he will not be saying ‘This is right’, i.e., ‘I choose to do this’, [s]he will be saying ‘This is A B C D’ (normative-descriptive words), and action will follow natur- ally. As the empty choice will not occur the empty word will not be needed. It would however be far from my intention to demote or dispense with the term ‘good’: but rather to restore to it the dignity and authority which it possessed before Moore ap- peared on the scene. I have spoken of efforts of attention direc- ted upon individuals and of obedience to reality as an exercise of love, and have suggested that ‘reality’ and ‘individual’ present themselves to us in moral contexts as ideal end-points or Ideas of Reason. This surely is the place where the concept of good lives. ‘Good’: ‘Real’: ‘Love’. These words are closely connected. And here we retrieve the deep sense of the indefinability of good, which has been given a trivial sense in recent philosophy. Good is indefinable not for the reasons offered by Moore’s successors, but because of the infinite difficulty of the task of apprehending a magnetic but inexhaustible reality. Moore was in a way nearer the truth than he realized when he tried to say both that Good was there and that one could say nothing of what it essentially was. If apprehension of good is apprehension of the individual and the real, then good partakes of the infinite elusive character of reality.

#### Existentialism presents an unrealistic and inaccurate account of human identity by attributing the will to instantaneous moments of choice

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

We have learned from Freud to picture ‘the mechanism’ as something highly individual and personal, which is at the same time very powerful and not easily understood by its owner. The self of psychoanalysis is certainly substantial enough. The existentialist picture of choice, whether it be surrealist or rational, seems unrealistic, over-optimistic, romantic, because it ignores what appears at least to be a sort of continuous background with a life of its own; and it is surely in the tissue of that life that the secrets of good and evil are to be found. Here neither the inspir- ing ideas of freedom, sincerity and fiats of will, nor the plain wholesome concept of a rational discernment of duty, seem complex enough to do justice to what we really are. What we really are seems much more like an obscure system of energy out of which choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and often dependent on the condition of the system in between the moments of choice.

#### Existentialism fails – it can not account for the independence of moral philosophy from science

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Existentialism, in both its Continental and its Anglo-Saxon versions, is an attempt to solve the problem without really facing it: to solve it by attributing to the individual an empty lonely freedom, a freedom, if he wishes, to ‘fly in the face of the facts’. What it pictures is indeed the fearful solitude of the individual marooned upon a tiny island in the middle of a sea of scientific facts, and morality escaping from science only by a wild leap of the will. But our situation is not like this. To put it simply and in terms of the example which we have considered of M and her daughter-in-law: even if M were given a full psychoanalytical explanation of her conduct to D she need not be confined by such an explanation. This is not just because M has a senseless petulant freedom which enables her to be blind, nor is it just because (the more subtle view favoured by Hampshire) she is then enabled to redeploy her psychic forces on a ground of greater knowledge. It is because M is not forced to adopt these concepts at all, in preference say to any particular set of moral or religious concepts. Science can instruct morality at certain points and can change its direction, but it cannot contain morality, nor ergo moral philosophy. The importance of this issue can more easily be ignored by a philosophy which divorces freedom and knowledge, and leaves knowledge (via an uncriticized idea of ‘impersonal reasons’) in the domain of science. But M’s independence of science and of the ‘world of facts’ which empiricist philosophy has created in the scientific image rests not simply in her moving will but in her seeing knowing mind. Moral concepts do not move about within a hard world set up by science and logic. They set up, for different purposes, a different world.

#### Platonic/Augustinian ethics resolve this conflict – only my framework can account for the deepening process of self-reflection that enables us to escape from limitations of looking purely at isolated acts of the will

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Let us now ask quite simply if this is realistic, if this is what, in our experience, moral choice is like. It might seem at first that the existentialists have an advantage in that they do account for a peculiar feature of moral choice, which is the strange emptiness which often occurs at the moment of choosing. Of course choices happen at various levels of consciousness, importance, and difficulty. In a simple easy unimportant choice there is no need to regard ‘what goes on’ as anything beyond the obvious sequence of reason, decision, action, or just reason, action; and such choices may properly be regarded as ‘impersonal’. ‘Shall I go? Oh yes, I promised to.’ I receive my bill and I pay it. But difficult and painful choices often present this experience of void of which so much has been made: this sense of not being determined by the reasons. This sensation is hailed with delight by both wings of existentialism. The Kantian wing claims it as showing that we are free in relation to the reasons and the Sur- realist wing claims it as showing that there are no reasons. Indeed this experience of emptiness seems perfectly to verify the notion that freedom is simply the movement of the lonely will. Choice is outward movement since there is nothing else there for it to be. But is this the case, and ought we really to be so pleased about this experience? A more sombre note concerning it is struck at one point by Sartre, who on this problem veers wildly between Kantianism and Surrealism. Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits. If we are so strangely separate from the world at moments of choice are we really choosing at all, are we right indeed to identify ourselves with this giddy empty will? (Hampshire: ‘I identify myself with my will.’) In a reaction of thought which is never far from the minds of more extreme existentialists (Dostoevsky for instance), one may turn here towards determinism, towards fatalism, towards regarding freedom as a complete illusion. When I deliberate the die is already cast. Forces within me which are dark to me have already made the decision. This view is if anything less attractive and less realistic than the other one. Do we really have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image of total determinism? Can we not give a more balanced and illuminating account of the matter? I suggest we can if we simply introduce into the picture the idea of atten- tion, or looking, of which I was speaking above. I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is. One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a grandi- ose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens in between such choices is indeed what is crucial. I would like on the whole to use the word ‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like ‘looking’ as the neutral word. Of course psychic energy flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic vocabu- lary. (M seeing D as pert-common-juvenile, etc.) Attention is the effort to counteract such states of illusion.

#### Only an Augustinian/platonic approach to ethics can account for the value of art – the existentialist account is incoherent, representing a failure in the attempt to comprehend human nature as purely rational.

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

I said that any artist would appreciate the notion of ill as obedience to reality, an obedience which ideally teaches a pos- ition where there is no choice. One of the great merits of the moral psychology which I am proposing is that it does not contrast art and morals, but shows them to be two aspects of a single struggle. The existentialist-behaviourist view could give no satisfactory account of art: it was seen as a quasi-play activity, gratuitous, ‘for its own sake’ (the familiar Kantian-Bloomsbury slogan), a sort of by-product of our failure to be entirely rational. Such a view of art is of course intolerable. In one of those important movements of return from philosophical theory to simple things which we are certain of, we must come back to what we know about great art and about the moral insight which it contains and the moral achievement which it repre- sents. Goodness and beauty are not to be contrasted, but are largely part of the same structure. Plato, who tells us that beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love immediately by nature, treats the beautiful as an introductory section of the good. So that aesthetic situations are not so much analogies of morals as cases of morals. Virtue is au fond the same in the artist as in the good man in that it is a selfless attention to nature: something which is easy to name but very hard to achieve. Artists who have reflected have frequently given expression to this idea. (For instance, Rilke praising Cézanne speaks of a ‘consuming of love in anonymous work’. Letter to Clara Rilke, 13 October 1907.)

## K Interaction

### Augustine Good

The AC is the only way to appropriately solve for oppression

1. Any theory that does not focus on unifying our reason and desires fails– oppression is not structural, but attitudinal – our lack of respect for others causes actions that treat them as less valuable. Only the neg grounds motivation to create just social system, which outweighs since it enables resolution of root causes. Anything else taints solutions– e.g. the White Man’s Burden
2. To view all as valuable, we can not view others instrumentally since it makes the badness of oppressing one person contingent on consequences. Only a framework that recognizes the unconditional wrongness of oppression prevents misapplication. The Augustinian ethic establishes the unconditional value of individuals, preventing them from being treated as things.

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

More significantly, Murdoch’s focus is not on the concepts with which we describe our options — just, courageous, cruel — and whose application guides action, but on the concepts with which we describe our circumstance and the people with whom we interact. Think back to M and D. What the mother gains is not a deeper apprehension of her own moral character, or of her behaviour, but of her daughter-in- law and what she is really like. Nor does Murdoch confine herself to concepts that carry a specific valence, positive or negative, like the ones on Williams’ list. As becomes increasingly clear in the second essay of Sovereignty, the knowledge that constitutes virtue is not knowledge of the Good, or even of particular virtues, but of the real existence of other people: “The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” (Murdoch 1970: 64).

1. Ability to understand oppression is contingent on volitionality -- otherwise we view oppression as predetermined –unifying our reason, will, and desires is necessary for moral responsibility, which is a prerequisite to the instantiation of the aff
2. The NC provides the only metric for individuals to internalize the badness of oppression – the aff roots ethics in individuals, rather than things like fear of punishment
3. Only my framework allows us to view freedom as cultivated rather than isolated to given moments of abstract individual action – cultivation of character through time is the only way to combat problematic actions while not viewing behavior as unchangeable

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Let us now ask quite simply if this is realistic, if this is what, in our experience, moral choice is like. It might seem at first that the existentialists have an advantage in that they do account for a peculiar feature of moral choice, which is the strange emptiness which often occurs at the moment of choosing. Of course choices happen at various levels of consciousness, importance, and difficulty. In a simple easy unimportant choice there is no need to regard ‘what goes on’ as anything beyond the obvious sequence of reason, decision, action, or just reason, action; and such choices may properly be regarded as ‘impersonal’. ‘Shall I go? Oh yes, I promised to.’ I receive my bill and I pay it. But difficult and painful choices often present this experience of void of which so much has been made: this sense of not being determined by the reasons. This sensation is hailed with delight by both wings of existentialism. The Kantian wing claims it as showing that we are free in relation to the reasons and the Sur- realist wing claims it as showing that there are no reasons. Indeed this experience of emptiness seems perfectly to verify the notion that freedom is simply the movement of the lonely will. Choice is outward movement since there is nothing else there for it to be. But is this the case, and ought we really to be so pleased about this experience? A more sombre note concerning it is struck at one point by Sartre, who on this problem veers wildly between Kantianism and Surrealism. Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits. If we are so strangely separate from the world at moments of choice are we really choosing at all, are we right indeed to identify ourselves with this giddy empty will? (Hampshire: ‘I identify myself with my will.’) In a reaction of thought which is never far from the minds of more extreme existentialists (Dostoevsky for instance), one may turn here towards determinism, towards fatalism, towards regarding freedom as a complete illusion. When I deliberate the die is already cast. Forces within me which are dark to me have already made the decision. This view is if anything less attractive and less realistic than the other one. Do we really have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image of total determinism? Can we not give a more balanced and illuminating account of the matter? I suggest we can if we simply introduce into the picture the idea of atten- tion, or looking, of which I was speaking above. I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is. One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a grandi- ose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens in between such choices is indeed what is crucial. I would like on the whole to use the word ‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like ‘looking’ as the neutral word. Of course psychic energy flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic vocabu- lary. (M seeing D as pert-common-juvenile, etc.) Attention is the effort to counteract such states of illusion.

#### Attention to the good is a source of moral energy – only this motivates people to become better

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Belief in the Good is a protection against despair because it tells us that every problem can be solved. But the consolation may go further. At times, Murdoch suggests that faith in the Good is a recognition of “the absolute pointlessness of virtue [and] its supreme importance”, that “nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be virtuous” (Murdoch 1970: 84–5). The unity here is not just that of a right decision, one that responds to every fact, but that if one makes this decision, nothing else matters: there is no cause for regret or dismay; all other reasons are “silenced”.44 Murdoch emphasizes, too, that while it may be difficult, “contemplation of the Good [is] a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue” (Murdoch 1970: 99). It is a “psychological fact, and one of importance to moral philosophy, that we can all receive moral help by focusing our attention upon things which are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps [...] the idea of goodness itself” (Murdoch 1970: 54–5).45

### Ethics Bad

#### **Your arguments about the failure of ethics apply to other ethics – by adopting a Platonic/Augustinian understanding of ethics, we can improve our knowledge of the world and facilitate moral improvement**

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Moral tasks are characteristically endless not only because ’within’, as it were, a given concept our efforts are imperfect, but also because as we move and as we look our concepts themselves are changing. (Murdoch 1970: 27) We may need new and better concepts in order to comprehend our reasons, to bring into view the facts for which Moral Internalism holds. This opens an extraordinary possibility. If new concepts make available new facts, knowledge of which is inextricable from choice, philosophy can make moral progress through intellectual change. In the last two essays of Sovereignty, Murdoch insists on the practical nature of her project: “How can we make ourselves better? is a question moral philosophers should try to answer.” (Murdoch 1970: 76) On the Platonic conception, they can. As Murdoch wrote in “Vision and Choice in Morality”: Great philosophers coin new moral concepts and communicate new moral visions and modes of understanding. [...] From here we may see that the task of moral philosophers has been to extend, as poets may extend, the limits of language, and enable it to illuminate regions which were formerly dark. (Murdoch 1956: 42, 49) Given Moral Internalism, the extension of language and thought can constitute moral improvement. Nor does Murdoch simply observe this prospect. In the parts of her book that seem most unorthodox, their rhetoric most high-flown, she tries to enact it, to rehabilitate the concept of the Good, neglect of which is a moral, not just an intellectual, vice: “The image of the Good as a transcendent magnetic centre seems to me the least corruptible and most realistic picture for us to use in our reflections on the moral life.” (Murdoch 1970: 73) Against the background of the Platonic theory, we can explain what Murdoch is philosophers’ imprint – 15 – doing in these passages, why it matters to moral philosophy, and how it constitutes a form of proof.

### Idealism Bad

#### Ideals do not prevent us from seeing reality – rather, they are a source of inspiration that pushes us to overcome nihilism and improve – non-ideal standards can not be a source of motivation

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Let us consider the case of conduct. What of the command ‘Be ye therefore perfect?’ Would it not be more sensible to say ‘Be ye therefore slightly improved?’ Some psychologists warn us that if our standards are too high we shall become neurotic. It seems to me that the idea of love arises necessarily in this context. The idea of perfection moves, and possibly changes, us (as artist, worker, agent) because it inspires love in the part of us that is most worthy. One cannot feel unmixed love for a mediocre moral standard any more than one can for the work of a mediocre artist. The idea of perfection is also a natural producer of order. In its light we come to see that A, which superficially resembles B, is really better than B. And this can occur, indeed must occur, without our having the sovereign idea in any sense ‘taped’. In fact it is in its nature that we cannot get it taped. This is the true sense of the ‘indefinability’ of the good; which was given a vulgar sense by Moore and his followers. It lies always beyond, and it is from this beyond that it exercises its authority. Here again the word seems naturally in place, and it is in the work of artists that we see the operation most clearly. The true artist is obedient to a conception of perfection to which his work is constantly related and re-related in what seems an external manner. One may of course try to ‘incarnate’ the idea of perfec- tion by saying to oneself ‘I want to write like Shakespeare’ or ‘I want to paint like Piero’. But of course one knows that Shake- speare and Piero, though almost gods, are not gods, and that one has got to do the thing oneself alone and differently, and that beyond the details of craft and criticism there is only the mag- netic non-representable idea of the good which remains not ‘empty’ so much as mysterious. And thus too in the sphere of human conduct.

#### Attention to the good is a source of moral energy – only this motivates people to become better

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Belief in the Good is a protection against despair because it tells us that every problem can be solved. But the consolation may go further. At times, Murdoch suggests that faith in the Good is a recognition of “the absolute pointlessness of virtue [and] its supreme importance”, that “nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be virtuous” (Murdoch 1970: 84–5). The unity here is not just that of a right decision, one that responds to every fact, but that if one makes this decision, nothing else matters: there is no cause for regret or dismay; all other reasons are “silenced”.44 Murdoch emphasizes, too, that while it may be difficult, “contemplation of the Good [is] a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue” (Murdoch 1970: 99). It is a “psychological fact, and one of importance to moral philosophy, that we can all receive moral help by focusing our attention upon things which are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps [...] the idea of goodness itself” (Murdoch 1970: 54–5).45

#### The notion of the good empowers us to make the world better and revise our understanding of it

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Looking back to the end of section 3, let us begin with this: According to Murdoch, we can become morally better by seeing the world in light of the Good. Murdoch offers this concept precisely as a source of “moral help” and “uncontaminated energy”. In a way, there is no mystery here. It is not mysterious what we gain from belief in the Good or how it can affect our actions, if Murdoch is right. This belief is a source of moral motivation. The puzzle is what this has to do with the existence of the Good. Why should practical reasons for using a concept or holding a belief show that the concept is not empty or that the belief is true? Murdoch is adamant that hers “is not a sort of pragmatism or a philosophy of ‘as if’” (Murdoch 1970: 72–3). We should not simply pretend that the lines converge; we are justified in thinking that they do. In order to make sense of this, we need to say more about the concept of the Good. To think in terms of this concept—of the perfection of thought, as such — is to interpret the norms involved in other concepts as parts of a coherent whole. Among the norms that define the concept of the Good itself are these: from the fact that the norms of a concept require some response, infer that it is required by the Good; and from the fact that the Good requires some response, infer that no other response can be required. If we reason in this way, we will conclude that the norms of every concept are consistent in practice with the norms of every other. We will be committed to the resolution of conflict. When the demands of disparate concepts appear to come apart, we will regard the tension as merely apparent, revising our use of these concepts until it gives way. The idea of the Good thus operates as a regulative ideal for our changing conceptual grasp.

### Winter & Leighton

#### Our epistemology’s not sufficiently skewed – we can still recognize certain objective goods – contained in our ability to perceive the world is an inherent understanding of the appropriate response – misapplication of rules is impossible since application is contained in true moral vision

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

No doubt these proposals raise questions of their own. Perhaps the result is to make the epistemology of the mental more mysterious than it seemed. We won’t pursue that issue here. Our task is to find in Murdoch a theory of concepts that makes sense of Moral Internalism. She rejects the genetic theory, and her claim is not merely about thick concepts but about the whole range of thoughts with which we articulate our social world. What account does she give? The clue to Murdoch’s picture lies in the invocation of “realism”, which we encountered in section 1. In a Platonic mode, Murdoch connects the realism of virtue with the “appreciation of beauty in art and nature”, which is “a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real” (Murdoch 1970: 63).36 Great art shares in the exactness and objective attention Murdoch associates with morals. The same is true of technai in general: in an intellectual discipline, “I am confronted by an authoritative structure which commands my respect. [...] Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of reality” (Murdoch 1970: 87). And in the most general formulation of all: “The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact” (Murdoch 1970: 64). It is possible to extract from these increasingly abstract claims a Platonic theory of concepts and concept-possession.37 This theory appliestoallconcepts,notjusttothosewhicharemorallyrelevant:“Are there forms of mud, hair and dirt? If there are then nature is redeemed into the area of truthful vision. (My previous argument assumes of course, in Platonic terms, that there are.)” (Murdoch 1970: 86) In outline, the theory is this: each concept is associated with norms for its proper use, both practical and theoretical; these norms describe when the concept should be applied and what follows from its application, both cognitively and in relation to the will; to grasp a given concept is to approximate, in one’s dispositions of thought, a conformity with these norms. **Concept-possession thus comes by** degree and points to a limit we may never reach: **perfect compliance with the norms by which our concepts are defined.**

### A2 Love K

#### The importance of moral love does not mean that we should have love for those that harm us – love may push us to dissociate from those people

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

Murdoch’s theory of love is initially puzzling. Why should accurate perception of another, even with perfect grasp of the concepts applied, go along with love, not loathing or contempt? Suppose D really were tiresome and juvenile, or, if those are defective concepts, consider the “clear-eyed contemplation of the misery and evil of the world” (Murdoch 1970: 59). Must the agents of evil be objects of love? Murdoch’s thought is that they must. The air of paradox in this claim can be dissolved in part by recalling that the love in question is not selective — it is not fondness or affection or the desire for intimacy — but love as a moral emotion.48 (The example of M and D is misleading in this respect. It is an accident that the object of M’s loving gaze is her daughter-in-law, not a murderer or an acquaintance at work.) The love that interests Murdoch is the love one should have for one’s neighbour — that is, for anyone with whom one interacts.49 If love in this sense is partial, that is only because we are limited. “Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real” (Murdoch 1959: 215). Since everyone is real, we ought to love them all. It does not follow from this that we should feel affection for everyone or that we should pursue their interests. Love involves “true vision” and leads us to act towards others as we are morally required to act. It might be out of love that we prevent them from doing harm, or berate them, or refuse to associate with them.

#### You misunderstand – love is not an inherent good – it can be oriented towards the wrong ends.

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

However I think that Good and Love should not be identified, and not only because human love is usually self-assertive. The concepts, even when the idea of love is purified, still play differ- ent roles. We are dealing here with very difficult metaphors. Good is the magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves. False love moves to false good. False love embraces false death. When true good is loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is automatically refined, and when the soul is turned towards Good the highest part of the soul is enlivened. Love is the tension between the imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived of as lying beyond it. (In the Symposium Plato pictures Love as being poor and needy.) And when we try perfectly to love what is imperfect our love goes to its object via the Good to be thus purified and made unselfish and just. The mother loving the retarded child or loving the tiresome elderly relation. Love is the general name of the quality of attachment and it is capable of infinite degradation and is the source of our greatest errors; but when it is even partially refined it is the energy and passion of the soul in its search for Good, the force that joins us to Good and joins us to the world through Good. Its existence is the unmistakable sign that we are spiritual creatures, attracted by excellence and made for the Good. It is a reflection of the warmth and light of the sun.

## Kant

### O/V

#### The Kantian notion of choice is ill-suited to describe our ability to make moral decisions, and the role of moral attention rather than pure acts of will

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

Let us take first the notion of an object of attention. The religious believer, especially if his God is conceived of as a per- son, is in the fortunate position of being able to focus his thought upon something which is a source of energy. Such focusing, with such results, is natural to human beings. Consider being in love. Consider too the attempt to check being in love, and the need in such a case of another object to attend to. Where strong emotions of sexual love, or of hatred, resentment, or jealousy are concerned, ‘pure will’ can usually achieve little. It is small use telling oneself ‘Stop being in love, stop feeling resent- ment, be just.’ What is needed is a reorientation which will provide an energy of a different kind, from a different source. Notice the metaphors of orientation and of looking. The neo- Kantian existentialist **‘**will’ is a principle of pure movement. But how ill this describes what it is like for us to alter. Deliberately falling out of love is not a jump of the will, it is the acquiring of new objects of attention and thus of new energies as a result of refocusing. The metaphor of orientation may indeed also cover moments when recognizable ‘efforts of will’ are made, but explicit efforts of will are only a part of the whole situation. That God, attended to, is a powerful source of (often good) energy is a psychological fact. It is also a psychological fact, and one of Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 09:12 28 January 2017 importance in moral philosophy, that we can all receive moral help by focusing our attention upon things which are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps (I will discuss this later) the idea of goodness itself. Human beings are naturally ‘attached’ and when an attachment seems painful or bad it is most readily displaced by another attachment, which an attempt at attention can encourage. There is nothing odd or mystical about this, nor about the fact that our ability to act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention. ‘Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.’

#### Your notion of universalizability and reason divorced from context can not be the basis for a theory– rather, moral content is produced through experience and development of attitudes towards external objects

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The entry into a mental concept of the notion of an ideal limit destroys the genetic analysis of its meaning. (Hampshire allowed the idea of perfection to touch one concept only, that of intention: but he tried to save this concept from morality by making the ideal limit a scientific one.) Let us see how this is. Is ‘love’ a mental concept, and if so can it be analysed genetically? No doubt Mary’s little lamb loved Mary, that is it followed her to school; and in some sense of ‘learn’ we might well learn the concept, the word, in that context. But with such a concept that is not the end of the matter. (Nor indeed the beginning either.) Words may mislead us here since words are often stable while concepts alter; we have a different image of courage at forty from that which we had at twenty. A deepening process, at any rate an altering and complicating process, takes place. There are two senses of ‘knowing what a word means’, one connected with ordinary language and the other very much less so. Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, and not in terms of switching on to some given impersonal network. Moreover, if morality is essentially connected with change and progress, we cannot be as democratic about it as some philosophers would like to think. We do not simply, through being rational and knowing ordinary language, ‘know’ the meaning of all necessary moral words. We may have to learn the meaning; and since we are human historical indi- viduals the movement of understanding is onward into increas- ing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language.

#### Kantianism is a corruption of philosophy – we do not create the good out of acts of will

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Good has often been said to be indefinable for reasons con- nected with freedom. Good is an empty space into which human choice may move. I want now to suggest that the inde- finability of the good should be conceived of rather differently. On the kind of view which I have been offering it seems that we do really know a certain amount about Good and about the way in which it is connected with our condition. The ordinary per- son does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that [s]he creates values by his choices. [s]He thinks that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting it wrong. We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which Good lies. Equally we recognize the real existence of evil: cynicism, cruelty, indifference to suffering. However, the concept of Good still remains obscure and mysterious. **We see the world in the light of the Good**, but what is the Good itself? The source of vision is not in the ordinary sense seen. Plato says of it ‘It is that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does all that it does, with some intuition of its nature, and yet also baffled’ (Republic 505). And he also says that Good is the source of knowledge and truth and yet is something which surpasses them in splendour (Republic 508–9).

### Agency

1. Agency can’t be normatively binding – either there’s a low standard for what it means to be an agent such that all individuals qualify, which means there are low standards such that people always act ethically, or there are higher standards such that only some are agents, but if they fail to engage in the enterprise of agency then the rules of it do not apply to them, and individuals could choose not to be agents. The structure of the world rather than the will makes certain actions obligatory – this resolves the shmagency objection

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

In reading The Sovereignty of Good, it will prove useful to start at the end of the first essay, not the beginning. What Murdoch works towards in “The Idea of Perfection” is an alternative to the picture of freedom on which the agent “chooses his reasons in terms of, and after surveying, the ordinary facts which lie open to everyone” (Murdoch 1970: 34). It is this picture that serves as common ground for her several antagonists — behaviourist, existentialist, and Kantian. And it is one that she rejects. I suggest [that] we introduce into the picture the idea of attention, or looking [...] I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is the result of moral imagination and moral effort. [...] One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. (Murdoch 1970: 35–6) The place of choice is certainly a different one if we think in terms of a world which is compulsively present to the will, and the discernment and exploration of which is a slow business. [...] If I attend properly, I will have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. (Murdoch 1970: 38) In the stark formulation at the heart of the following essay, “realism [...] is a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self [...] true vision occasions right conduct” (Murdoch 1970: 64). That Murdoch makes these striking claims is sometimes recognized. What is less well understood is why they matter. We can bring this out by finding the disputed conception of choice in the background of section 1. The picture of freedom as autonomy, not determined by the plain facts of one’s circumstance, is shared by rationalists of different kinds, by instrumentalists and Kantians alike. The problem of moral reasons could be solved by giving it up. In raising this problem, we imagined someone who is fully aware of the circumstance that requires h[er]im to offer help, of serious need and modest cost, but who remains unmoved. The task that looked difficult, within the confines of ethical rationalism, was to explain why he should be moved, why these facts provide him with reasons to act. We must trace the necessity of being moved to the nature of the will. Murdoch’s intervention is to find an alternative view. For Murdoch, the necessity of being moved by moral reasons lies not in the nature of the will but in the motivational import of cognition. Despite appearances, the agent we imagined is impossible. One cannot fail to be moved by an adequate conception of the facts that require a response: “true vision occasions right conduct”. There is thus no need to enter the maze of options in which we got lost before.

### Freedom

#### Freedom of the will is not about the capacity for choice but about having something meaningful to choose – only through understanding and pursuing the Good can our choices become meaningful. This implies that moral development and understanding only occurs through the development and perfection of character.

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Let us now ask quite simply if this is realistic, if this is what, in our experience, moral choice is like. It might seem at first that the existentialists have an advantage in that they do account for a peculiar feature of moral choice, which is the strange emptiness which often occurs at the moment of choosing. Of course choices happen at various levels of consciousness, importance, and difficulty. In a simple easy unimportant choice there is no need to regard ‘what goes on’ as anything beyond the obvious sequence of reason, decision, action, or just reason, action; and such choices may properly be regarded as ‘impersonal’. ‘Shall I go? Oh yes, I promised to.’ I receive my bill and I pay it. But difficult and painful choices often present this experience of void of which so much has been made: this sense of not being determined by the reasons. This sensation is hailed with delight by both wings of existentialism. The Kantian wing claims it as showing that we are free in relation to the reasons and the Sur- realist wing claims it as showing that there are no reasons. Indeed this experience of emptiness seems perfectly to verify the notion that freedom is simply the movement of the lonely will. Choice is outward movement since there is nothing else there for it to be. But is this the case, and ought we really to be so pleased about this experience? A more sombre note concerning it is struck at one point by Sartre, who on this problem veers wildly between Kantianism and Surrealism. Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits. If we are so strangely separate from the world at moments of choice are we really choosing at all, are we right indeed to identify ourselves with this giddy empty will? (Hampshire: ‘I identify myself with my will.’) In a reaction of thought which is never far from the minds of more extreme existentialists (Dostoevsky for instance), one may turn here towards determinism, towards fatalism, towards regarding freedom as a complete illusion. When I deliberate the die is already cast. Forces within me which are dark to me have already made the decision. This view is if anything less attractive and less realistic than the other one. Do we really have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image of total determinism? Can we not give a more balanced and illuminating account of the matter? I suggest we can if we simply introduce into the picture the idea of atten- tion, or looking, of which I was speaking above. I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is. One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a grandi- ose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens in between such choices is indeed what is crucial. I would like on the whole to use the word ‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like ‘looking’ as the neutral word. Of course psychic energy flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic vocabu- lary. (M seeing D as pert-common-juvenile, etc.) Attention is the effort to counteract such states of illusion.

#### A moral philosophy that exalts the value of freedom without accounting for the importance of moral love is doomed to fail

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

That virtue operates in exactly the same kind of way in the central area of morality is less easy to perceive. Human beings are far more complicated and enigmatic and ambiguous than languages or mathematical concepts, and selfishness operates in Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 09:12 28 January 2017 the sovereignty of good over other concepts 89 a much more devious and frenzied manner in our relations with them. Ignorance, muddle, fear, wishful thinking, lack of tests often make us feel that moral choice is something arbitrary, a matter for personal will rather than for attentive study. Our attachments tend to be selfish and strong, and the transformation of our loves from selfishness to unselfishness is sometimes hard even to conceive of. Yet is the situation really so different? Should a retarded child be kept at home or sent to an institution? Should an elderly relation who is a trouble-maker be cared for or asked to go away? Should an unhappy marriage be continued for the sake of the children? Should I leave my family in order to do political work? Should I neglect them in order to practise my art? The love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking. The difficulty is to keep the atten- tion fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from return- ing surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair. The refusal to attend may even induce a fictitious sense of freedom: I may as well toss a coin. Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful action. But the back- ground condition of such habit and such action, in human beings, is a just mode of vision and a good quality of conscious- ness. It is a task to come to see the world as it is. A philosophy which leaves duty without a context and exalts the idea of free- dom and power as a separate top level value ignores this task and obscures the relation between virtue and reality. We act rightly ‘when the time comes’ not out of strength of will but out of the quality of our usual attachments and with the kind of energy and discernment which we have available. And to this the whole activity of our consciousness is relevant.

#### Only an understanding of human identity that accounts for our orientation to the world around us can provide a coherent notion of freedom and a unified conception of action

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

One might at this point pause and consider the picture of human personality, or the soul, which has been emerging. It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists. The freedom which is a proper human goal is the freedom from fantasy, that is the realism of compassion. What I have called fantasy, the proliferation of blinding self-centred aims and images, is itself a powerful system of energy, and most of what is often called ‘will’ or ‘willing’ belongs to this system. What counteracts the system is attention to reality inspired by, consisting of, love. In the case of art and nature such attention is immediately rewarded by the enjoyment of beauty. In the case of morality, although there are sometimes rewards, the idea of a reward is out of place. Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes appropriate, occasions action. It is what lies behind and in between actions and prompts them that is important, and it is this area which should be purified. By the time the moment of choice has arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature of the act. This fact produces that curious separation between consciously rehearsed motives and action which is sometimes wrongly taken as an experience of freedom. (Angst.) Of course this is not to say that good ‘efforts of will’ are always useless or always fakes. Explicit and immediate ‘willing’ can play some part, especially as an inhibiting factor. (The daemon of Socrates only told him what not to do.)

#### We must abandon the Kantian notion of the self – it relies on an untenable divide between the rational and emotive self which does not account for the central role of value as a structural intermediary that explains the phenomena of will.

Kent. BONNIE KENT. Augustine’s ethics. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Edited by Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann. NP 7/25/16. 210

The centrality of the will in this analysis marks a major change from ancient moral psychology.54 Although philosophers such as Aristotle discuss rational appetite, decision, intentional, uncoerced action, and other notions associated with the later concept of the will, they are most impressed by the division between the soul’s rational and non-rational powers. Regarding intellect, the rational power par excellence, as the true self, they tend to treat ordinary emotions as non-rational and hence as in some sense external to the true self. In con- trast, Augustine attributes three powers to the soul: reason or intellect, memory, and will. As the will comes to supplant the intellect as the true self, the morally responsible “I” becomes less the “I” who knows, believes, speculates, and reasons and more the “I” who loves, fears, struggles, and chooses. Not only does Augustine posit no basic division between will and emotion, he also suggests that different emotions migh**t** even be understood as different kinds of volition: The important factor is the quality of a person’s will, because if the will is perverse, it will have these perverse affections, but if it is right, they will be not only blame- less but even praiseworthy. The will is in all of them; indeed, they are nothing other than expressions of will. For what are desire and joy but the will in agreement with that which we want? And what are fear and grief but the will in disagreement with that which we reject?55 Exactly what does Augustine mean by “the will”? What is this power that human beings and angels supposedly have and animals supposedly lack? Quasi- formal definitions of the “will” prove virtually useless. To understand Augustine, one does better to ponder the theoretical work that he believes the concept of the will is needed to do. Begin with a thought experiment that Augustine proposes: Suppose that there are twins, precisely the same in mind and body, social conditioning, personal his- tories, and all other respects, who find themselves in the same situation, equally attracted by the same forbidden object. One succumbs to temptation, the other does not. How can we explain this phenomenon, Augustine asks, except with ref- erence to the will?56 Of course, a skeptic would remain unpersuaded. The problem itself is spurious, the skeptic might retort, because two persons who are so much the same would in the same situation do precisely the same thing. The suggested thought experiment “proves” the existence of the will only by tacitly assuming it.

1. Only an Augustinian conception of identity is coherent since our dispositions and values define who we are as people and whether actions are attributable to us – e.g. if two people are addicted to drugs, and one who wishes to stop but succumbs to temptation, and the other is ambivalent, the ambivalent one is more responsible for their actions.

#### Conceptualizing an individual’s normative identity as split into their desires and their evaluation of value is necessary to consider the possibility of free will, unification of ones’ appetite with ones reason is the only way for action to be possible. You can not act unless you desire to act a specific way – reason has no power over action.

### People = Ends, not means

#### The only way to recognize the moral significance of others as moral beings rather than things is through an orientation of love

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

More significantly, Murdoch’s focus is not on the concepts with which we describe our options — just, courageous, cruel — and whose application guides action, but on the concepts with which we describe our circumstance and the people with whom we interact. Think back to M and D. What the mother gains is not a deeper apprehension of her own moral character, or of her behaviour, but of her daughter-in- law and what she is really like. Nor does Murdoch confine herself to concepts that carry a specific valence, positive or negative, like the ones on Williams’ list. As becomes increasingly clear in the second essay of Sovereignty, the knowledge that constitutes virtue is not knowledge of the Good, or even of particular virtues, but of the real existence of other people: “The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” (Murdoch 1970: 64).

### Practical Reason

#### If reason accounts for our understanding of certain concepts, then only a platonic account of the necessary responses required by reason can make sense of normativity

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

This picture of concepts is related to Davidson’s “constitutive ideal of rationality” and to the “normativity of the intentional”. A more recent Platonist, Ralph Wedgwood, makes a similar claim: [The] doctrine that the intentional is normative can be viewed as a way of cashing out Plato’s metaphor that the Form of the Good is to the understanding what the sun is to vision (Republic, 507b–509a). We count as sighted because we are appropriately sensitive to light, the ultimate source of which is the sun; in a similar way, we count as thinkers because we are appropriately sensitive to normative requirements, the source of which is a coherent system of eternal and necessary truths about what we ought to think or do or feel. (Wedgwood 2007: 3) On the Platonic theory, we must respond to the norms of reason, at least by approximation, in using the concepts we do. They are at once a condition of thought and an ideal to which we aspire.38 The “necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact” is the necessity of this aspiration and this ideal, a necessity involved in any attempt to depict reality as it is.

#### Only a platonic account of the good can make sense of moral motivation – rationality alone can not account for the necessity of the full cognition of facts in appreciating the importance of ethical action

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

This argument does not tell us what there is reason to do. In particular, it does not tell us that the needs of other people provide us with reasons to act. If there are such reasons, however, it follows from the Platonic theory that the corresponding norms are built into our concepts. When there is decisive moral reason to act in a certain way, knowledge of that reason, including ideal grasp of the concepts it involves, entails decisive motivation. Moral Internalism holds. This argument answers the question “Why be moral?” not by showing that there is reason to do what is right, or by persuading the amoralist, but by avoiding the dilemma posed in section 1. Even if the argument for ethical rationalism goes through, we can save the generality of moral reasons without deriving their existence from the nature of the will. On the Platonic theory of concepts, there is another possibility: that rational agents are moved by such considerations because they are reasons — or so we assume against the sceptic — and because rationality belongs to full cognition of the facts.

This takes out Kant -- to understand a concept is to understand it in its application through full cognition of the facts, which precludes ability to abstract to a universalizeable maxim since it loses the necessary component to make ethics universalizable

#### My framework recontextualizes what constitutes rationality and reason – only this understanding bridges the ought-ought gap

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

This reading makes sense of much that is obscure in The Sovereignty of Good, from the role of the genetic theory, through Murdoch’s realism, to her conception of choice. But it leaves a number of loose ends. One is specific to the context in which I have placed Murdoch’s views. I have argued that she avoids the problem of moral reasons as it afflicts the ethical rationalist. But this may be too quick. The truth of rationalism would constrain what constitutes a norm of practical reason. Do the norms involved in our possession of concepts, according to Murdoch’s Platonism, meet this constraint? We can put the problem this way: **According to the Platonic theory, concepts are associated with norms to which we must approximately conform, ideal possession of a concept involves full conformity**, and this is the standard of ideal rationality. According to ethical rationalism, to be practically rational is to achieve the aim or end of agency, as such. We thus have two potentially conflicting views of practical rationality. But we can reconcile their claims. **If ideal rationality is full conformity with the norms inscribed in our concepts, and to be practically rational is to achieve the aim or end of agency**, as such**, the aim of agency must be to grasp the concepts with which to describe our circumstance.** Though she is not explicit about it, this may be Murdoch’s view. She conceives attention as “a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” and calls this “the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent” (Murdoch 1970: 33). As she goes on to say, this is both “a logical and a normative claim”: it has the same dual character as the aim of agency, for the ethical rationalist, which bridges the is-ought gap. On this interpretation, while Murdoch offers something like “the reverse of Hampshire’s picture”, she agrees, in a way, with the only explicit ‘ought’ in his psychology. We ought to know what we are doing. We should aim at total knowledge of our situation and a clear conceptualization of all our possibilities. (Murdoch 1970: 7) The difference is in how she conceives such knowledge, not as a matter of public, impersonal fact, but as the object of just perception, and not as expanding our range of possibilities, but as closing them off without precluding freedom, so that right conduct is assured. The “ought” of attention to social reality by which our thoughts are perfected is the “ought” of agency or practical reason and the “ought” of meeting the norms by which our concepts are defined.40

### Self-reflection

#### Self-reflection can not be the basis of an ethical theory -- we can not accurately perceive ourselves, nor can it be the mechanism of self-betterment

Murdoch 71, Iris. (Dame Jean Iris Murdoch DBE (/ˈmɜːrdɒk/; 15 July 1919 – 8 February 1999) was a British novelist and philosopher, best known for her novels about good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious.) The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. 1971. NP 1/31/17.

In such a picture sincerity and self-knowledge, those popular merits, seem less important. It is an attachment to what lies outside the fantasy mechanism, and not a scrutiny of the mech- anism itself, that liberates. Close scrutiny of the mechanism often merely strengthens its power. ‘Self-knowledge’, in the sense of a minute understanding of one’s own machinery, seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, usually a delusion. A sense of such self-knowledge may of course be induced in analysis for thera- peutic reasons, but ‘the cure’ does not prove the alleged know- ledge genuine. Self is as hard to see justly as other things, and when clear vision has been achieved, self is a correspondingly smaller and less interesting object. A chief enemy to such clarity of vision, whether in art or morals, is the system to which the technical name of sado-masochism has been given. It is the peculiar subtlety of this system that, while constantly leading attention and energy back into the self, it can produce, almost all the way as it were to the summit, plausible imitations of what is good. Refined sado-masochism can ruin art which is too good to be ruined by the cruder vulgarities of self-indulgence. One’s self is interesting, so one’s motives are interesting, and the unworthiness of one’s motives is interesting. Fascinating too is the alleged relation of master to slave, of the good self to the bad self which, oddly enough, ends in such curious compromises. (Kafka’s struggle with the devil which ends up in bed.) The bad self is prepared to suffer but not to obey until the two selves are friends and obedience has become reasonably easy or at least amusing. In reality the good self is very small indeed, and most of what appears good is not. The truly good is not a friendly tyrant to the bad, it is its deadly foe. Even suffering itself can play a demonic role here, and the ideas of guilt and punishment can be the most subtle tool of the ingenious self. The idea of suffer- ing confuses the mind and in certain contexts (the context of ‘sincere self-examination’ for instance) can masquerade as a purification. It is rarely this, for unless it is very intense indeed it is far too interesting. Plato does not say that philosophy is the Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 09:12 28 January 2017 study of suffering, he says it is the study of death (Phaedo 64a), and these ideas are totally dissimilar. That moral improvement involves suffering is usually true; but the suffering is the by- product of a new orientation and not in any sense an end in itself.

#### Self Legislation Fails, the self cannot be authoritative over the self.

Kierkegaard. Soren Kierkegaard. Journals and Papers Vol 1. page 188. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Assisted by Gregor Malantschuk and published in 1976.

Bracketed for gendered language

Kant was of the opinion that [wo]man is his [her] own law (autonomy)—that is, he binds himself under the law which he himself gives himself. Actually, in a profounder sense, this is how lawlessness or experimentation are established. This is not being rigorously earnest any more than Sancho Panza’s self-administered blows to his own bottom were vigorous. It is impossible for me to be really any more rigorous in A than I am or wish to be in B. Constraint there must be if it is going to be in earnest. If I am bound by nothing higher than myself and I am to bind myself, where would I get the rigorousness as A, the binder, which I do not have as B, who is supposed to be bound, when A and B are the same self.

## Libertarianism

The libertarian assumes that lack of coercion renders one free, but this oversimplifies human identity by presuming individuals are blank slates

Tim Keller writes: Keller, Timothy. [American Pastor] *The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism*. New York: Penguin Group, 2008. MT

Bracketed for grammar

Christianity is supposedly a limit to personal growth and potential because it constrains our freedom to choose our own beliefs and practices. Immanuel Kant defined an enlightened human being as one who trusts in his or her own power of thinking, rather than in authority or tradition.27 This resistance to authority in moral matters is now a deep current in our culture. Freedom to determine our own moral standards is considered a necessity for being fully human. This oversimplifies, however. Freedom cannot [can’t] be defined in strictly negative terms, as the absence of confinement and constraint. In fact, in many cases, confinement and constraint is actually a means to liberation. If you have musical aptitude, you may give yourself to practice, practice, practice the piano for years. This is a restriction, a limit on your freedom. There are many other things you won’t be able to do with the time you invest in practicing. If you have the talent, however, the discipline and limitation will unleash your ability that would otherwise go untapped. What have you done? You’ve deliberately lost your freedom to engage in some things in order to release yourself to a richer kind of freedom to accomplish other[s][.] things. This does not mean that restriction, discipline, and constraint are intrinsically, automatically liberating. For example, a five-foot-four, 125-pound young adult male should not set his heart on becoming an NFL lineman. All the discipline and effort in the world will only frustrate and crush him (literally). He is banging his head against a physical reality—he simply does not have the potential. In our society many people have worked extremely hard to pursue careers that pay well rather than fit their talents and interests. Such careers are straitjackets that in the long run stifle and dehumanize us. Disciplines and [C]onstraints, then, liberate us only when they fit with the reality of our nature and capacities. A fish, because it absorbs oxygen from water rather than air, is only free if it[’s] is restricted and limited to [in] water. If we put it out [O]n the grass, its freedom to move and even live is not enhanced, but destroyed. The fish dies if we do not honor the reality of its nature. In many areas of life, [F]reedom is not so much the absence of restrictions as finding the right ones, the liberating restrictions. Those that fit with the reality of our nature and the world produce greater power and scope for our abilities and a deeper joy and fulfillment. Experimentation, risk, and making mistakes bring growth only if, over time, they show us our limits as well as our abilities. If we only grow intellectually, vocationally, and physically through judicious constraints—why would it not also be true for spiritual and moral growth? Instead of insisting on freedom to create spiritual reality, shouldn’t we be seeking to discover it and disciplining ourselves to live according to it? The popular concept—that we should each determine our own morality—is based on the belief that the spiritual realm is nothing at all like the rest of the world. Does anyone really believe that? For many years after each of the morning and evening Sunday services I remained in the auditorium for another hour to field questions.

The AC can not provide a coherent theory of action, since it can’t explain categories like weakness of the will. Augustinian ethics is key for unified agency necessary to explain the phenomena of moral reasoning.

Davidson 1. Davidson, Donald. 2001. *How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? Essays on Actions and Events.* NP 7/26/16.

The situation is common; life is crowded with examples: I ought to do it because it will save a life, I ought not because it will be a lie; if I do it, I will break my word to Lavina, if I don't, I will break my word to Lolita; and so on. Anyone may find himself in this fix, whether he be upright or temporizing, weak‐willed or strong. But then unless we take the line that moral principles cannot conflict in application to a case, we must give up the concept of the nature of practical reason we have so far been assuming. For how can premises, all of which are true (or acceptable), entail a contradiction? It is astonishing that in contemporary moral philosophy this problem has received little attention, and no satisfactory treatment. Those who recognize the difficulty seem ready to accept one of two solutions: in effect they allow only a single ultimate moral principle; or they rest happy with the notion of a distinction between the prima facie desirable (good, obligatory, etc.) and the absolutely desirable (good, obligatory, etc).17 I shall not argue the point here, but I do not believe any version of the ‘single principle’ solution, once its implications are understood, can be accepted: principles, or reasons for acting, are irreducibly multiple. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how to take advantage of the purported distinction between prima facie and absolute value. Suppose first that we try to think of (p.35) ‘prima facie’ as an attributive adverb, helping to form such predicates as ‘x is prima facie good, right, obligatory’ or ‘x is better, prima facie, than y’. To avoid our recent trouble, we must suppose that ‘x is better, prima facie, than y’ does not contradict ‘y is better, prima facie, than x’, and that ‘x is prima facie right’ does not contradict ‘x is prima facie wrong’. But then the conclusion we can draw, in every case of conflict (and hence of incontinence) will be ‘x is better, prima facie, than y, and y is better, prima facie, than x’. This comes down, as is clear from the structure practical reasoning would have on this assumption, to saying ‘There is something to be said for, and something to be said against, doing so and so—and also for and against not doing it.’ Probably this can be said about any action whatsoever; in any case it is hard to accept the idea that the sum of our moral wisdom concerning what to do in a given situation has this form. The situation I describe is not altered in any interesting way if ‘prima facie’ or ‘prima facie obligatory’ is treated as a (non‐truth‐functional) sentential operator rather than as a predicate. I shall return shortly to this problem; now let us reconsider incontinence. The image we get of incontinence from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hare is of a battle or struggle between two contestants. Each contestant is armed with his argument or principle. One side may be labelled ‘passion’ and the other ‘reason’; they fight**; one side wins, the wrong side, the side called ‘passion’ (or ‘lust’ or ‘pleasure’). There is, however, a competing image (to be found in Plato, as well as in Butler and many others). It is adumbrated perhaps by Dante (who thinks he is following Aquinas and Aristotle) when he speaks of the incontinent man as one who ‘lets desire pull reason from her throne’ (Inferno, Canto v).** Here there are three actors on the stage: reason, desire, and the one who lets desire get the upper hand. The third actor is perhaps named ‘The Will’ (or ‘Conscience’). It is up to The Will to decide who wins the battle. If The Will is strong, {it} he gives the palm to reason; if {it} he is weak, he {it} may allow pleasure or passion the upper hand. This second image is, I suggest, superior to the first, absurd as we may find both. **On the first story, not only can we not account for incontinence; it is not clear how we can ever blame the agent for what he does: his action merely reflects the outcome of a struggle within him**. What could he do about it? And more important, **the first image does not allow us to make sense of a conflict in one (p.36) person's soul, for it leaves no room for the all‐important process of weighing considerations.**18 In the second image, the agent's representative, The Will, can judge the strength of the arguments on both sides, can execute the decision, and take the rap. The only trouble is that we seem back where we started. For how can The Will judge one course of action better and yet choose the other?

#### The AC adopts an incoherent account of identity – defining freedom solely in external terms fails to account for the way agent’s can take actions that make themselves unfree

Watson, Gary. (Gary Watson is one of the country’s leading philosophers, whose writings have shaped our understanding of the nature of moral agency, moral responsibility, freedom of action, and freedom of the will. His interest in concepts of legal responsibility target the relations between moral and criminal responsibility and the criminal law’s conceptions of moral agency.) Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1975), pp. 205-220. NP 8/31/16.

Bracketed for gendered language

The valuational system of an agent is that set of considerations which, when combined with his factual beliefs (and probability estimates), yields judgments of the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, **is a.** To ascribe free agency to a being presupposes it to be a being that makes judg- ments of this sort. To be this sort of being, one must assign values to alternative states of affairs, that is, rank them in terms of worth. The motivational system of an agent is that set of considerations which move him [her] to action. We identify his motivational system by identifying what motivates him. The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that an agent's valuational system and motiva- tional system may not completely coincide. Those systems harmonize to the extent that what determines the agent's all-things-considered judgments also determines his actions. Now, to be sure, since to value is also to want, one's valuational and motivational systems must to a large extent overlap. If, in appropriate circumstances, one were never inclined to action by some alleged evaluation, the claim that that was indeed one's evaluation would be disconfirmed. Thus one's valuational system must have some (considerable) grip upon one's motivational sys- tem. The problem is that there are motivational factors other than valuational ones. The free agent has the capacity to translate his values into action; his actions flow from his [her] evaluational system. One's evaluational system may be said to constitute one's stand- point, the point of view from which one judges the world. The important feature of one's evaluational system is that one cannot coherently dissociate oneself from it in its entirety. For to dis- sociate oneself from the ends and principles that constitute one's evaluational system is to disclaim or repudiate them, and any ends and principles so disclaimed (self-deception aside) cease to be constitutive of one's valuational system. One can dissociate one- self from one set of ends and principles only from the standpoint of another such set that one does not disclaim. In short, one cannot dissociate oneself from all normative judgments without forfeiting all standpoints and therewith one's identity as an agent.

Takes out NC – we can only question our desires from a valuational standpoint, rather than a reason-based standpoint.

## Util

### O/V

1. Consequentialism collates worth in states of affairs, such as being alive or happy. However, the value concepts cannot be conceived impersonally. If I value my Dog’s happiness I must value my dog for its own sake in a particular way as I can otherwise value my dog without valuing its happiness. Thus, consequentialist categories of value first presuppose the particular love orientation of the aff.

### Extinction Bad

#### My framework means extinction impacts don’t matter. All they do is serve to pull us away from thinking about the right and moral responses to the world around us. Additionally, even if greed is the only way to stop extinction it would still be wrong. Finally, the AC turns your extinction scenario.

C.S. **Lewis**. *Present Concerns: A Compelling Collection of Timely, Journalistic Essays.* “On Living in an Atomic Age.” Compiled in 1986.

In one way **we think** a great deal **too much of the** **atomic bomb.** "How are we to live in an atomic age?" I am tempted to reply: "Why, as you would have lived in the sixteenth century when the plague visited London almost every year, or as you would have lived in a Viking age when raiders from Scandinavia might land and cut your throat any night; or indeed, as **you are already living in an age of cancer**, an age of **syphilis**, an age of paralysis, an age of air raids, an age of railway accidents, an age of **motor accidents.**" In other words, **do not** let us begin by **exaggerat**ing **the** novelty of our **situation.** Believe me, dear sir or madam, **you and all** whom **you love were already sentenced to death before the atomic bomb was invented: and quite a high percentage of us were going to die in unpleasant ways.** We had, indeed, one very great advantage over our ancestors - anesthetics; but we have that still. **It is** perfectly **ridiculous** **to** **go** about whimpering and **drawing long faces because the scientists have added one more chance of painful** and premature **death to a world** which already bristled with such chances and **in which death** itself **was** not a chance at all, but **a certainty.** The other evil (in my view) is the incubus of "Research". The system was, I believe, first devised to attract the Americans and to emulate the scientists. But the wisest Americans are themselves already sick of it; as one of them said to me, "I guess we got to come to giving every citizen a Ph. D. shortly after birth, same as baptism and vaccination." And it is surely clear by now that the needs of the humanities are different from those of the sciences. In science, I gather, a young student fresh from his First in the Tripos can really share in the work of one of his seniors in a way that is useful to himself and even to the subject. But this is not true of the man who has just got his First in English or Modern Languages. Such a man, far from being able or anxious (he is by definition no fool) to add to the sum of human knowledge, wants to acquire a good deal more of the knowledge we already have. He has lately begun to discover how many more things he needs to know in order to follow up his budding interests; that he needs economics, or theology, or philosophy, or archaeology (and always a few more languages). To head him off from these studies, to pinfold him in some small inquiry whose chief claim often is that no one has ever made it before, is cruel and frustrating. It wastes such years as he will never have again; for an old proverb says that "All the speed is in the morning". What keeps the system going is the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to get an academic job without a "research degree". Can the two ancient universities do anything by combining to break down this bad usage? This is the first point to be made: and **the first action** to be taken **is to pull ourselves together. If we are all going to be destroyed** by an atomic bomb, let that bomb **when it comes find us doing sensible and human things - praying, working, teaching, reading, listening to music, bathing the children, playing tennis, chatting to our friends over** apint and a **game of darts - not huddled together like frightened sheep** and thinking about bombs. **They may break our bodies** (a microbe can do that) **but they need not dominate our mind.** "**But**," **You reply,** "**it is not death** - not even painful and premature death - that we are bothering about. Of cause the chance of that is not new. **What is new is** **that** the atomic bomb **may finally** and totally destroy **civilization** itself. The lights may be put out for ever." This brings us much nearer to the real point; but let me try to make clear exactly what I think that point is. **What were your views about the ultimate future of civilization** before the atomic bomb appeared on the scene**?** What did you think all this effort of humanity was to come in the end? The real answer is known to almost everyone who has even a smattering of science; yet, oddly enough, it is hardly ever mentioned. And **the real answer** (almost beyond doubt) **is that, with or without atomic bombs, the whole story is going to end in NOTHING. The astronomers hold out no hope that this planet is going to be permanently inhabitable. The physicists hold out no hope that organic life is going to be a permanent possibility in any part of the material universe.** **Not only this earth, but the whole show, all the suns of space, are to run down.** **Nature is a sinking ship.** Bergson talks about élan vital, and Mr. Shaw talks about the "Life-force" as if they could surge on for ever and ever. But that comes of concentrating on biology and ignoring the other sciences. **There is** really **no** such **hope. Nature does not**, in the long run, **favour life. If Nature is all the exists** - in other words, if there is no God and no life of some quite different sort somewhere outside Nature - **then all stories will end in the same way:** in a universe from which all life is banished without possibility of return. It will have Benn an accidental flicker, and there will be no one even to remember it. No doubt **atomic bombs may cut its duration** on this present planet shorter that it might have been; **but the whole thing, even if it lasted for billion years, must be** so **infinitesimally short in relation to the oceans of dead time which** precede and **follow** it that I cannot feel excited about its curtailment**.** What the wars and the weather (are we in for another of those periodic ice ages?) and the atomic bomb have really done is to remind us forcibly of the sort of world we are living in and which, during the prosperous period before 1914, we were beginning to forget. And this reminder is, so far as it goes, a good thing. We have been waked from a pretty dream, and now we can begin to talk about realities. We see at once (when we have been waked) that the important question is not whether an atomic bomb is going to obliterate "civilization". The important question is whether "Nature" - the thing studied by the sciences - is the only thing in existence. Because if you answer yes to the second question, then the first question only amounts to asking whether the inevitable frustration of all human activities may be hurried on by our own action instead of coming at its natural time. That is, of course, a question that concerns us very much. Even on a ship which will certainly sink sooner or later, the news that the boiler might blow up now would not be heard with indifference by anyone. But those who knew that the ship was sinking in any case would not, I think, be quite so desperately excited as those who had forgotten this fact, and were vaguely imagining that it might arrive somewhere. It is, then, on the second question that we really need to make up our minds. And let us begin by supposing that Nature is all that exists. Let us suppose that nothing ever has existed or ever will exist except this meaningless play of atoms in space and time: that by a series of hundredth chances it has (regrettably) produced things like ourselves - conscious being who now know that their own consciousness is an accidental result of the whole meaningless process and is therefore itself meaningless, though to us (alas!) it feels significant. In this situation there are, I think, three things one might do: (1) You might commit suicide. Nature which has (blindly, accidentally) given me for my torment this consciousness which demands meaning and value in a universe that offers neither, has luckily also given me the means of getting rid of it. I return the unwelcome gift. I will be fooled no longer. (2) You might decide simply to have as good a time as possible. The universe is a universe of nonsense, but since you are here, grab what you can. Unfortunately, however, there is, on these terms, so very little left to grab - only the coarsest sensual pleasures. You Can't, except in the lowest animal sense, be in love with a girl is you know (and keep on remembering) that all the beauties both of her person and of her character are a momentary and accidental pattern produced by the collision of atoms, and that your own response to them is only a sort of psychic phosphorescence arising from the behaviour of your genes. You can't go on getting any very serious pleasure form music if you know and remember that its air of significance is a pure illusion, that you like it only because your nervous system is irrationally conditioned to like it. You may still, in the lowest sense, have a "good time": but just in so far as it becomes very good, just in so far as it ever threatens to push you on from cold sensuality into real warmth and enthusiasm and joy, so far you will be forced to feel the hopeless disharmony between your own emotions and the universe in which you really live. (3) You may defy the universe. You may say, "Let it be irrational, I am not. Let it be merciless, I will have mercy. By whatever curious chance it has produced me, now that I am here I will live according to human values. I know the universe will win in the end, but what is that to me? I will go down fighting. Amid all this wastefulness I will persevere; amid all this competition, I will make sacrifices. Be damned to the universe!" I suppose that most of us, in fact, while we remain materialists, adopt a more or less uneasy alternation between the second and the third attitude. And although the third is incomparably the better (it is, for instance, much more likely to "preserve civilization"), both really shipwreck on the same rock. That rock 0 the disharmony between our own hearts and Nature - is obvious in the second. The third seems to avoid the rock by accepting disharmony from the outset and defying it. But it will not really work. In it, you hold up our own human standards against the idiocy of the universe. That is, we talk as if our own standers were something outside the universe which can be contrasted with it; as if we could judge the universe by some standard borrowed from another source. But if (as we were supposing) Nature - the space-time-matter system - is the only thing in existence, then of course there can be no other source for our standards. They must, like everything else, be the unintended and meaningless outcome of blind forces. Far from being a light from beyond Nature where by Nature can be judged, they are only the way in which anthropoids of our species feel when the atoms under our own skulls get into certain states - those states being produced by causes quite irrational, unhuman, and non-moral. Thus the very ground on which we defy Nature crumbles under our feet. The standard we are applying is tainted at the source. If our standards are derived from this meaningless universe they must be as meaningless as it. For most modern people, I think, thoughts of this kind have to be gone through before the opposite view can get a fair hearing. All Naturalism leads us to this in the end 0 to a quite final and hopeless discord between what our minds claim to be and what they really must be in Naturalism is true. They claim to be spirit; that is, to be reason, perceiving universal intellectual principles and universal moral laws and possessing free will. But if Naturalism is true they must in reality be merely arrangements of atoms in skulls, coming about by irrational causation. We never think a though because it is true, only because blind Nature forces us to think it. We never do an act because it is right, only because blind Nature forces us to do it. It is when one has faced this preposterous conclusion that one is at last ready to listen to the voice that whispers: "But suppose we really are spirits? Suppose we are not the offspring of Nature …?" For, really, the naturalistic conclusion is unbelievable. For one thing, it is only through trusting our own minds that we have come to know Nature herself. If nature when fully known seems to teach us (that is, if the sciences teach us) that our own minds are chance arrangements of atoms, then there must have been some mistake; for if that were so, then the sciences themselves would be chance arrangements of atoms and we should have no reason for believing in them. **There is only one way to avoid this deadlock. We must go back to a much earlier view. We must simply accept** it that **we are spirits, free and rational beings, at present inhibiting an irrational universe, and must draw the conclusion that we are not derived from it.** We are strangers here. We come from somewhere else. **Nature is not the only thing that exists.** There is "another world", and that is where we come from. **A fish feels at home in the water.** If we "belonged here" we should feel at home here. All that we say about "Nature red in tooth and claw", about death and time and mutability, all our half-amused, half-bashful attitude to our own bodies, is quite inexplicable on the theory that we are simply natural creatures. **If this world is the only world, how did we come to find its laws** either **so dreadful** or so comic**?** If there is no straight line elsewhere, how did we discover that Nature's line is crooked? But what, then, is Nature, and how do we come to be imprisoned in a system so alien to us? Oddly enough, the question becomes much less sinister the moment one realized that Nature is not all. Mistaken for our mother, she is terrifying and even abominable. But if she if only our sister - if she and we have a common Creator - if she is our sparring partner - then the situation is quite tolerable. Perhaps we are not here as prisoners but as colonists: only consider what we have done already to the dog, the horse, or the daffodil. She is indeed a rough playfellow. There are elements of evil in her. To explain that would carry us far back: I should have to speak of Powers and Principalities and all that would seem to a modern reader most mythological. This is not the place, nor do these questions come first. It is enough to say here that Nature, like us but in her different way, is much alienated from her Creator, though in her, as in us, gleams of the old beauty remain. But they are there not to be worshipped but to be enjoyed. She has nothing to teach us. **It is our business to live by our own law** not by hers: to follow, in private or in public life, **the law of love and temperance even when they seem to be suicidal, and not** the law of **competition** and grab**, even when they seem to be necessary to our survival. For it is part of our spiritual law never to put survival first: not even the survival of our species. We must resolutely train ourselves to feel that the survival of Man on this Earth, much more of our own nation or culture or class, is not worth having unless it can be had by honourable and merciful means. The sacrifice is not so** **great** as it seems. **Nothing is more likely to destroy a species or a nation than a determination to survive at all costs. Those who care for something else more than civilization are the only people by whom civilization is at all likely to be preserved.** Those who want heaven most have served Earth best. Those who love Man less than God do most for Man.

### Aggregation

1. The framework is a question of our orientation towards certain ends – humans are deserving of a specific response because of their nature as moral agents, rather than the number of agents. Aggregation is incoherent – it devalues individuals and reduces them to mere objects

Taurek. Should the Numbers Count? John M. Taurek. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Summer, 1977), pp. 293-316. [www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/taurek.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/taurek.pdf) NP 8/31/16.

Yet I can imagine it will still be said, despite everything, "But surely the numbers must count for something." I can hear the incredulous tones: "Would you flip a coin were it a question of saving fifty persons or saving one? Surely in situations where the numbers are this dispro- portionate you must admit that one ought to save the many rather than the few or the one." I would flip a coin even in such a case, special considerations apart. I cannot see how or why the mere addition of numbers should change anything. It seems to me that those who, in situations of the kind in question, would have me count the relative numbers of people involved as something in itself of significance, would have me attach impor- tance to human beings and what happens to them in merely the way I would to objects which I valued. If six objects are threatened by fire and I am in a position to retrieve the five in this room or the one in that room, but unable to get out all six, I would decide what to do in just the way I am told I should when it is human beings who are threatened. Each object will have a certain value in my eyes. If it happens that all six are of equal value, I will naturally preserve the many rather than the one. Why? Because the five objects are together five times more valuable in my eyes than the one. But when I am moved to rescue human[s] beings from harm in situ- ations of the kind described, I cannot bring myself to think of them in just this way. I empathize with them. My concern for what happens to them is grounded chiefly in the realization that each of them is, as ￼307 Should the Numbers Count? I would be in his place, terribly concerned about what happens to [them] him. It is not my way to think of them as each having a certain objective value, determined however it is we determine the objective value of things, and then to make some estimate of the combined value of the five as against the one. If it were not for the fact that these objects were creatures much like me, for whom what happens to them is of great importance, I doubt that I would take much interest in their preservation. As merely intact objects they would mean very little to me, being, as such, nearly as common as toadstools. The loss of an arm of the Pieta means something to me not because the Pieta will miss it. But the loss of an arm of a creature like me means something to me only because I know he will miss it, just as I would miss mine. It is the loss to this person that I focus on. I lose nothing of value to me should he lose his arm. But if I have a concern for him, I shall wish he might be spared his loss.

#### Aggregation is incoherent – the aggregation of the good of different people is good for no one

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And so it is in the original situation. I cannot but think of the situa- tion in this way. For each of these six persons it is no doubt a terrible thing to die. Each faces the loss of something among the things [s]he values most. His loss means something to me only, or chiefly, because of what it means to him. It is the loss to the individual that matters to me, not the loss of the individual. But should any one of these five lose his [her] life, his [her] loss is no greater a loss to [her] him because, as it happens, four others (or forty-nine others) lose theirs as well. And neither he nor anyone else loses anything of greater value to him than does David, should David lose his life. Five individuals each losing his [her] life does not add up to anyone's experiencing a loss five times greater than the loss suffered by any one of the five. If I gave my drug to the five persons and let David die I cannot see that I would thereby have preserved anyone from suffering a loss greater than that I let David suffer. And, similarly, were I to give my drug to David and let the five die I cannot see that I would thereby have allowed anyone to suffer a loss greater than the loss I spared David. Each person's potential loss has the same significance to me, only as a loss to that person alone. Because, by hypothesis, I have an equal concern for each person involved, I am moved to give each of them an equal chance to be spared his loss. My way of thinking about these trade-off situations consists, essentially, in seriously considering what will be lost or suffered by this one person if I do not prevent it, and in comparing the significance of that for him [her] with what would be lost or suffered by anyone else if I do not prevent it. This reflects a refusal to take seriously in these situations any notion of the sum of two persons' separate losses. To me this ap- pears a quite natural extension of the way in which most would view analogous trade-off situations involving differential losses to those in- volved, indeed even most of those who find my treatment of the cases thus far described paradoxical. Perhaps then, in one last effort to per- suade them, it may be helpful to think about a trade-off situation of this kind.

#### Suffering can not be aggregative – small amounts of pain by individuals can not be combined to make a large amount of pain

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Suppose I am told that if you, a stranger to me, agree to submit to some pain of significant intensity I will be spared a lesser one. Special circumstances apart, I can see no reason whatever why you should be willing to make such a sacrifice. It would be cowardly of me to ask it of you. Now add a second person, also a stranger to you. Again we are told that if you volunteer to undergo this same considerable pain each of us will be spared a lesser one. I feel it would be no less contemptible of me to ask you to make such a sacrifice in this situation. There is no reason you should be willing to undergo such a pain to spare me mine. There is no reason you should be willing to undergo such a pain to spare this other person his. And that is all there is to it. Now, adding still others to our number, not one of whom will suffer as much as you are asked to bear, will not change things for me. It ought not to change things for any of us. If not one of us can give you a good reason why you should be willing to undergo a greater suffering so that he might be spared a lesser one, then there is simply no good reason why you should be asked to suffer so that the group may be spared. Suffering is not additive in this way. The discomfort of each of a large number of individuals experiencing a minor headache does not add up to anyone's experiencing a migraine. In such a trade-off situation as this we are to compare your pain or your loss, not to our collective or total pain, whatever exactly that is supposed to be, but to what will be suffered or lost by any given single one of us. Perhaps it would not be unseemly for a stranger who will suffer some great agony or terrible loss unless you willingly submit to some relatively minor pain to ask you to consider this carefully, to ask you to empathize with him in what he will have to go through. But to my way of thinking it would be contemptible for any one of us in this crowd to ask you to consider carefully, "not, of course, what I personally will have to suffer. None of us is thinking of himself here! But contem- plate, if you will, what we the group, will suffer. Think of the awful sum of pain that is in the balance here! There are so very many more of us." At best such thinking seems confused. Typically, I think, it is outrageous. Yet, just such thinking is engaged in by those who, in situations of the kind described earlier, would be moved to a course of action by a mere consideration of the relative numbers of people involved. If the numbers should not be given any significance by those involved in these trade-off situations, why should they count for anyone? Suppose that I am in a position either to spare you your pain or to spare this large number of individuals each his lesser pain, but unable to spare both you and them. Why should I attach any significance to their numbers if none of those involved should? I cannot understand how I am supposed to add up their separate pains and attach significance to that alleged sum in a way that would be inappropriate were any of those involved to do it. If, by allowing you to suffer your pain, I do not see that I can thereby spare a single person any greater pain or, in this case, even as much pain, I do not see why calling my attention to the numbers should move me to spare them instead of you, any more than focusing on the numbers should move you to sacrifice for them collectively when you have no reason to sacrifice for them indi- vidually.

### Pain/Pleasure

1. Util presupposed pleasure and pain are universally good or bad, but this is false - for example, someone who is forced to watch videos of someone torturing a child should not take pleasure in the experience. Some things ought not elicit pleasure.
2. The implicit dualism between the goodness of pleasure and the badness of pain is axiologically unstable. Augustianism solves.

C. S. **Lewis explains that for normative dualism**. *God in the dock*. 1973. <http://cslewis.wikispaces.com/Dualism>

The metaphysical difficulty is this.The two Powers, the **good and** the **evil, do not explain each other.** Neither Ormuzd nor Ahriman can claim to be the Ultimate. More ultimate than either of them is the inexplicable fact of their being there together. Neither of them chose this tete-a-tete. Each of them, therefore, is conditioned--finds himself willy-nilly in a situation; and either that situation itself, or some unknown force which produced that situation, is the real Ultimate. Dualism has not yet reached the ground of being. **You cannot accept two conditioned** and mutually independent **beings as** the **self-grounded**, self-comprehending Absolute. On the level of picture-thinking this difficulty is symbolised by our inability to think of Ormuzd and Ahriman without smuggling in the idea of a common space in which they can be together and thus confessing that we are not yet dealing with the source of the universe but only with two members contained in it. Dualism is a truncated metaphysic. The moral difficulty is that **Dualism gives evil a positive,** substantive, self-consistent **nature, like** that of **good.** If this were true, if Ahriman existed in his own right no less than Ormuzd, what could we mean by calling Ormuzd good except that we happened to prefer him. In what sense can the one party be said to be right and the other wrong? **If evil has the same** kind of **reality as good,** the same autonomy and completeness, **our allegiance to good becomes** the **arbitrar**il**y** chosen loyalty of a partisan. **A sound theory of value** demands something different. It **demands that good** should **be original and evil a** mere **perversion;** that good should be the tree and evil the ivy; that good should be able to see all round evil (as when sane men understand lunacy) while evil cannot retaliate in kind; **that good** should **be able to exist on its own while evil** requires the good on which it **is parasitic** in order to continue its parasitic existence.

1. Util can’t account for the fact that pleasure is only good if it’s felt appropriately, and pain is only bad if felt inappropriately – e.g. pain that makes us take our hands off the stove is good, while a pill that takes away pain from losing a friend is improper. Only using a theory which determines when certain responses are appropriate can succeed.
2. Util incorrectly takes an impersonal view of pleasure and pain which fails, since we only think pleasure is valuable if it’s appropriate – e.g. a murderer feels pain because of their guilt should feel more pain than an innocent person.
3. It’s incoherent for everything to be instrumentally valuable to maximizing pain or pleasure, since it destroys the notion of value - e.g. we have friends because we value them, but things like our friend becoming sick doesn’t diminish their importance – if we had friends only when they made us happy, it would destroy the concept of friendship.

#### Our desires can’t be the basis of morality, rather, the basis of ethics is our ability to determine what is worth desiring – our desire to find happiness and avoid pain does not make either normatively valuable

Watson, Gary. (Gary Watson is one of the country’s leading philosophers, whose writings have shaped our understanding of the nature of moral agency, moral responsibility, freedom of action, and freedom of the will. His interest in concepts of legal responsibility target the relations between moral and criminal responsibility and the criminal law’s conceptions of moral agency.) Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1975), pp. 205-220. NP 8/31/16.

To answer this question, one might begin by contrasting, at least in a crude way, a humean with a platonic conception of practical reasoning. The ancients distinguished between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, between Reason and Appetite. Hume employed a superficially similar distinction. It is important to understand, however, that (for Plato at least) the rational part of the soul is not to be identified with what Hume called "Reason" and contradistinguished from the "Passions." On Hume's account, Reason is not a source of motivation, but a faculty of determining what is true and what is false, a faculty concerned solely with "matters of fact" and "relations among ideas." It is completely dumb on the question of what to do. Perhaps Hume could allow Reason this much practical voice: given an initial set of wants and beliefs about what is or is likely to be the case, particular desires are generated in the process. In other words, a humean might allow Reason a crucial role in deliberation. But its essential role would not be to supply motivation-Reason is not that kind of thing-but rather to calculate, within a context of desires and ends, how to fulfill those desires and serve those ends. For Plato, however, the rational part of the soul is not some kind of inference mechanism. It is itself a source of motivation. In general form, the desires of Reason are desires for "the Good."

Perhaps the contrast can be illustrated by some elementary no- tions from decision theory. On the Bayesian model of deliberation, a preference scale is imposed upon various states of affairs con- tingent upon courses of action open to the agent. Each state of affairs can be assigned a numerical value (initial value) according to its place on the scale; given this assignment, and the probabilities that those states of affairs will obtain if the actions are performed, a final numerical value (expected desirability) can be assigned to the actions themselves. The rational agent performs the action with the highest expected desirability. In these terms, on the humean picture, Reason is the faculty that computes probabilities and expected desirabilities. Reason is in this sense neutral with respect to actions, for it can operate equally on any given assignment of initial values and probabilities -it has nothing whatsoever to say about the assignment of initial values. On the platonic picture, however, the rational part of the soul itself determines what has value and how much, and thus is responsible for the original ranking of alternative states of affairs. It may appear that the difference between these conceptions is merely a difference as to what is to be called "Reason" or "rational," and hence is not a substantive difference. In speaking of Reason, Hume has in mind a sharp contrast between what is wanted and what is thought to be the case. What contrast is implicit in the platonic view that the ranking of alternative states of affairs is the task of the rational part of the soul? The contrast here is not trivial; the difference in classificatory schemes reflects different views of human psychology. For one thing, in saying this (or what is tantamount to this) Plato was call- ing attention to the fact that it is one thing to think a state of affairs good, worth while, or worthy of promotion, and another simply to desire or want that state of affairs to obtain. Since the notion of value is tied to (cannot be understood independently of) those of the good and worthy, it is one thing to value (think good) a state of affairs and another to desire that it obtain. However, to think a thing good is at the same time to desire it (or its promotion). Reason is thus an original spring of action. It is because valuing is essentially related to thinking or judging good that it is appro- priate to speak of the wants that are (or perhaps arise from) evaluations as belonging to, or originating in, the rational (that is, judging) part of the soul; values provide reasons for action. The contrast is with desires, whose objects may not be thought good and which are thus, in a natural sense, blind or irrational. Desires are mute on the question of what is good.8

#### Our desire for certain ends does not make those ends valuable

Watson, Gary. (Gary Watson is one of the country’s leading philosophers, whose writings have shaped our understanding of the nature of moral agency, moral responsibility, freedom of action, and freedom of the will. His interest in concepts of legal responsibility target the relations between moral and criminal responsibility and the criminal law’s conceptions of moral agency.) Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1975), pp. 205-220. NP 8/31/16.

The tacit identification of desiring or wanting with valuing is so common 5 that it is necessary to cite some examples of this distinc- tion in order to illustrate how evaluation and desire may diverge. There seem to be two ways in which, in principle, a discrepancy may arise. First, it is possible that what one desires is not to any degree valued, held to be worth while, or thought good; one assigns no value whatever to the object of one's desire. Second, although one may indeed value what is desired, the strength of one's desire may not properly reflect the degree to which one values its object; that is, although the object of a desire is valuable, it may not be deemed the most valuable in the situation and yet one's desire for it may be stronger than the want for what is most valued. The cases in which one in no way values what one desires are perhaps rare, but surely they exist. Consider the case of a woman who has a sudden urge to drown her bawling child in the bath; or the case of a squash player who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the face with the racquet. It is just false that the mother values her child's being drowned or that the player values the injury and suffering of his opponent. But they desire these things nonetheless. They desire them in spite of themselves. It is not that they assign to these actions an initial value which is then outweighed by other considerations. These activities are not even represented by a positive entry, however small, on the initial "desirability matrix." It may seem from these examples that this first and radical sort of divergence between desiring and valuing occurs only in the case of momentary and inexplicable urges or impulses. Yet I see no conclusive reason why a person could not be similarly estranged from a rather persistent and pervasive desire, and one that is ex- plicable enough. Imagine a man who thinks his sexual inclinations are the work of the devil, that the very fact that he has sexual inclinations bespeaks his corrupt nature. This example is to be contrasted with that of the celibate who decides that the most ful- filling life for him will be one of abstinence. In this latter case, one of the things that receive consideration in the process of reaching his all-things-considered judgment is the value of sexual activity. There is something, from his point of view, to be said for sex, but there is more to be said in favor of celibacy. In contrast, the man who is estranged from his sexual inclinations does not acknowledge even a prima facie reason for sexual activity; that he is sexually inclined toward certain activities is not even a consideration. An- other way of illustrating the difference is to say that, for the one man, forgoing sexual relationships constitutes a loss, even if negli- gible compared with the gains of celibacy; whereas from the standpoint of the other person, no loss is sustained at all.

### Rule Util Hijack

1. Even if happiness is valuable, it can only be meaningfully pursued by rightly ordering our desires. Rightly loving things as one ought is the only orientation which can actually act as a reliable rule to direct utilitarian calculation.
   1. Inordinate orientation of loves is what leads to decisions that minimize utility – e.g. when we spend thousands on a new car rather than giving to charity, we value our social status over people
   2. Inordinate desires condemns even those in ‘good’ positions to unhappiness. My framework is the only reliable rule by which one can pursue the NC standard.

Bonnie **Kent** [PhD Columbia. Prof of Phil at UC Irvine]. Augustine’s Ethics. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge University Press 2006.

The importance of happiness in Augustine’s ethics can scarcely be overestimated. Of his surviving works, the very first he completed is a dialogue entitled De beata vita – an early indication of issues he continued to reflect upon to the very end of his career. On at least two broad points he agrees with standard philosophical teachings. First, all human beings desire happiness. Indeed, Augustine recognizes that the skeptical Cicero himself chose “We certainly all want [or will] to be happy” when seeking an assertion that nobody doubts.9 Second, **only “people who like to argue” equate happiness with** merely **living as one wants.** No serious philosopher would take such a view, for who could be more miserable than someone who lives as he wants but wants something inappropriate?10 **Imagine wanting to live on a diet of gin** and chocolate**, or any** of the various **self-destructive desires** that people actually have. Augustine again sides with Cicero in claiming that **we are often better** off in **failing to get something** that **we want than** we would be in simply **wanting something inappropriate,** because **fortune does less to make us happy than our own minds** do to make us unhappy. For example, someone might buy what turns out to be a losing lottery ticket week after week, year after year, without feeling distressed at the failure to strike it rich. (There is nothing wrong with wanting to be rich, just as long as we do not pin our happiness on it.) On the other hand, **somebody with an excessive desire for wealth might possess millions and still continue to labor, miserably** and compulsively, **at acquiring** even **more.** A radical decline in his wealth might likewise plunge such a person into despair, as it did some of the millionaires who saw their investment portfolios devastated by the US stock market crash of 1929. In Augustine’s view, **wanting wealth is one thing, loving** it **another. We must always be on guard against falling in love with objects unworthy of love.**

#### Aiming to maximize happiness prevents attainment of happiness

Setiya 14, Kieran. The Midlife Crisis. Volume 14, no. 31 november 2014. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The mystery is why. Why would the achievement of one’s deepest desires be a matter of indifference? How did things turn out this way? Mill offers two explanations. According to the first, his experiences “led him to adopt a theory of life, very unlike that on which I had before acted”: I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. (Mill 1873: 117) An interesting concept, this — the so-called “paradox of egoism,” according to which the exclusive pursuit of happiness prevents you from being happy — but as a diagnosis, quite bizarre. Whatever lay behind Mill’s crisis, it was not excessive devotion to himself. His “conception of his own happiness” was already “identified with [an] object” distinct from being happy: “to be a reformer of the world” (Mill 1873: 111). Mill aimed at the benefit of others, not simply or directly at his own. He did not need to learn the lesson of the paradox. And yet the crisis came.

### Intuitionism

1. Aggregation is counterintuitive - e.g. we think parents are categorically more valuable than 1,000 bugs, regardless of the bug's capability to be happy, we categorically think some things are more valuable than others, so util’s most consistent with intuitionism
2. Valuing the dispositions individuals have towards the world rather than the consequences that they bring about is most intuitive e.g. we disrespect people who would lie or kill given the opportunity, regardless of whether or not they act wrongly, more than someone who kills by accident.
3. Consequentialism is not intuitive - e.g. you would not kill your mother to save a stranger since we prioritize certain relationships over others – only a conception of ethics that’s consistent with our hierarchy values is coherent

## Will to Power

### Constitutivism Bad

1. Constitutivism conflates two different notions of what is constitutive – if agency is inescapable and constitutes a minimal threshold for being an agent, that can’t be normative, since you’ll never fail to meet its standards. Yet if agency is escapable and constitutes a higher standard for moral action, it can’t bind action, since you can avoid being an agent and thus avoid moral responsibility.
2. Agency is escapable – individuals can decide to take action that isn’t based on overcoming barriers or gaining power – e.g. by making agreements to sacrifice their control, so they’re not bound by the AC. Only the structure of the world rather than the will makes certain actions obligatory, which resolves the shmagency objection.

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

In reading The Sovereignty of Good, it will prove useful to start at the end of the first essay, not the beginning. What Murdoch works towards in “The Idea of Perfection” is an alternative to the picture of freedom on which the agent “chooses his reasons in terms of, and after surveying, the ordinary facts which lie open to everyone” (Murdoch 1970: 34). It is this picture that serves as common ground for her several antagonists — behaviourist, existentialist, and Kantian. And it is one that she rejects. I suggest [that] we introduce into the picture the idea of attention, or looking [...] I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is the result of moral imagination and moral effort. [...] One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. (Murdoch 1970: 35–6) The place of choice is certainly a different one if we think in terms of a world which is compulsively present to the will, and the discernment and exploration of which is a slow business. [...] If I attend properly, I will have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. (Murdoch 1970: 38) In the stark formulation at the heart of the following essay, “realism [...] is a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self [...] true vision occasions right conduct” (Murdoch 1970: 64). That Murdoch makes these striking claims is sometimes recognized. What is less well understood is why they matter. We can bring this out by finding the disputed conception of choice in the background of section 1. The picture of freedom as autonomy, not determined by the plain facts of one’s circumstance, is shared by rationalists of different kinds, by instrumentalists and Kantians alike. The problem of moral reasons could be solved by giving it up. In raising this problem, we imagined someone who is fully aware of the circumstance that requires h[er]im to offer help, of serious need and modest cost, but who remains unmoved. The task that looked difficult, within the confines of ethical rationalism, was to explain why he should be moved, why these facts provide him with reasons to act. We must trace the necessity of being moved to the nature of the will. Murdoch’s intervention is to find an alternative view. For Murdoch, the necessity of being moved by moral reasons lies not in the nature of the will but in the motivational import of cognition. Despite appearances, the agent we imagined is impossible. One cannot fail to be moved by an adequate conception of the facts that require a response: “true vision occasions right conduct”. There is thus no need to enter the maze of options in which we got lost before.

1. C/A C.S. Lewis - in the same way we learn that truth matters in arguments, we learn that are external moral facts, and that certain things are deserving of certain responses – your NC presupposes the legitimacy of external values
2. Only externalism is coherent – even if an agent isn’t motivated to act, that doesn’t mean they ought not do the correct thing. To grasp certain facts or aspects of the empirical world is to appreciate and understand an appropriate response required by ethics.

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

No doubt these proposals raise questions of their own. Perhaps the result is to make the epistemology of the mental more mysterious than it seemed. We won’t pursue that issue here. Our task is to find in Murdoch a theory of concepts that makes sense of Moral Internalism. She rejects the genetic theory, and her claim is not merely about thick concepts but about the whole range of thoughts with which we articulate our social world. What account does she give? The clue to Murdoch’s picture lies in the invocation of “realism”, which we encountered in section 1. In a Platonic mode, Murdoch connects the realism of virtue with the “appreciation of beauty in art and nature”, which is “a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real” (Murdoch 1970: 63).36 Great art shares in the exactness and objective attention Murdoch associates with morals. The same is true of technai in general: in an intellectual discipline, “I am confronted by an authoritative structure which commands my respect. [...] Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of reality” (Murdoch 1970: 87). And in the most general formulation of all: “The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact” (Murdoch 1970: 64). It is possible to extract from these increasingly abstract claims a Platonic theory of concepts and concept-possession.37 This theory appliestoallconcepts,notjusttothosewhicharemorallyrelevant:“Are there forms of mud, hair and dirt? If there are then nature is redeemed into the area of truthful vision. (My previous argument assumes of course, in Platonic terms, that there are.)” (Murdoch 1970: 86) In outline, the theory is this: each concept is associated with norms for its proper use, both practical and theoretical; these norms describe when the concept should be applied and what follows from its application, both cognitively and in relation to the will; to grasp a given concept is to approximate, in one’s dispositions of thought, a conformity with these norms. **Concept-possession thus comes by** degree and points to a limit we may never reach: **perfect compliance with the norms by which our concepts are defined.**

#### Even so – the NC accounts for motivation – rationality alone can not account for the necessity of the full cognition of facts in appreciating the importance of ethical action

Setiya 13 summarizes Murdoch, Kieran. *Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good*. Volume 13, no. 9 may 2013. NP 1/25/17.

This argument does not tell us what there is reason to do. In particular, it does not tell us that the needs of other people provide us with reasons to act. If there are such reasons, however, it follows from the Platonic theory that the corresponding norms are built into our concepts. When there is decisive moral reason to act in a certain way, knowledge of that reason, including ideal grasp of the concepts it involves, entails decisive motivation. Moral Internalism holds. This argument answers the question “Why be moral?” not by showing that there is reason to do what is right, or by persuading the amoralist, but by avoiding the dilemma posed in section 1. Even if the argument for ethical rationalism goes through, we can save the generality of moral reasons without deriving their existence from the nature of the will. On the Platonic theory of concepts, there is another possibility: that rational agents are moved by such considerations because they are reasons — or so we assume against the sceptic — and because rationality belongs to full cognition of the facts.

### Hijacks

1. Viewing agents as defined by an internal struggle between reason and desire fails to account for moral blame – we view an agent’s action as the result of a struggle within them in which one side was arbitrarily stronger, rather than a unified person who is responsible for their choices.
2. Desires must be distinct from our values – people have desires that fail to unify their identity– e.g. when a mom momentarily desires to drown her child - we must separate desires from the person, and only values, not desires, can be unified. Thus, our standing as a person must be defined by our values. Our desire for power isn’t morally relevant.
3. Constitutivism matters in terms of ethics, not the specific agent. Murder is bad, not because there are humans, but because it is an unconditional wrong.
4. It’s a question of what’s the relevant obstacle – overcoming evil, rather than
5. Overcoming things isn’t constitutive of agency – rather – unification of agency occurs when ones’ values cohere with their desires, since they are then correctly oriented